

GREEK MERCENARIES

From the Late Archaic Period
to Alexander

Matthew Trundle

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TIMELINE

<i>Date</i>	<i>The West</i>	<i>The Aegean</i>	<i>The East</i>
675–640		Archilochus of Paros active	
664			Ionians and Carians serve Psammetichus in Egypt
657		Tyrants rise in Corinth	
590			Greeks at Abu Simbel with Psammetichus II Alcaeus' brother fighting for the Babylonians
546–510			Rise of Persian Empire
546		Argive <i>misthōtoi</i> help install tyranny of Pisistratus at Athens	Cyrus the Persian defeats Croesus of Lydia and rules Ionian Greeks
525		Polycrates tyrant of Samos	
510		Tyranny ousted at Athens	
499–494			Ionian Revolt suppressed
491	Gelon tyrant at Gela		
490		Persians defeated at Marathon	
485	Gelon tyrant at Syracuse		

TIMELINE

<i>Date</i>	<i>The West</i>	<i>The Aegean</i>	<i>The East</i>
480–479		Xerxes invades Greece and is repulsed	
478		Delian League founded	
478–431		Athens dominates Aegean	
431–404		Great Peloponnesian War	
414–412	Athenian expedition to Sicily: Arcadian mercenaries serve on either side		Lycon the Athenian in service with Pissuthnes
405	Dionysius I becomes tyrant at Syracuse		
404–403		Sparta at war with Elis	
401			The <i>anabasis</i> campaign in which Cyrus the Younger raises 13,000 Greek mercenaries to overthrow his brother; defeated at Cunaxa
401–399			Return of Cyrus' Greeks from Babylon to Aegean basin Greeks take service with Thracian chieftain Seuthes
399–396	Dionysius I hires mercenaries for massive campaigns against the Carthaginians		Sparta employs Cyrus' Greeks against Persia in Asia Minor
396–394			Agesilaus in Asia Minor fighting the Persians
395–386		Corinthian War: Athens, Corinth, Argos and Thebes fight Sparta	
394			Persian–Athenian fleet defeats Spartans at Cnidus

TIMELINE


<i>Date</i>	<i>The West</i>	<i>The Aegean</i>	<i>The East</i>
390		Iphicrates and mercenary peltasts defeat a Spartan division at Lechaeum near Corinth	
386		Peace of Antalcidas (the King's Peace)	
382		Spartans seize Theban citadel	
379		Thebes liberated	
378		Second Athenian League created Chabrias and his professional peltasts successfully defend Boeotia against hoplites	
377–375			Mausolus rules Caria Iphicrates campaigns with Pharnabazus
375–370		Iphicrates' supposed reforms to hoplite–peltast arms Jason of Pherae; Tagus of Thessaly	
373			Persians invade Egypt
371		At Leuctra, Thebes, under Epaminondas and Pelopidas, defeats Sparta	
369		Foundation of Arcadian League and Megalopolis	
367	Dionysius I dies: Dionysius II tyrant at Syracuse		
366–360			Great Satraps Revolt
364		Pelopidas killed in Thessaly	Timotheus' command in Thrace: Iphicrates and Charidemus serve with Cotys about this time

TIMELINE


<i>Date</i>	<i>The West</i>	<i>The Aegean</i>	<i>The East</i>
362		Battle of Second Mantinea; Epaminondas killed	
362–360			Agesilaus and Chabrias in Egypt fighting Persians
359		Philip II becomes king of Macedon	
357–355		Social War of Athens and allies	
356–354	Dion ousts Dionysius II as tyrant at Syracuse		
356–346		Third Sacred War: Phocis seizes Delphi Treasures support many mercenaries	
351–349		Demosthenes (4.28–9) suggests mercenaries be sent to Thrace to fight Philip on ration money	Persians invade Cyprus: Euagoras and Timotheus defend island
346		Phocis defeated by Philip II; Peace of Philocrates	
344–338	Timoleon in Sicily: ousts tyrannies		
343–342			Artaxerxes III reconquers Egypt; Greek mercenaries fight on both sides Mentor the Rhodian now high in Persian service
341	Timoleon defeats Carthaginians at the Battle of Crimisus; Greek mercenaries on both sides		

TIMELINE

<i>Date</i>	<i>The West</i>	<i>The Aegean</i>	<i>The East</i>
338		Philip defeats Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea, establishes League of Corinth	
336		Philip killed: Alexander III becomes king of Macedon and head of League of Corinth	Memnon fighting against Philip's forces for the Persians
334–330			Alexander invades Persian Empire and becomes Great King
334			Satraps defeated at Granicus with 20,000 Greek mercenaries
333			Darius III defeated at Issus with 30,000 Greek mercenaries
331		Remnants of Darius III's Greek mercenaries fight for Sparta against Macedon at Megalopolis	Darius III defeated at Gaugamela Remnants of Greek mercenaries flee with Great King
330–328			Alexander in Bactria
327–326			Alexander in India
325–324			Alexander returns west
323			Alexander dies
323–322		Lamian War: Athens and allies revolt from Macedon: mercenaries from Taenarum	



Map 1 The eastern Mediterranean and region



Map 2 The Aegean basin

PREFACE

I grew up in the 1970s when Africa provided many sordid tales about mercenary activities and shady deals. Mad Mike Hoare and his ilk regularly found their way into the media in a blend of romance and revulsion. In 1982 offers of lucrative contracts lured several English cricketers, led by Graham Gooch, to play for an England XI sponsored by South African Breweries against an internationally banned South Africa. The British press labelled Gooch's players mercenaries. Subsequently, I read Xenophon's account of the doomed attempt of Cyrus the Younger to seize the Persian throne from his brother with the help of 13,000 Greek mercenary soldiers. Xenophon told of Cyrus' defeat at Cunaxa and the isolated Greeks' epic march back to safety and the sea at the end of the fifth century BC. Xenophon's is a great story, which George Cawkwell claimed that 'every schoolboy used to know' (Cawkwell 1972: 9). As Cawkwell realized, 'time has changed and all that', but the story remains one of the most entertaining and inspirational from antiquity, and Xenophon's *Anabasis* (*The Persian Expedition* of the Penguin translation) is by far the best introduction to an understanding of Greek mercenary service from Classical Greek literature.

Hoare, Gooch and Xenophon were mercenaries. I kept asking the question, do these three men have anything in common, or do we use the term mercenary too loosely and conveniently? At graduate school in Canada, by then something of a mercenary myself as an Englishman in the employment of the Canadians, I revisited the *Anabasis* for a paper I wrote about the mercenary nature of Xenophon's Greeks. Was there such a thing as a mercenary in the Greek world? And the seeds of this project were sown.

H. W. Parke published his *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* seventy years ago. It remains a brilliant chronological history of Greek mercenaries to the death of Alexander and I have found it invaluable in writing what follows. Nevertheless, Parke wrote at a time when national sentiment was far stronger than it is today. Mercenaries were easier to label and identify. He did not seek to place the Greek mercenary ideologically, socially, economically and politically within the ancient world. He did not look beyond the surface to see whether all the Greeks who served the Great King of Persia or the pharaohs of Egypt

PREFACE

were themselves simply mercenaries. Furthermore, the constraints of a chronological organization left little room for discussion of social conditions and relationships. I hope what follows does some of these things and both complements and enhances Parke's work.

This book looks at the mercenary phenomenon through ancient and modern eyes. The Greeks had no word for mercenary. This must tell us something about their views about soldiers who to us appear as mercenaries. Greeks had no concept of nationalism. This too makes it difficult to find true mercenaries in the Greek world who transgressed the national and political boundaries that we have constructed over the past 200 years. This book looks at those ancient Greeks whom modern commentators perceive as mercenaries and tries to show that they functioned within social, political and economic orbits that transcended simply mercenary relationships. Ancient mercenaries, if that remains an accurate name to call them, were a part of the social fabric of the ancient world of cities and peoples. They facilitated relationships between aristocrats and rulers throughout the Mediterranean in the Classical period of Greek history. Far from being the ancient equivalents of Italian *condottieri* or Mad Mike Hoare, ancient Greek mercenaries never extracted themselves from the embedded society and economy of the ancient world. Money and greed were not the principal driving forces of ancient Greek mercenary service, which always remained part of a complex network of international aristocratic relationships and alliances. It is time to rethink who and what was a mercenary soldier in the ancient Greek world.

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Ultimately, thanks to my family for everything, and in particular my mother, Elisabeth Trundle, to whom this book is dedicated.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>CIG</i>	Bockh, H. A. (ed.) (1828–77) <i>Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , Berlin: Officina Academia.
Diehl	Diehl, E. (ed.) (1949–) <i>Anthologia Lyrica Graeca</i> , Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.
Dittenberg, <i>SIG</i>	Dittenberger, W. (ed.) (1915–24) <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , 4 Bde., Leipzig: N. D. Hildesheim.
Edmonds	Edmonds, J. M. and Meineke, A. (eds) (1957–61) <i>Fragments of Attic Comedy</i> , Leiden: E. J. Brill.
<i>FGrH</i>	Jacoby, F. (ed.) (1923–) <i>Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker</i> , Leiden, New York: E. J. Brill.
<i>FHG</i>	Müller, C. (ed.) (1841–70) <i>Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum</i> , Paris: Firmin Didot.
<i>HCT</i>	Gomme, A. W., Andrewes, A. and Dover, K. J. A. (1956) <i>Historical Commentary on Thucydides</i> , vols 1–5, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hicks and Hill	Hicks, E. L. and Hill, G. F. (eds) (1901) <i>A Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions</i> , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
<i>IC</i>	Guarducci, M. (ed.) (1935–50) <i>Inscriptiones Creticae</i> , Rome: Libreria Della Strato.
<i>IG</i>	(1924–) <i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> , Berlin: de Gruyter.
Kassel and Austin	Kassel, R. and Austin, C. (eds) (1983) <i>Poetae Comici Graeci</i> , vols 1–8, Berlin: de Gruyter.
Kock	Kock, T. (ed.) (1976) <i>Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta</i> , Utrecht: Hes.
LSJ	Liddell, H. G. and Scott, R. and Jones, H. S. (1940) <i>A Greek English Lexicon</i> , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
M&L	Meiggs, R. and Lewis, D. (1969) <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century BC</i> , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
<i>OGIS</i>	Dittenberger, W. (ed.) (1903–5) <i>Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae</i> , Leipzig: N. D. Hildesheim.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>RE</i>	Pauly, A., Wissowa, G. and Kroll, A. (1893–1974) <i>Real-encyclopaedie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> , ed. G. Wissowa, Stuttgart.
<i>SEG</i>	(1923–) <i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i> , Leiden and Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben.
Tod	Tod, M. N. (ed.) (1948) <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions</i> , Oxford: Clarendon Press.

The translations from ancient sources are from the Loeb editions unless otherwise stated.

Monetary units

cyzicene (a gold coin of Cyzicus)
daric (a gold coin of Persia)
obol (a small coin)
drachma (four obols)
mina (100 drachmae)
talent (6,000 drachmae, 60 minae)

INTRODUCTION

This book seeks to show that the mercenary played a central role in Greek history in the late Classical period. Ludmilla Marinovic once observed that Greek mercenaries reflected and influenced all aspects of ancient Greek life: economic, political, military and ideological (Marinovic 1988: 282; Bettalli 1995: 24). The study of war and of politics has gone hand-in-hand with the study of the Classical world. Herodotus (1.1) and Thucydides (1.1) recognized the importance of warfare to the study of their present and their past. Classical Greek warfare was not a private, but a public feature of a citizen's life. Traditionally, warfare in the Greek communities reflected the society of those communities. Citizen assemblies were made up of the same people who fought in the armies of the Greek cities. Citizens were expected to fight. To pay someone else to fight for them went against this expectation (Aymard 1967: 498; Mossé 1968: 221–9; Vernant 1974: 28). Warfare was, therefore, a participatory and societal obligation to the community. Victor Davis Hanson's studies, concerned as they are with the integral relationship between hoplite warfare and the community's free farming population, illustrate the centrality of military affairs to the life of the Greek *polis* (Hanson 1989: 32–8 and 1995: 221–89). Many aspects of *polis* life and literature illustrate the symbiotic relationship between warfare and farming: the warrior as farmer and the farmer as warrior (Arist. *Pol.* 4.1291a31; Hanson 1995: 242). The Greek citizen fought as a hoplite (*hoplitês*). The hoplite was a heavily armoured infantryman who carried a large round concave shield that protected him and his neighbour. Hoplites trusted one another to stand together for their own mutual protection. Hoplite armies therefore relied as much on morale as on skill. Hoplite warfare was communal as well as civic. Military life and the face of battle were regular features of the lives of free ancient Greeks. Ideally, Greek citizens were land-holding soldiers who provided their own equipment and defended their state and their land from attack. Mercenaries challenged that ideal, and in Classical Greek society mercenaries were prolific.

The mercenaries explored herein were military men. The majority of Greek mercenaries were probably the very citizens who formed the cores of *poleis* armies. The mercenary reflected Greek society because of the integral

relationship between war, socio-economic organization and politics. The mercenary, however, challenged the community values of ancient Greek society because a mercenary was not a member of the community for which he fought and had no stake in that society, being neither citizen nor landholder. The importance of mercenaries in transforming the nature of Greek society cannot be belittled. In the hoplite community war was highly political. Mercenary service cut the links between citizen and community service, between a son and his household, between an independent farmer and his land, between the ideal amateur and the professional specialist. Mercenaries cut the link between war and the political life of the community and thus the independence of the citizen who abrogated his responsibilities in needing a specialist to defend his home and his state.

Economically, mercenaries were of major significance to Greek history. Geoffrey de Sainte Croix (1981: 182) claims Greek mercenary service was the first large-scale instance of hired labour. Warfare had important economic considerations. The Greeks defined the economic status groups of citizens within the state as relative to the military roles they performed: the wealthier were cavalry (*hippeis*), the middle group the heavy infantry (*hoplitai*) and the poor were excluded from land warfare (see *Ath. Pol.* 7.3–5; *Plut. Sol.* 18.1–3). These groups were based on the ability of each to provide the necessary arms for military service. This kind of status grouping may be reflected in Solon's social organization of Athens in which Athenians who could provide a horse were called knights (*hippeis*) and the heavy infantry (*hoplitai*) from the stratum below these were the farmers or yoke-men (*zeugitai*).¹ The economic effects of the removal of the citizen from warfare, by the introduction of mercenaries in some instances and general professionals in others, had important ramifications for the *polis*.² Mercenaries helped to monetize the Greek world. Furthermore, as wage-earners, mercenaries provide illustrations of the nature of payment, of wages and even of contracts in the Classical Greek world.

Socially, Greek mercenaries came from all strata of Greek society. They formed mobile military communities in their own right apart from the states from which they came. Not only were military men an integral part of the Greek *polis*, but mercenaries abroad were also socially significant as they remained separate from the local peoples. Mercenary armies were like small cities separate from the *polis*. John Davies (1993: 187) notes of the formation of mercenary communities in the fourth century BC that 'in this way [mercenary service] emerged as a social role, precipitated both by the poverty, skill and ambition of individuals and by the needs of governments'.

Nussbaum realized the significance of this and produced a sociological analysis of the 10,000 Greeks who participated in the failed coup of Cyrus the Younger at the end of the fifth century BC (Nussbaum 1967). Nussbaum presents this army, the first roving Greek mercenary army, as if it were a *polis*, and the relationships found within the army are examined to determine the

political, economic and social nature of its structure. In general, mercenaries present interesting illustrations of identity creation beyond state boundaries and the armies in which they fought present historians with dissociated communities of men who often belonged to no city community themselves. They displayed continued adherence to traditional forms of Greek social patterns and interaction, like eating habits and communal messes, far away from the Greek communities from which they purported to come.³

Mercenaries lay at the heart of a variety of significant relationships. These range from army hierarchies and command structures to family ties and friendships at home and abroad. Mercenary generals appear as international statesmen who built networks across the eastern Mediterranean in the fifth and fourth centuries BC to assist in their political positions at home through their connections abroad. Thus, they were similar to their ancestors in the Homeric world, where guest- or ritualized friendships (*xeniai*) and gift-giving were a part of society and community both at home and abroad. Mercenary service was part of this greater world beyond the Greek mainland, and its role in international politics of the Classical age was clearly very important.

In the Classical world, Greek mercenaries illustrate a wide range of social and economic relationships. What follows differs from previous studies of Greek mercenaries. It treats mercenary service as a social phenomenon that transcended the societies across the whole Mediterranean. Previous works have tended to be either chronologically based narrative accounts of where mercenaries fought (Parke 1933; Griffith 1935), or socio-economic and thematic studies of mercenary life that have concentrated on specific regions or sources, or on other themes like pay, equipment or specific armies.⁴ The Greek mercenary played a part in many aspects of Classical Greek life. Greek mercenaries were an extension of the family's relationships both inside and outside the *polis*. They played an important role in diplomacy and in the creation and retention of inter-*polis* and international relationships between the great men of the period. This book is an analysis of the Greek mercenary as a political, social and economic phenomenon that was central to Classical Greek history.

The sources are diverse. They include literary texts of the Archaic and Classical worlds, and also inscriptions, coins and images. Much of the information provided about mercenaries is circumstantial. It comes from oblique references in political and rhetorical orations, in stock images of wandering vagabond professional soldiers in comedy, or from random names scratched into monumental architecture in far-flung parts of the Mediterranean. The contemporary historians refer to mercenaries as part of, but not central to, their narratives. Only Xenophon presents a detailed picture of the Greek mercenary community on campaign in one of his many works.⁵ The *Anabasis* is both atypical and full of Xenophon's personal perspectives, but remains the most detailed description of mercenaries and mercenary service from the Classical Greek past. A good deal of information comes from the later Greek

historians writing under the Romans: Diodorus, Plutarch and Polyaeus.⁶ They provide much information that is circumstantial and questionable. Their works remain very useful, however, for understanding trends and reflections of the image of the mercenary from antiquity, particularly the ubiquity of mercenary service in the fourth century BC. They did, after all, follow older (contemporary) sources many of which are now lost to the modern researcher. The image of the mercenary is dependent upon all of these sources of evidence, as it is upon modern conceptions of a feature of warfare that may at some times be seen as romantic, at others seedy.

Finally, what follows demonstrates that mercenary service interacted with Greek society in many ways and on many levels. The mercenary, as the concept is understood today, was not familiar to the Greeks, and service for a foreign power in an imperialist endeavour was not perceived *prima facie* as bad or immoral. The mercenary was an ambiguous figure in Greek antiquity. Only when mercenary service transgressed specific boundaries that were seen as cultural or political taboos, like professionalism whereby a man became a specialist soldier and so became dependent on an employer or served against his own *polis*, was it frowned upon. The study of the Greek mercenary illuminates many aspects of society both in the Greek cities from which mercenaries came and in the tyrannies, kingdoms and empires that they served.

Historical background

When the first Greek mercenaries appeared in the Aegean cannot be known. It must have been very early in Greek history because of the endemic nature of war in ancient society. Among non-Greek peoples this was certainly the case. The Old Testament recorded that David the Israelite was briefly a mercenary of the Philistines in the early Iron Age (I Samuel, 27.1–29.11; Parke 1933: 1). David himself may well have employed Greek-speaking mercenaries from Crete in the tenth century BC (Cartledge 1987: 315; II Samuel, 20.23; I Kings, 1.38). The earliest Greek word for mercenary was *epikouros* or fighter-alongside (Lavelle 1997: 232). Brian Lavelle noted that a Linear B tablet from the late Bronze Age referred to younger males as *e-pi-ko-wo*, possibly a Bronze Age form of the word *epikouros*, which did in later times refer to a mercenary (ibid.: 229). The first literature that the Greeks created, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, contains no references to mercenaries (Bettalli 1995: 39). In these epics the allies of the Trojans were *epikouroi*, perhaps comparable to companions, certainly fighters-alongside, but not mercenaries (Lavelle 1997: 229–35). The first recognizable Greek mercenaries come to light in overseas service for certain during the Archaic age (the eighth and seventh centuries BC). Ionians appeared alongside Carians in the service of the Egyptian Pharaoh Psammetichus about 664 BC (Hdt. 2.152–4; Pl. *Lach.* 187 b; Diod. 1.66.12; Parke 1933: 4; Griffith 1935: 236). A little after this event the poet Archilochus

called himself an *epikouros*, like a Carian (West 1993; Archilochus 15: 216).⁷ Ephorus (*FGrH* 70 F 12) thought that the Carians were the first mercenaries to serve for payment (*misthophorêsai*). Several scholars have recently discussed the Carians' mercenary traditions and they may well have created a tradition of mercenary service.⁸

From late in the eighth until the sixth century BC several of the Greek *poleis* of the Peloponnese and Sicily, and Athens from the middle of the sixth century, came under the rule of tyrants. These 'extra-constitutional strong men' ruled communities of citizen-farmers (Andrewes 1963: 20).⁹ The tyrants were the first Greek employers of mercenaries. They used hired men to gain power, as bodyguards and as instruments to maintain their regimes. As we shall see, the mercenary and the tyrant often went hand-in-hand in the Greek world. In the west, the late sixth and early fifth centuries were a period of conflict and civic formation (Kaplan 2002: 230). Diodorus' histories give the impression of large numbers of wandering foreigners, sometimes styled as *misthophoroi*, sometimes as *xenoi*, roaming Sicily in search of settlement, employment and plunder.¹⁰ Many may not even have been Greek. The early tyrant dynasties of Sicily, notably the family of Gelon at Syracuse, seem to have been prolific employers of such men. The way that these men readily, it seems, accepted land and citizenship within the cities of Sicily suggests that they are hard to distinguish from colonists (*oikêtai*) seeking new lives in a turbulent period of state reformation.

Some evidence suggests that Greeks found service in the Near East with the Assyrian and Babylonian monarchs in the seventh century BC.¹¹ The fall of Assyria at the end of the century and the collapse of the short-lived New Babylonian Empire in the sixth left a power vacuum in the Near East. Into that vacuum came the Persians from southern Iran. The rise of the Persian Empire in the middle of the sixth century BC rapidly changed the political context of the Near East. The Persians did not initially use the services of Greeks, mercenary or otherwise.¹² By their conquest of Egypt around 525 BC, in particular, but also because of their domination of smaller states in the eastern Mediterranean, the Persians gave more stability to the whole region. The mainland Greeks remained unconquered by Persian expansion and, therefore, free from imperial impositions of service with them. Mercenaries continued to serve the tyrants of the Greek mainland and Sicily as bodyguards at the end of the sixth century and in the early years of the fifth. By the 460s BC, however, most of the tyrannies of the Greek world had disappeared. The disappearance of tyrannies must have made demand for mercenaries very limited.

In the last years of the sixth century BC, the Persian Empire had extended its domain over the Greek cities of Ionia. There is little recorded mercenary activity in the Aegean from the late sixth century to the middle years of the fifth century BC. Nothing suggests Greeks in the far east before the fourth century, though we have precious little evidence for the Persian

Empire east of Mesopotamia before Alexander's conquests in the 330s and 320s BC. Nevertheless, Greeks in service abroad played a very small part in the narrative of events from the fall of the tyrannies to the latter part of the Peloponnesian War. There no doubt were Greek mercenaries in this period. It is possible that Greek mercenaries made up some part of Aristagoras' forces in his campaign in Naxos about 498 BC.¹³ The Ionian Revolt (499–494 BC), in which several of the Greek communities under Persian rule attempted to secede from the Persian Empire, was akin to a national rising and therefore not associated with mercenary warfare. The Persian Wars followed. The Persians invaded and failed to conquer the Greek mainland between 490 and 479 BC. On land, mercenary infantry played little role in the events of the Persian Wars, but they played a growing one as the fifth century unfolded and through the Great Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC), perhaps influenced by naval developments. From 478 to 404 BC Athens had established an empire in the Aegean. This period saw huge numbers of paid rowers in the fleets of the cities of the Aegean who, whether citizens, allies, subjects or indeed mercenaries, received regular cash payments. Professional seamen played a crucial role in the Peloponnesian War. In addition, Greeks, and particularly Peloponnesians, increasingly found service with the Persian governors (*satrapai*) of the western parts of the Persian Empire in the final decades of the fifth century (Roy 1967: 292–323; Wilson 1989: 147–51; Tuplin 1992: 67–70). The lack of direct evidence for very large numbers of Greek mercenaries need not mean that they were not already in Persian service in good numbers by the latter half of the fifth century BC. Later evidence and events suggest, however, that the fifth century BC saw less mercenary activity among the land forces of the Greeks than the fourth, but we should be careful not to underrate the numbers of Greeks in foreign service in the latter years of the fifth century BC, despite our scanty evidence.

In the late fifth century, the numbers of mercenaries in the land forces of the Mediterranean were on the brink of an explosion. The century closed with the Great Peloponnesian War and Athenian defeat in 404 BC. Power in the Aegean fragmented. Tyrants reappeared in Sicily. These men proved keen employers of mercenaries from the Peloponnese. The Syracusan tyrant Dionysius I (405–367 BC), in particular, actively hired as many men as he could for his wars against the Carthaginians. The Carthaginians in turn became large-scale employers of Greek mercenaries themselves. Of even greater consequence to mercenary numbers was Persia. The Persians had used the Greeks in a variety of roles, such as garrison troops and bodyguards, in the fifth century (Tuplin 1992: 67–70). In the early fourth century the authority of the Persian Empire began to disintegrate in its western satrapies. This was prefaced by the failed coup of Cyrus the Younger. He was the brother of the Great King, Artaxerxes II, and in 401 BC he led an expedition into the heart of the Persian Empire to overthrow his brother. His army included over 10,000 Greek mercenary hoplites, most of whom

were Peloponnesians. While Cyrus and the Greeks won the ensuing battle, fought at Cunaxa near Babylon, Cyrus himself was killed. This left the Greeks a great distance from home with neither an employer nor a purpose. Xenophon the Athenian recorded the story of their successful march from Cunaxa back to the Greek world in his *Anabasis*.

The experiences of Cyrus and his Greeks provided a paradigm for future events. From 399 to 330 BC there were a number of attempts made by satraps of the western provinces to assert their independence from the Great King. The sources do not say how many satraps tried to revolt from the empire, but several of them are known to have done so, particularly in what became called the Great Satraps' Revolt of the 360s. The collapse of Persian imperial unity led to the prolific employment of Greeks either to uphold the authority of the Great King or to help to defend a part of his empire from him. This period also saw Greeks serving the *poleis* of the Greek mainland in increasing numbers. Warfare had become a year-round affair in the Aegean and citizen-farmers found it increasingly impractical to campaign overseas. In addition, the appearance of specialist soldiers on the battlefield, like archers, slingers and lightly armed troops, forced states to hire these troops from amongst trained professionals. Such trained professionals were not found amongst amateur soldier-farmers who fought in the phalanx and were unable to conduct complicated manoeuvres on the battlefield or to use special weapons. The fourth century BC became an age of specialization and of professionalization in war. Both year-round warfare and specialist forces opened new avenues of service for mercenaries. The literary sources recorded a boom in the number of Greek mercenaries in this period and this has been called the Greek mercenary explosion of the fourth century BC (Miller 1984: 153).

Sparta also began to use mercenaries in this period. Sparta's wars against Persia, and subsequently the Greek cities, required specialist manpower. Conversely, the Spartans allowed their allies to hire mercenaries from the Peloponnese. Spartan commanders, like Agesilaus in the 360s BC, even found service with foreign dignitaries to make money for increasingly desperate campaigns in the Peloponnese. Strong men like Jason of Pherae rose to power in central Greece and demonstrated that a well trained and well led mercenary army might challenge to dominate Greek affairs in the 370s (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.5). The Third Sacred War, fought between 356 and 346 BC, also illustrated the importance of mercenaries in the fourth century. The small state of Phocis seized the holiest of Greek shrines at Delphi and with it the ample resources provided by the dedicatory offerings at the site. Neighbouring cities disputed the Phocian claim to the sanctuary, and war followed. The resources of Phocis were small, but the money that the Phocian generals were able to mint from the temple dedications paid for enough mercenaries to withstand several invasions successfully over a ten-year period. They failed to maintain their hegemony at Delphi but, like Dionysius I, they

had demonstrated what might be achieved with enough revenue to purchase ample professional soldiers in Greece (Williams 1976; Buckler 1989).

Philip II came to the throne of the growing power of Macedon in 359 BC. Philip was the only victor of the Third Sacred War against Phocis, despite the coalition of states, including Thebes, that formed the alliance to defend the shrine of Delphi (Buckler 1989: 147). Philip's victory in the Third Sacred War facilitated his entry into the affairs of central Greece. The rise of Macedon provided another region of employment for Greeks abroad. Philip had ample resources to pay soldiers who were Macedonians and to buy the aid of foreigners (Diod. 16.8.6–7). Philip's army was the tool with which his son Alexander conquered Persia. Macedon was not the first among Greek mainland states to have a standing and professional army. Argos maintained a chosen group of soldiers called the *logades* in the fifth century (Thuc. 5.67.2). The Arcadians had established a core of trained and maintained troops, called the *eparittoi*, at the inception of the Arcadian confederacy in 369 BC, and Elis had also employed such specialists (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.13, 4.34). Thebes had a similar group of men in their 300-strong Sacred Band. Even Athens maintained a picked body of chosen men, the *epilektoi* (Plut. *Phoc.* 13.2–3; Aisch. 2.169), and invested its resources in the *ephêbeia*, a group of trained young adult aristocratic but citizen soldiers.¹⁴ All these might loosely be termed professional military organizations in the fourth century BC. However, Philip's army became both professional and national. It was these professionals who decisively defeated the amateur citizen-hoplites of Athens and Thebes at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC. This victory allowed Philip to dominate the Greek cities of the mainland. The professional soldier had progressively become more common on mainland Greece in the fourth century and, eventually, although citizen militias still appear in Polybius' histories of the third century BC, he supplanted the amateur farmer-hoplite on the stage of Hellenistic warfare.

Philip's son and successor, Alexander III (the Great), conquered the Persian Empire in less than a decade. He used many Greek mercenaries in the process, and his adversary, the Great King Darius III, employed as many as 50,000 such men to oppose him. Alexander's army was, essentially, professional. It left the Aegean basin in 334 BC, and ten years later very few of those men returned to their homes. When Alexander died in 323 BC, the Greek world had changed forever, and the Hellenistic period (323–30 BC) had replaced the Classical period just as a Greco-Macedonian empire had replaced the Persian.

The last event that is relevant to this study occurred at Alexander's death. Several cities of mainland Greece began the Lamian War (323–322 BC). In essence, this was a rebellion against Macedonian rule. Its conclusion provides the chronological terminus for this study. It was an important turning point in Greek history and particularly in Athenian history.¹⁵ There are other reasons for concluding this analysis in 322 BC that have more relevance

INTRODUCTION

to Greek mercenaries. Alexander's conquests broadened the world of the Greek *poleis*. The successor kingdoms dwarfed these *poleis*. The focus of historians shifted from the city to these kingdoms. After 322 BC international relationships changed. The men who ruled the Hellenistic world did so by commanding loyalty not through nationality but by personality. The dominant generals of this age were all Macedonians with the exception of Eumenes. Their Greco-Macedonian soldiers were in no way obliged to serve them by terms other than personal friendship, loyalty, or hope of reward. National or cultural ties no longer played any part in the decision of one man to fight for another.¹⁶ Military settlements and garrisons protected the boundaries of the new kingdoms. Evidence shows personal guarantees of loyalty in the form of oaths between kings and mercenaries in a new age of service.¹⁷ A final factor makes 322 BC a sensible date to end this work. From the end of the Lamian War the sources cease to distinguish clearly between the mercenary, the citizen and the professional soldier. Professional soldiering had become more common. Indeed, once all soldiers had become professionals, studying the mercenary becomes more difficult, because, as the first man to study Greek mercenary soldiers in detail, H. W. Parke (1933: 208–9), states,

instead of simplifying our task, this prevalence of the mercenary makes it the more difficult. For when once all soldiers have been reduced to one professional type, our authorities cease often to distinguish the mercenary as such. All fighting men are *stratiôtai* and *pezoi* or *hippeis*.

The terminology after 322 BC, along with the ever-broadening horizons of the Greek world, would produce a different piece of research and a different set of questions than those presented here. If this work went on to discuss the wars of Alexander's successors it would, most certainly, lose sight of the Classical Greek *polis* and with it any idea of the citizen as an amateur, who was both a soldier and a farmer. The evolving relationship of the citizen with his socio-economic and political environment, and his adaptation and specialization within that environment, are crucial to understanding the decline of the *polis* and the creation of the Hellenistic world.

IMAGES AND SOURCES

Mercenary terminology

The Classical Greek word for a soldier was *stratiôtês*. This was a neutral term, neither pejorative nor indicative of the type of soldier to which it referred. In order to be more specific, the Greeks named types of soldiers by the kind of equipment that they employed. The heavily armed infantrymen or hoplites (*hoplitai*) carried heavy arms (*bopla*), while lightly armed men (*psiloi*) were sometimes more specifically identified by their weapons: javelin-men or stone-throwers (*akontistai*, *petroboloi*), archers (*toxotai*), peltasts (*peltastai*) who carried crescent-shaped wicker shields (*peltai*), and unarmed men, literally naked-ones (*gymnêtês*), are all examples. Mercenaries were soldiers. The Greeks had no specific noun for a mercenary, nor a verb to denote doing mercenary service, nor an adjective to describe mercenary behaviour. Other languages developed words for mercenary service. The Latin word *mercenarius* is the root for the French term *mercenaire* and the English *mercenary*. It can refer to a soldier who serves a foreign power for remuneration independently from the state of which he is a citizen. The German word *Söldner* comes from the Late Latin *solidarius*, itself from the Latin *solidus*, the solid gold coin paid to the troops in the later Empire.

The Greek words most commonly used for mercenaries carried alternative meanings in different contexts and appear to have changed over time. This is something first noticed by H. W. Parke (1933: 20–1). In the works of the early Greek writers, fighter-alongside (*epikouros*), a helper, is the most common term used for a mercenary. Foreigner (*xenos*) could also refer to mercenaries by the fifth century BC, though it generically meant several things, such as ritualized guest-friend or stranger. Before the later fifth century, such foreign assistants were sometimes persuaded by a wage payment (*misthos*), perhaps to show their mercenary nature. As wages became more common in the Classical world, so new terms emerged to describe those who received them. Thus, by the later fifth and fourth centuries BC sources increasingly use wage-earner (*misthophoros*) to denote mercenary soldiers. Among the Greek historians of the Roman period, *misthophoros* became the standard word used of mercenaries of the Classical world. As more professionals appeared in battle in the fourth



Figure 1 The seventh-century BC protocorinthian Chigi vase (*olpe*) has the most famous representation of hoplite warfare on the scene in its upper band. Note the large shields (*aspides*) and the conformity of arms (*hopla*) carried by the hoplites (Hirmer Verlag Munich neg. no. 591.2036).

century so the terms for such soldiers changed over time, hence the shift from fighter-alongside (*epikouros*) to wage-earner (*misthophoros*). By the end of the fourth century, the amateur soldiers and not the professionals needed definition, and the formerly neutral Greek soldier (*stratiôtês*) meant the professional soldier as opposed to the citizen militiaman.

Not all mercenaries served on land. Greek naval warfare consumed money for the remuneration of crews and oarsmen. Identifying the mercenary as opposed to the professional but citizen or allied serviceman in Classical navies is not easy, and ancient terminology does little to assist. Naval personnel required payment because they were from the poorer classes of society. The poor men (*thêtes*) who provided the backbone of the navies of the Classical world needed subsistence payments at the very least. The enormous numbers of men required for such service and the time involved on naval campaigns meant that naval warfare was financially consuming in a way that land warfare was not.¹ Sailors (*nautai*), the specialist crews of triremes (*hyperêsiai*) and the armed marines (*epibatai*) received pay (*misthos*) from generals (*stratêgoi*) and ships' captains (*triêrarchoi*) alike in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. Good evidence illustrates that offers of higher pay by individual ship commanders led to competition in hiring skilled and experienced seamen even from within the Athenian citizen body as early as the late fifth century (Dem. 45.85; 50.7, 15, 18; Lysias 21.10). Forensic speeches demonstrate the levels of professionalism achieved within the Athenian fleet at the time. A similar relationship existed between the poor members of a ship's crew and their trierarch as between a mercenary soldier and his paymaster (*misthodontês*).

Our sources present crews as behaving in a mercenary manner. Athenian crews abandoned Athenian ships for payment, promises of higher wages, bonuses or even subsistence payments if they felt that their commander was low on resources (Dem. 50.12–16). Unsurprisingly, therefore, non-Athenian but allied crewmen from the islands in the Athenian empire, often unhelpfully called in our Athenian sources foreigners (*xenoi*), felt little obligation to stay with Athenian fleets in the face of higher offers of payment. Spartan, Athenian and Persian paymasters believed offers of higher pay would lure oarsmen away from their current allegiance during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1.31.1, 143.1; 7.13.2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.4). Evidence shows that this was also true in the fourth century (Dem. 50). In very dire circumstances non-Athenian crewmen and slaves needed no excuse to stay with the Athenian fleet, as events at Syracuse showed to Nicias in 413 BC (Thuc. 7.13.2). Naval practices illustrate much about financial relationships and considerations of professionals in military service, but tellingly, most likely due to the financial nature of naval warfare within *polis* navies, no distinct terminology developed for purely mercenary as opposed to national naval crews. Naval warfare was a mercenary kind of warfare in a way that land warfare was not.

The ancient Greeks used four terms, on occasion interchangeably, for their mercenaries. These terms are central to this work. They provide a means by

which men are identified as mercenaries. The terms for mercenaries changed over time and due to context. Diodorus wrote in the first century BC long after the Classical mercenary, but unconsciously identified the transformation of terminology that can be seen in the texts of his predecessors as the Greeks moved from vague terms like *epikouros* towards the more accurate *misthophoros* or the more generic *stratiôtês*. Diodorus came at the end of a long process of developing terminology. His unyielding preference for *misthophoros* over *epikouros* illustrates the transformation of terminology. There was a movement, unconscious though it may have been, away from euphemisms and towards more accurate terms for mercenary soldiers.

The earliest of the terms used of mercenary infantry was *epikouros*. *Epikouros*, literally fighter-alongside, might be a helper, a companion or an assistant. It was, like all the other words, not a specific term meaning a mercenary soldier. Parke (1933: 13) described it as a euphemism.² Homer used *epikouroi* to refer primarily to the Lycian allies of Priam at Troy, but notably described Aphrodite as the *epikouros* of Ares.³ Richmond Lattimore translates this term as companion.⁴ Brian Lavelle interprets the epithet in Homer as positive and non-mercenary. The Lycians were good soldiers and virtuous allies (Lavelle 1997: 229–62). Archilochus (15.216; West 1993) sang unrepentantly in the seventh century that he should be called an *epikouros* like a Carian, though it has been questioned that he ever was a mercenary himself (Campbell 1967: 136; Lavelle 1997: 236). Lavelle thinks the poet and his audience were aware of Homer's Lycian *epikouroi*. Carian was a deliberate twist from Homeric convention in the light of the recent appearance in Egypt of Carian and Ionian soldiers who found service as fighters alongside the Pharaoh in Egypt from about 664/3 BC. The impression was that they were richly rewarded for their services and so *epikouros* had taken on its mercenary connotations in the wake of these events. Hermippus cited a proverb in which 'epikouroi from Arcadia' are listed as regional imports to Athens from Arcadia (Kassel and Austin, *Hermippus*, frag. 63 line 18). Herodotus used this term to describe allies and auxiliaries (Hdt. 1.64.2, 154.4; 2.152.14, 163.2–3, 168.12; 3.4.2, 11.3, 11.12, 45.14, 54.6, 145.15, 146.13–19; 6.39.14; 7.189.3). The fact that he termed the Argives who fought with Pisistratus as hirelings for a wage (*misthôtai*) and not *epikouroi* would suggest that *epikouros* was not a strong enough term for their relationship to the tyrant (Hdt. 1.61.4; Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 15.1–3). The sources make it clear that money lay at the centre of the Pisistratid cause. *Epikouroi* continued in use through the fifth century and Thucydides used this word more than any other to describe soldiers persuaded by pay (Thuc. 1.115.4; 2.33.1, 70.3, 79.3; 3.18.1, 34.2, 73, 85.3; 4.46.2, 129.3, 130.3, 131.3; 6.55.3, 58.2; 8.25.2, 28.4, 38.3).

The term *epikouros* all but disappears in the histories written after the later fifth century BC. Xenophon illustrates this disappearance particularly for the first half of the fourth century BC. He used *epikouros*-related words only twice in the *Anabasis*, a work devoted entirely to mercenaries (Xen. *An.*



Figure 2 Mid-fifth-century BC Attic *skyphos* depicting a stone-thrower (*petrobolos*) carrying a sword and using an animal skin to protect his left arm (Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum, Inv. IV 1922).

4.5.13; 5.8.21). On both occasions this is not to refer to mercenaries or mercenary activity. In the first instance he used a related noun to denote protection (*epikourêma*), and to specify medical aid given to soldiers in distress, and second, verbally, ‘to be an epikouros’ (*epi-epikoureô*) or a helper for those who needed protection. Xenophon’s *Hellenica* is no different. On only one occasion is the term used as a noun indicating mercenaries, as in 369 BC an Arcadian statesman proclaimed that his people were traditionally fighters for others (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.23). The oldest word for mercenaries denotes the traditional profession of the region. The *epikouroi* of Arcadia were proverbial. On all other occasions in Xenophon, it serves as a word denoting aid, succour or assistance (Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.3; 6.5.40, 47; 7.4.6). To reinforce the transformation, in the second century AD Arrian used *epikouros* with respect to aid received rather than to any type of soldier (Arr. *Anab.* 6.5.4). More tellingly, the word’s use had changed much earlier, contemporary with Xenophon: Plato’s *epikouroi* form the second hierarchical tier in his idealized republic and so could not have represented anything other than full and important members of his theoretical community (Pl. *Resp.* 415 a). It is little surprise that the Archaic term *epikouros* disappeared from later texts.

By the later fifth century BC, the term *xenos* was applied to mercenary soldiers (*RE*, vol. 9a, pt 2, 1442–3, s.v. *xenos*). This word could denote a foreigner or a stranger in any context. It usually, but certainly not always, referred specifically to a Greek from another Greek community. It often described men bound to one another by ties of reciprocity and ritualized friendship (a guest-friend). The ritualized or guest-friend was always an outsider, bound to



Figure 3 Mid-fifth-century BC Attic *skyphos* depicting a Thracian peltast armed with a crescent-shaped shield (*pelta*) and javelin (Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum, Inv. IV 1922).

a family and household not by ties of blood, but by bonds of hospitality and reciprocity. There were other meanings. The Athenians referred to their subject-allies as *xenoi* in inscriptions dealing with the Delian League (Finley 1954: 104–5; Gauthier 1971: 44–79), though some have suggested that in this context *xenoi* meant mercenaries (Loraux 1986: 32). In either event they probably served for payment. Thucydides must mean these subject allies of the Delian League on occasions when he used the term (e.g. Thuc. 1.68.1–2; 7.13.2). In spite of these other meanings, Xenophon used the term exclusively of the mercenaries who served with him under Cyrus the Younger in his attempted coup of 401 BC. The Thracian mercenaries who defeated a Spartan division (*mora*) at Lechaeum on 390 BC were simply called *to xenikon* or the foreign corps (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.11–18; Dem. 4.24; Ar. *Plout.* 173). Like *epikouros* there is a certain euphemistic quality to the term *xenos*. The notion of a mercenary as a ritualized foreign friend gave the hired soldier an elevated status and a special relationship with his employer. Clearly not all the Greek soldiers on the *anabasis* with Xenophon can have been ritualized friends of Cyrus, the Persians or even all the Greek generals on the expedition. It was, no doubt, much better to be the *xenos* of the Great King's brother than a hired mercenary. Xenophon would have been keen to emphasize a special relationship. *Xenos* survived into the fourth century BC as a term for mercenaries. It was used often by Aeneas Tacticus writing in the middle of the century (Aen. Tact. 10.21, 12.2, 13.1, 3, 18.14) and even appears in the work of Arrian over 500 years later (e.g. Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.4, 24.4).

The payment of regular wages became common in the fifth century BC.

Wage payments were important sources of income for mercenaries. Herodotus had recognized that men served as mercenaries having been persuaded by wage payment (Hdt. 1.61.3). Thucydides also claimed that men were hired or persuaded by pay (Thuc. 1.60; 4.80.5). The wage-earning soldier and the mercenary soon became synonymous. *Misthophoros* refers to any man who drew regular pay, not necessarily mercenaries. Payments might come from jury service, Delian League embassies, temple-building, as well as soldiering. Thucydides used *misthophoroi* sparingly (Thuc. 1.35.4; 3.109.3; 6.43.1; 7.57.3, 9, 58.3). He first used the term of mercenaries in the speech of the Corcyraeans to the Athenians on the brink of war (Thuc. 1.35.4). They are undoubtedly referring to naval mercenary oarsmen. Naval warfare consumed vast amounts of resources. In the fifth century, naval warfare became closely associated with coined money for payment of crews who rowed in the fleet. These regular payments no doubt influenced land warfare, and infantry called *misthophoroi* appear first in Thucydides' *Histories* in an action at Amphilochia in c. 426/5 BC (Thuc. 3.109.3). The term *misthophoros* became the most common word used of the mercenary in antiquity. Xenophon used *misthophoros* extensively in his *Hellenica* and occasionally in the *Anabasis* (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.30; 3.1.23; 4.2.5; 6.9; 14). Ephorus, who also wrote in the fourth century BC, appears to have favoured the term *misthophoros*. His attribution of the invention of mercenary service to the Carians is indicative of this for, as he stated, they were the first to serve for wages (*misthophorêsai*), but the time to which he is referring in the mid-seventh century was well before the appearance of wages (*misthos*) or wage-earners (*misthophoroi*) in the eastern Mediterranean (Ephorus, *FGrH* 70 F 12).

Diodorus' histories span the period of Archaic and Classical Greek history. Diodorus (*floruit* c. 50 BC) wrote long after the fourth century and was clearly influenced in his choice of terms by subsequent events in the Greek world, especially the Roman conquest of the Greeks. Following his fourth-century source, Ephorus of Cyme, he used the term *misthophoros* almost exclusively, even though he must have known about the earlier Greek historians who did not use this word. He tellingly called both the 'bronze men' of Herodotus, who were the allies (*epikouroi*) of Psammetichus from Caria and Ionia in the seventh century BC (Diod. 1.66.12), and Xenophon's guest-friends (*xenoi*) serving with Cyrus, *misthophoroi* or wage-earners (Diod. 14.14.3). When he did use *xenos* for mercenary it often appears with the notation that such men were paid wages (Diod. 16.28.2). Diodorus' use of *misthophoros* for mercenary is almost exclusive of other terms from the Archaic and Classical Greek periods.

Arrian (AD 86–160) also wrote long after the events he described. He too used *misthophoros* prolifically, although not exclusively. Arrian used *xenos* in conjunction with *misthophoros*, to produce a term meaning foreign wage-earner (*xenos misthophoros*). It is a conjunction found rarely before in Greek texts, though notably in a speech delivered by Demosthenes in 351 BC and

in Aeneas Tacticus' treatise on surviving a siege (Dem. 5.28; Aen. Tact. 12.2. See also Diod. 11.72.3). It is very close to a modern definition of a mercenary as it incorporates ideas of both remuneration and foreignness. Arrian used *misthophoros* and *xenos* to describe several of Alexander's mercenaries, sometimes one term and sometimes the other. Then again, he used both terms to describe some of Alexander's mercenaries (*xenoi-misthophoroi*). The reason has proved problematic for some historians. He may have used foreign wage-earners (*xenoi-misthophoroi*) to distinguish one group of mercenaries from other ordinary *misthophoroi*. It is possible that one term meant Alexander's original mercenaries, those who came with him from Greece in 334 BC, and the other term meant men sent out after his initial invasion of Persia.⁵ Berve (1926: 144) suggested there may have been a military distinction, that each term represented a different kind of soldier, but Arrian seems to have used both terms fairly indiscriminately (e.g. Arr. *Anab.* 2.5.1, 9.1). Foreign wage-earners (*xenoi misthophoroi*) are listed separately from the other (Greek) wage-earners (*misthophoroi*) in the order of battle at Gaugamela in 331 BC (Arr. *Anab.* 3.9.4). Perhaps the terms did distinguish between Greeks and non-Greeks on the battlefield or Arrian's source had made a distinction for simplicity between separate mercenary units. Whatever the answer, most significantly, foreign wage-earner (*xenos-misthophoros*) categorized a mercenary with more clarity than previous terminology.

Clearly we can identify that a chronological succession of terms was applied to the Greek mercenary from the seventh to the fourth centuries BC (Parke 1933: 20–1).⁶ Specifically, there was a development from the euphemistic fighter-alongside or ally (*epikouros*) to the more realistic wage-earner (*misthophoros*). The reason for the transition of terms initially stems from the meaning of *epikouros*. The verbal form means to act as a helper, to give aid, to help or to protect. Homer's *epikouroi* were not mercenaries, but allies. Lavelle thinks that the transition to mercenary came with the appearance of large numbers of *epikouroi*, fighters-alongside, in Egypt in about 664/3 BC (Lavelle 1997: 229–62). Archilochus was aware of these men and responded by applying the term to a new way of fighting by foreigners for reward. But it lacked precision. When Herodotus used the term he needed to explain the financial nature of *epikouros* relationships. Thus, on two occasions he had to note that *epikouroi* were paid (Hdt. 1.154.4; 3.45.14) and on another that they were hired (Hdt. 3.45.3; see Lavelle 1989: 36). In Herodotus' thought, *epikouros* could imply a mercenary, but more commonly seems to have meant what it had been to Homer, a fighter-alongside.

Thucydides reveals the same problem with the precise identity of his *epikouroi*. Most of Thucydides' references to *epikouroi* occur in the first four books of his history (Thuc. 1.115.4; 2.33.1, 70.3, 79.3; 3.18.1, 34.2, 73.1, 85.3; 4.46.2, 52.2, 129.3, 130.3, 131.3). They appear twice thereafter in book six and three times in book eight (Thuc. 6.55.3, 58.2; 8.25.2, 28.4, 38.3). Unlike Herodotus, he had another term at his disposal for mercenary – *misthophoros*

(Thuc. 1.35.4; 3.109.2; 6.43; 7.57.3, 9, 11, 58.3). The term occurs in books one, three, six and seven. There was not a chronological shift in terminology, for *epikouroi* appear in several occasions in book eight in 412 BC. Thucydides must have conceived of the two types of soldiers differently and Lavelle argues that *epikouroi* in Thucydides were regularly allies rather than mercenaries (Lavelle 1989: 36–9). This was not always the case, for on at least one occasion *epikouroi* were also persuaded by pay (Thuc. 4.52.2). Even this demonstrates that Thucydides conceived of an *epikouros* as not always a mercenary. But foreign *misthophoroi* in military contexts were mercenaries. At Syracuse, Thucydides clearly meant to distinguish those who fought only for pay from those who fought for friendship or because of necessity as subject-allies of either side. As Wilson points out, Thucydides shows the *misthophoroi* to be the lowest on the moral scale of those who fought (Wilson 1989: 148–9; Thuc. 7.57.3, 9, 11, 58.3). They are as far from citizen-soldier volunteers as soldiers can get.

Thucydides' literary successors abandoned *epikouros* as a noun indicating a mercenary soldier. Xenophon illustrates this in his *Hellenica* and *Anabasis* in using *xenos* and *misthophoros*. The orators used *epikouros* in the sense of provider of help and assistance, in defence, legally, medically or on account of friendship (Isoc. 4.168, 11.22, *Ep.* 9.79; Dem. 21.99, 205; 49.50; 58.61). Only once was it used as a term to denote military assistance by auxiliaries (Isoc. 19.38). Plato gives the most striking illustration of *epikouros* in juxtaposition to mercenary service. He called the members of the second tier of social status in his republic, the silver tier, *epikouroi* (*Pl. Resp.* 415 a). These men were neither paid nor came from outside of the state. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle used the term *epikouria* for the concept of assistance rather than for mercenary service (Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8.13.11; 14.2, 4). The ambiguity of *epikouros* did not provide enough precision for mercenary soldiers.

Coins in the Greek world were relatively new even in the late fifth century BC, and the payment of regular wages in coin would also have been novel.⁷ The first attested use of *misthos* comes in the 470s and 460s BC (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 27.4). A wage-earner need not have been a military man, but anyone in receipt of regular wages. In the Athens of the late fifth century this could be anyone on state business: a juryman, a public temple-builder, a Delian League commissioner, a soldier, or a sailor (Parke 1933: 231; Lysias, 27.1 and 2. See also Burke 1992: 215, n. 63). The growth of the Athenian Empire out of the Delian League meant a growth in the number of people earning regular wages from the Athenian state (Humphreys 1979: 14–16; Burke 1992: 216–17, n. 73). The sources demonstrate a steady growth in the use of *misthos* for payment to Athenian citizens throughout the fifth century. At the same time there would no doubt have been a growth in the acceptance of the term *misthophoros*. Its use appears, therefore, in Thucydides who was writing in 431 BC and later, but not in Herodotus whose subject matter, at least, predates 479 BC. The Athenians at Potidea received *misthos* in 428 BC

(Thuc. 3.17.4). The Great Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC) acted as a catalyst in the movement of Athenian citizen-farmers away from incomes derived from their land towards state income generated by the Athenian Empire (see Humphreys 1979: 14, 16–17, 24). Contemporary with the Peloponnesian War and thereafter the wage-earning *misthophoros* superseded other terms for mercenaries.

Military as well as economic developments played their part in the process of seeking a more precise definition. Year-round campaigning during the Peloponnesian Wars of the latter half of the fifth century BC forced the citizens into a more professional level of warfare. Thucydides and Xenophon both used *misthophoros* in connection with the idea of regular wages. It is obvious that regular wages and professional service go hand-in-hand. The professionalization of military service in the later fifth century led to the first great mercenary army gathered by Cyrus in 401 BC, and created new relationships and the need for more accurate ways of demonstrating military and economic interaction in the Greek world.

Taking a wage for work carried a stigma in antiquity. Indeed work itself was considered base and derided by aristocratic values. Free and independent nobles were not supposed to labour for another under obligation or for any remuneration. Wage-earning negated a free man both his freedom (*eleutheria*) and his independence (*autarcheia*). In this sense, the orators frequently use words that derive from wage or hire to denigrate their opponents. Thus Demosthenes decried Epicrates, whom he named Cyrebius (Offal-man) as the hireling (*misthôtos*) of Chabrias (Dem. 19.287). It is true that few socio-economic relationships are equal and involve no obligations, but the *Iliad*'s heroes followed Agamemnon to Troy to take service as free men. Terms like *xenos* and *epikouros*, used in the *Iliad* to mean guest-friend and companion, obscured any financial interest or compulsion to service. Accordingly, Xenophon described all the Greeks serving with him on the *anabasis* either as *xenoi* or simply as soldiers or hoplites. He reserved the term *misthophoros* for the mercenaries who fought against him on the campaign (Xen. *An.* 4.3.4, 4.18; 7.8.15). Despite the term *xenos*, he noted that his men were paid *misthos*, just as certain *epikouroi* in Thucydides received pay (Thuc. 4.52.2). The reality is that *xenos* was another euphemism (Xen. *An.* 1.2.11–12). Xenophon was happy to describe the mercenaries of other armies as *misthophoroi* throughout the *Hellenica*, not to mention the men hired to maintain the regime of Hieron (Xen. *Hier.* 10) and non-Greeks (*barbaroi*) in another's service in the *Anabasis*, but he balked at the term for his own men. The same use of terminology to obscure the reality of certain obligatory or financial relationships in the context of an increasingly monetized economy in the later Archaic and early Classical age has recently been identified in aristocratic relationships with prostitutes. Thus aristocrats called their extra-familial sexual companions *hetairai* as opposed to the more common *pornai* of the public economy of the ordinary citizens of Athens (Dover 1989: 20–1; Kurke 1997: 106–55). The



Figure 4 Amphora depicting a Thracian peltast wearing a cloak and carrying a crescent-shaped shield (*pelta*) and two javelins (Oxford, Ashmolean Museum, 1971.867).

betaira, like the *epikouros* or *xenos*, operated in a world of friendship and gift exchange and not a world of grubby coined money (Kurke 1997: 106–55).

The trend in terminology away from euphemisms coincided with developments in the Greek world that transformed the citizen from a farmer-soldier into a specialist soldier. Economic developments created professionals. There was a period of transition in the later fifth century BC, a time when *epikouroi*, *misthophoroi* and *xenoi* appear in the sources together and before the eventual professionalization and specialization of the Greek world in the fourth century. This created a world in which more soldiers were professionals, and, accordingly, the sources make it difficult to distinguish the citizen-soldier from the mercenary and the purely professional soldier. This transition can be traced in the terminology from the helper, companion and assistant to the wage-earner on the battlefields of the eastern Mediterranean.

The definition of a mercenary

The obscure terminology employed by the Greeks for mercenaries does not help the historian identifying them. Definitions are crucial in identifying the mercenary soldier. The principal scholars of Greek mercenaries agree that the professional quality of the Greek mercenary was of central importance. Parke (1933: 1) notes that '[t]he mercenary was a professional and ultimately the professional ousted the amateur from all important warfare'. Griffith (1935: 1), perhaps overly simplistically, claims that 'the professional soldiers of the ancient world were mercenaries', as many professionals could fight in their own civic armies. Most of Alexander's Macedonians by the end of his campaigns from 334 to 323 BC were professionals, but were they mercenaries? It is surely not a tight enough definition simply to claim that a mercenary was a professional. André Aymard (1967: 487) sought more rigid criteria. He argued that all mercenaries soldiered for a wage, but conversely even soldiers who also soldiered for a wage might still be serving in the armies of their country, king or chieftain. He goes still further in seeking an accurate definition (*ibid.*):

le mercenaire, en se liant par contrat envers son employeur, accepte l'éventuel sacrifice de sa vie sans être juridiquement obligé ni sentimentalement incité à courir un tel risque. Ni patrie, ni chef, ni cause à quoi il se voue: il sert dans une armée qui, camaraderie et esprit de corps à part, lui demeure étrangère.

The mercenary, once he has made a contract with his employer, accepts the eventual sacrifice of his life without being legally obliged nor motivated by sentiment to risk his life. Without a country, nor chief, nor cause to which he is devoted: he serves in the army where, camaraderie and *esprit de corps* aside, he is a foreigner.

In assessing the mercenaries of the Classical Greek world this point must be borne in mind. It should be recalled that many Athenian rowers and soldiers were paid for their service by the state. This may have occurred as early as the Persian Wars (Plut. *Them.* 10.3). Similarly, Spartan soldiers were professionals in all but name. They were clearly not mercenaries and, at the same time, would have been offended at the thought that they were.

In concentrating on both obligation and sentiment, Aymard raises the notion that a mercenary need have no conscience about the cause(s) for which he fought. By implication the mercenary cannot, therefore, be judged by outside commentators, but only by himself. It is his feelings and perceptions and not any absolute criterion by which a man can, and cannot, be called a mercenary.

In 1977 the Geneva Protocol was published to supplement the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It was produced because of changes that had taken place in the character of modern warfare. One such change was the prevalence of mercenaries in world conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s (Roberts and Guelff 1982: 387). Article 47 defines a mercenary. According to this document (*ibid.*: 414) a mercenary is any person who:

- (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
- (b) does in fact take a direct part in the hostilities;
- (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that party;
- (d) is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict;
- (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and
- (f) has not been sent by a state which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.

Three things appear to be critical in understanding the phenomenon of mercenary service from this definition: receipt of remuneration, military service by a foreigner or outsider and employment in respect of both the former conditions. Modern dictionary definitions of a mercenary highlight these three conditions. *The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* 1993 (s.v. *mercenary*) states a mercenary is 'A person who works merely for money or other material reward; a hireling . . . A person who receives payment for his or her services; *spec.* a professional soldier serving a foreign power'. Employment is the most important aspect of mercenary activity. A person employed to serve a nation, state, sovereign or political institution other than that of which he is a citizen or a resident is therefore a mercenary. He cannot have at the time of

employment any stake in the state or the nation that employed him beyond remuneration for his services. This takes Aymard's views of obligation and sentiment one step further. Foreigners such as the resident aliens in Athens (*metoikoi*) who fought for the Athenian *polis* had a stake in the society for which they fought. That stake might have been either industry or family. They were not mercenaries, even though they were not citizens of the state for which they fought. This would have remained true even if they had been paid, and the Geneva Protocol would recognize their legitimate status in the Athenian army. Similarly, most of the personnel in the Athenian and Spartan navies during the Peloponnesian War, according to both Thucydides and Xenophon, were professionals, in that they were paid for their services, even the Athenian lower-status oarsmen (*thêtes*). The fleet contained many men from the allied states usually referred to as *xenoi*. The foreigners with the Athenians at Syracuse served under alliance or compulsion. They were not mercenaries. Of course many seamen (*nautai*) were mercenaries, happy to switch sides for higher pay and better conditions. They are difficult to identify in the sources, but they did exist and in great numbers.

The Geneva Protocol definition, combined with the dictionary term, provides a useful model for defining a mercenary. An employer and employment are key components, combined with regular remuneration and amoral service abroad. Like the metic (*metoikos*), a legally registered resident foreigner in the city of Athens, the mercenaries of the Greek world must be distinguished from raiders (*leistai*) and pirates (*peirataî*).⁸ These were men who were not employed by any state or sovereign, but who might independently eke out livelihoods by stealing property from settled communities or travellers. Like raiders and pirates their rewards came from the booty that they could steal from their victims. It is, however, quite likely that many mercenaries resorted to the life of a raider or a privateer at one time or another in their careers, at which point they ceased to be mercenaries. Some have implied that mercenary service emerged from organized raiding and freebooting in the eastern Mediterranean. Thus, the Carians and Ionians who entered Egypt in the mid-seventh century may well have been raiders seeking booty until the Egyptian Pharaoh Psammetichus offered them great things (*megala*) if they joined his cause.⁹ Once employed, they became his mercenary fighters-alongside (*epi-kouroi*). By the same token, many mercenaries would cease to be mercenaries once their employment ended (Griffith 1935: 310–1; McKechnie 1989: 92; Krasilnikoff 1992: 27; Arist. *Pol.* 1256 a–b). Hence, Cyrus' hired Greeks were no longer mercenaries after his death. On their march back to the sea they bore more similarity to a roving band of raiders and plunderers, admittedly a large band, than to mercenaries. As we shall see, many mercenaries in the ancient Greek world derived their pay from plunder, but plunder that was filtered through a hierarchical military structure. The employers and generals divided the booty amongst the men. Griffith (1935: 262) notes that the profession of piracy – and no doubt he would also mean here freebooting by

land (*leisteia*) – ‘had much in common with the mercenary calling’ and attracted similar types of people. The distinction between plunderer and mercenary was a fine one, but the employment and process of remuneration of the latter are critical to the definition of the mercenary.

In conclusion, a relationship between employment and remuneration is what defines the mercenary. The Greeks recognized the importance of this by naming their mercenaries something other than simply soldiers, allies or raiders attached to military operations. The Greeks never developed a term that specifically identified the mercenary but, as is shown in the following chapter, the terms employed for mercenaries in the Classical period, among other things, denoted a relationship between the mercenary and his employer. What follows is concerned with men who found military service with and for others, outside their communities, and were, at least in theory, paid for this service. Significantly, the principles and the image of these men were very different from those that modern nationalism has fostered. Perhaps even more significantly, mercenary service in Greek antiquity was very much more a part of the fabric of Greek society than has previously been recognized.

The modern image of the mercenary

The rise of private military companies like Sandline International in the mid-1990s has rekindled popular and military interest in the ancient figure of the mercenary. Modern mercenaries have had an enduring fascination in modern thinking and attitudes. The context in which attitudes are formulated is crucial to understanding the meaning of those attitudes. Modern and ancient ideas about mercenaries are different. Nonetheless they each stem from polarized perspectives: on the one hand there has always been the notion of the romantic soldier of fortune and on the other the greedy dog of war. The Classical Greeks’ attitude towards mercenary service was quite different from those of the nation states in the post-Second World War era, but there is and always has been a blurred definition of the professional soldier fighting overseas for another’s cause. In short, the figure of the mercenary is and was ambiguous, and in the age of globalization and the multinational corporation the blurred nature of the mercenary will continue to fascinate and to confuse.

The figure of the mercenary conjures up a number of images in the twenty-first-century mind. The romantic soldier of fortune can be juxtaposed with the contemporary, politically defunct, and notorious symbol of imperialism. Two hundred years of modern nationalism have discredited entirely the concept of soldiering independently of patriotic service.¹⁰ For much of the recent past, western nationals have been prohibited from service in foreign armies without the sanction of their own state. In 1793 the USA became the first country to prosecute a man, Henfield, successfully for ‘disturbing the peace by privateering’ (Wharton 1970: 49–89). As a result, overseas service without permission became a common-law crime.

The Americans followed up this success with their own Foreign Enlistment Act in 1795, which was the first of its kind, an act that was stiffened and made permanent in 1818.¹¹ The Immigration and Nationality Act, section 349, provides for the removal of American nationality from a person enlisting to serve overseas and is, theoretically, the harshest of its kind today.

The English Crown, while not legislating against foreign service before the Americans, appears to have been the first to put barriers against their nationals serving abroad. In 1561 Elizabeth I issued a Royal Proclamation that forbade sailors from accompanying Scottish expeditions against the Portuguese (Holdsworth 1922–66: 6.308). She went on to prohibit recruitment for service against any country with which England was not at war. Subsequently, in the eighteenth century, Parliament enacted legislation prohibiting service against the Crown. By the early nineteenth century Britain had agreed, in a treaty with Spain, to prevent British nationals from helping insurgents in South America. A desire to remain neutral determined the British government's attitudes in the nineteenth century. Pressures from European and American nations on the British government to prevent British nationals from taking service heightened the need for more concrete legislation. The Federal Government of the United States made this particularly clear. The British government felt obliged to impose stiff legal penalties on British subjects serving abroad. The British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870, at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, finally outlawed mercenary service by British subjects. It prohibits British subjects both from mercenary service and from recruiting mercenaries from other countries, both in British territory and abroad. Certain other European nations have also made mercenary activity illegal.¹²

Alone of western nations are the French. They still maintain a standing mercenary army and have the most lenient legal and ideological attitude towards mercenary service. The French Foreign Legion regularly receives the loudest cheers in the Bastille Day procession. The image of the Legion illustrates the juxtaposition of romance with the harsh realities of modern mercenary service. Even the literature about the Legion can be poles apart. The romanticized novel *Beau Geste* by Percival Christopher Wren is the story of two brothers and a sadistic sergeant-major in a desolate outpost in French North Africa. It can be juxtaposed with Christian Jennings' *A Mouthful of Rocks: Modern Adventures in the French Foreign Legion*, which is the sensationalist autobiographical tale of another Englishman who enlisted in, and eventually escaped from, what is described as a brutal institution (Jennings 1989). Times have changed and even the Legion has standards for its recruits today. The Legion claims to reject 70 per cent of those who apply. They also check the identity of their new recruits. The days of the criminal escaping justice in the safety of a new life in French North Africa are over.¹³

The ambiguity of the figure of the mercenary is perhaps responsible for the enduring personal fascination that accompanies the lack of public

respect. The Roman gladiator presents an interesting parallel. Gladiators were pariahs on the one hand, but magical and alluring on the other. Their blood was believed to cure epilepsy and Roman society found them enthralling (Barton 1993: 12–15). Contemporary perceptions have to a large extent been formed by the popular treatment of mercenary service in films and such books as *The Dogs of War* (Forsyth 1974), *Who Dares Wins* (Geraghty 1980) and *The Wild Geese* (Carney 1977). Most recently, books like Guy Arnold's *Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World* (1999) and Tickler's *The Modern Mercenary: Dog of War or Soldier of Honour?* (1987) have perhaps redressed the balance. The romanticists can trade on the success that modern mercenaries have enjoyed in Africa, in particular, against large numbers of native troops. This success on the battlefield enabled films and books to exploit and avert attention from the seedy side of mercenary service.

The seamier side of mercenary service is worth some attention. Since the Second World War, mercenaries have not distinguished their profession with service for honourable causes.¹⁴ Governments have used mercenaries to fight undercover and illicit wars across their borders and to prop up regimes that have had a less than spotless humanitarian record.¹⁵ Ideologies of citizenship and nationalism and the behaviour of the mercenaries themselves in real situations, however, do not create the complete picture of the mercenary. Fiction may carry romantic titles like *The Wild Geese*, but non-fiction accounts by serious journalists have more negative names like *The Whores of War* and *The Dirty Wars*. White European mercenaries were rapacious in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s.

The journalist Lloyd Garrison spent some months with a small mercenary unit attached to the army of the province of Katanga in its struggle to assert itself over the newly founded Republic of Congo (Garrison 1968: 131–41). Many mercenaries had to be sent home for what their commander, an English graduate of Sandhurst, described as 'incompetence', in some cases, or 'perversions' in others. The Americans who had financed much of the operation had hoped that most of the soldiers would be Belgians tied to the former Belgian Congo so as to obscure the mercenary from the national interest. This in itself is interesting, and some of those interviewed believed they could make a difference for the future of Africa, and not just in an Africa ruled by white supremacists. Even in the 1960s, the mercenaries' romantic image was not dead. At least it was not dead in their minds.

Forging a new and in large part their own image from these two extremes are the modern self-styled private military companies (PMCs) like Sandline International and its former affiliated company Executive Outcomes. John Keegan, Defence Editor of the *Daily Telegraph* (13 May 1998), wrote:

Sandline is genuinely new, at least in contemporary terms, because it selects its personnel very carefully, is concerned to obey the legalities and seeks – and apparently wins – government endorsement for its

activities. It belongs with a small group of similar organizations, including Executive Outcomes, Defence Services Ltd (DSL), and MPRI (Military Professional Resources Inc.). They provide a range of military services, from the humanitarian, such as mine clearing in the aftermath of civil war, to personal and site protection and, ultimately, restoration of regimes.

Although Executive Outcomes claimed to have ceased trading in January 1999, Sandline continues to function and is a registered supplier on the United Nations Common Supplier Database (UNCSD), meaning they can legitimately fulfil contractual supplies to government and other non-mercenary operations. For example, in 2000 Sandline supplied walkie-talkies to peacekeepers in Kosovo. The CEO of Sandline, Colonel Tim Spicer, wrote in the *Sunday Times* (24 May 1998) that PMCs filled a niche in offering military services to governments who would not risk the lives of their citizens or who lacked the resources to engage in military operations. These PMCs are different only in their stated purpose from the old-style mercenary operations of the 1960s and 1970s. Their interests seem to be in countries which have wealthy natural resources, for example Sierra Leone or Papua New Guinea, for their mineral resources. Sandline's mission statement¹⁶ reveals the ambiguity of their situation. In the section on company policy, they state they will only provide services for governments that, in the view of the management, are 'internationally recognized' and preferably democratically elected. On the other hand, they will only provide services for 'internationally recognized' liberation movements with the added proviso that they are genuine. Clearly there is much that is open to interpretation here. It could be envisaged that the ideal situation would be for both rebel and government forces to be supported by the same PMC that would wage a war for both sides. The war would only end if the profit margins ceased to make sense. The payments, theoretically, could continue forever. The image of the mercenary produced by Sandline International may be more modern and corporate. It may reflect a new globalism. It may operate on a higher level than the mercenaries of the 1960s. Nevertheless, their operations remain mercenary, in that remuneration drives their interests, and the image of the mercenary remains ambiguous.

The ancient mercenary and the sources

Antiquity played a role in bringing to the modern world the image of the foreigner fighting for pay in a foreign land. The ambiguity of the figure of the mercenary is evident in ancient Greek ideology. The absence of a specific word denoting the mercenary illustrates ambivalence and ambiguity. The terms that were most commonly employed for such men were interchangeable with things that had nothing to do with military service; for example *misthophoros* might just as easily refer to a juryman as to a mercenary, *epikouros*

to a guardian, and *xenos* simply to a foreigner. Early Greek poetry romanticizes the itinerant warrior. Alcaeus (Bowra 1936: 160, Bowra's translation; see also Parke 1933: 3) wrote the following lines for his brother Antimenides' return from the Near East around 590 BC:

You have come from the ends of the earth with an ivory-bound hilt to your sword. Fighting with [*symmacheis*] the Babylonians you achieved a great feat [*aethlon*] and saved them from their troubles, slaying a fighting man who lacked only a single span from five royal cubits in height [i.e. about seven feet tall].

All of the Greek evidence that specifically deals with large-scale and identifiable mercenary service, however, dates from the fifth century BC and later. This is important for the image of men who served outside of their communities. *Polis* communities had coalesced and redefined civic relationships. Aristocracies were co-opted within these new communities, and their relationships with nobles outside of the *polis*, if not prohibited or necessarily frowned upon, were feared as potential threats to the civic community. Ritualized friendships (*xeniai*), which enabled overseas military service, became part of the apparatus of the state's diplomacy. In addition, the appearance of coinage in the sixth century BC introduced notions of payment and wages that are the basis of modern definitions of mercenary service. The image of the wandering soldier was bound to have changed. Not only do the sources refer to wage-earners, but also the coinage itself provides images that reflect mercenaries and their employers. Coinage, rather like ritualized friendship (*xenia*), established relationships and defined them. *Xenia*, with its close connection to the gift-giving culture of the aristocrats, remained acceptable amongst the elite in the Classical Greek world. Wage-earning, conversely, implied a subservient role for the recipient. It was neither aristocratic nor noble. It is clear, however, that most Athenians attached no stigma to and had no qualms about taking a wage in coin from the state rather than from any specific individual paymaster for military or even administrative public service.

Other changes on the Greek mainland affected the image of the mercenary. The aristocratic world was adapting to the more democratic societies of the more fully integrated *poleis*. Pisistratus and his sons, styled tyrants (*tyrannoi*), had ruled Athens in the late sixth century BC. Ancient opinions held that mercenaries helped to establish and maintain the Pisistratid tyranny over a disarmed and disenfranchised community (Hdt. 1.61.3–4; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 15.1–3). Hired outsiders usually, but not always, provided this armed force to support tyranny (Hdt. 5.55, 65, 71, 91, 94; 6.35, 102, 103, 107, 123; 7.6). Aristotle clearly conceived a relationship between the tyrant and hired outsiders keeping a servile population disenfranchised (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 15.1–3; *Pol.* 1285a, 1311a and 1313b). Note also that Diodorus (11.48.3, 53.2, 67.5)

also associated autocrats like Hieron, Thrasydaeus and Thrasybulus with *misthophoroi* and *xenoi* as bodyguards. After the overthrow of the Pisistratids, the idea of tyranny became anathema in democratic Athens in the fifth century BC (Andrewes 1963: 22–3). Fifth-century, and therefore post-tyrannical, Athens provided the context for the political literature upon which the mercenary's image was and must be constructed. Like post-revolutionary Americans, fifth- and fourth-century Athenians were, broadly speaking, anti-monarchic, despite certain examples to the contrary, like Plato's interest in Dionysius, Aischines' support for Philip and Isocrates' interest in Philip and the Cypriote Kings. *Poleis* tended to see sole rulers as tyrannical, and mercenaries were traditionally tools of tyranny.

This hatred of monarchy and its association with tyranny was founded in theory. In theory, the Classical fifth- and fourth-century BC Greek state was a body of free men who lived within a defined territory whose mutual goals were independence (*autarcheia*) and freedom (*eleutheria*). This group formed the political body that, at the very least, ratified that state's decisions in an assembly (*ekklesia*). Membership in this community was theoretically justified by fighting on the battlefield as a defender of the state's land (*chora*).¹⁷ Individual citizens needed to possess enough resources to provision themselves with the arms and armour of a heavily armed infantryman or hoplite. A professional and standing military, therefore, ran contrary to the ideal of the citizen and the *polis*. It flouted the amateur nature of the farmer-soldier. As warfare became increasingly the province of men in the state who held neither land nor citizenship the citizen lost his independence in the state because, in order to protect his freedom, he came to rely on the services and the skills of others. Worse than this, the employed professional may not even have been a member of the community. This was increasingly the case in the fifth century BC. Warfare had become more complex with the introduction of lighter troops and cavalry. These were more often than not drawn from the non-urbanized peripheries of the Greek world. The hoplites differed in status and type from those people who formed this new presence on the battlefield. A passage in Plutarch's life of the Spartan king Agesilaus points out the shame that the Spartiate hoplites felt at being beaten by a group of more lightly armed foreign mercenary troops (*peltastai*) at Lechaeum near Corinth in 390 BC (Plut. *Ages.* 22.2):

This was the greatest disaster that had happened to the Spartans in a long time; for they lost many brave men [*andres agathoi*] and those men were overwhelmed by targeteers [*peltastai*] and mercenaries [*misthophoroi*], though they were men-at-arms [*hoplitai*] and Lacedaemonians.

The juxtaposition between the Spartan hoplite and the mercenary peltast is clearly identified.

Ironically, most of the Greek mercenaries who served outside the Greek mainland were themselves hoplites. This added a further ambiguity. Greek hoplite mercenaries in service for those abroad were exercising their right to bear arms and fight as any Greek citizen might. But many mercenaries who fought for the Greek cities themselves did so with servile and non-Greek weapons (with light shields and javelins like the peltasts for example) and therefore were unlike free hoplites fighting as free citizen-soldiers. Mercenary armies were not therefore reflections of the Greek cities' citizen populations, but became tools of the states' power. Thus, the principles and ideology of the citizen militia were antithetical to that of the mercenary army (see Cartledge 1987: 314). The most common type of specialist soldier found in Greek mainland armies was the peltast that originated from Thrace. Jan Best has highlighted the association made by Greek authors between the mercenary and the Thracian. Thracians and, consequently, mercenary peltasts were seen as robbers and plunderers rather than honourable defenders of the state (Best 1969: 126–33).

Thucydides appears uninterested in the significance of mercenaries during the Peloponnesian War. This is revealing because his principal subject is a war fought in the fifth century involving many of the Greek communities of the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, there are a good number of references to mercenaries during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1.115.4; 2.33.1, 70.3, 79.3; 3.18.1, 34.2, 73.1, 85.3, 109.2; 6.46.2, 129.3, 130.3, 131.3; 7.43.1, 57.3, 9, 11, 58.3; 8.25.2, 28.4, 38.3). Their presence should not be underestimated. Mercenaries were part of the extra-*polis* network of relationships, usually personal and usually aristocratic in nature. Thucydides could have ignored them entirely as many extra-*polis* relationships were formed through personal and aristocratic ties. Gregory Crane (1996: 147) noted that 'Thucydides shapes the content and language of his history in such a way as to minimize all personalized ties to immediate family or to extended kin'. He illustrates this point by highlighting the very few occasions on which Thucydides mentions family or kinship relations generally, and words related to family or extra-*polis* connections specifically (ibid.: 75–94). This would extend to connections between aristocrats beyond their own state boundaries. For Thucydides, claims Crane (ibid.: 147), 'the *polis* has supplanted the *oikos* as the basic unit by which to evaluate "modern" Greek society (contemporary with Thucydides)'. Mercenaries and their relationship to those outside the state would fall outside an intra-*polis*-only community. The *polis* was central to his approach and his thinking, and aristocratic extra-*polis* connections, like ritualized friendship (*xenia*), challenged the integrity of the *polis*. The connections of the aristocrats established through friendship (*philia*) and ritualized friendship (*xenia*) were anathema to the fully integrated and homogeneous *polis*. Mercenaries did play a role in Thucydides' Peloponnesian War, but they remained on the periphery of the real struggle between the two central *poleis*, Sparta and Athens, and their citizens. It is, therefore, on Crane's model that

mercenaries in the later fifth century BC ought to be seen. Mercenaries were a part of the *poleis* for while, on the one hand, they were outsiders to those for whom they fought, they were, on the other, insiders of the communities from which they came. Thucydides acknowledged that they existed, but to him they were tools or agents of the states for which they fought.

The Athenian political orators produced speeches in the democratic context of late fifth- and fourth-century Athens. Demosthenes (6.46, 12.27) and Isocrates (5.96, 121, 6.168) both expressed their concerns about mercenary service and the reliance that the Athenians of the fourth century placed upon mercenaries. Both orators feared the itinerant wanderer as a threat to the *status quo* of the community (Isoc. 8.44). Isocrates (*Philippic*, 5.55) described the state of the mercenaries (*misthophoroi*) in the employment of the Phocians in the Sacred War (a common target for abuse) as more profitable (*lysitelēs*) dead than alive. This dislike of a professional force led the Athenians to extreme measures. The Athenian democracy, for a while, used a force of Scythian archers (*toxotai*) who were public slaves (*dēmosioi hypēretai*) to assist magistrates and the council in enforcing order in the city (Hunter 1994: 145–9). A standing group of citizens was not viable in a world of amateur farmers and rotating political officials. Besides, such an armed force within the city could have provided the basis for a coup. The Peloponnesian writer Aeneas Tacticus, who produced a treatise on *How to Survive under Siege*, recognized the dangers of having a group of mercenaries within the city walls. His treatise is full of advice against allowing such men too much freedom of movement and association (Aen. Tact. 10.7, 9, 12.2; Whitehead 1991: 110).

The two great philosophical writers of the fourth century BC also condemned the use of mercenaries in military service. Plato expressed concerns in his laws (Pl. *Leg.* 697e). Aristotle thought that professional soldiers were less likely to die fighting bravely than citizen militias. As he stated in his *Nicomachean Ethics* (3.8.9):

mercenaries [*stratiōtai*] prove cowards and when the danger proves too great and when they are at a disadvantage in numbers and equipment they are the first to flee, while citizen troops stand and die fighting.

Aristotle concluded that ‘professionals fear death more than they do disgrace’. It should not be overlooked that in the same discussion he had earlier praised professional fighters for their experience, skill, ability to inflict casualties and avoid suffering them in addition to the quality of their weapons. But his position surely idealized the amateur citizen-warrior who would fight for his property and his family to the last.

Warfare had a direct relationship to citizenship in the Classical Greek *poleis*. Warfare was an accepted and expected part of a citizen’s life. But professional soldiers were able to, and on many occasions did, win against the odds

and inflicted severe casualties upon their opponents. Furthermore, political speechwriters, notably Demosthenes, advocated the use of mercenaries in battle by the Athenians despite negative comments we have already seen (Dem. 4.28). Many philosophers, Plato included, advocated the notion that service for a good but foreign ruler was a noble pursuit. This is strongly implied in his letters to various Sicilian notables and in Plato's relationship with dynasts like Dionysius II and Dion. The ubiquity of foreign service in the fourth century, military or otherwise, suggests that the peoples of the Greek world had few qualms about hiring mercenaries or being hired as mercenaries. The Greeks had a reputation for military prowess in the fourth century in large part derived from the steadfast nature of the citizen-hoplite that Aristotle eulogises. Ironically, these were the same citizen-soldiers who, on the one hand, fought and died for the state and, on the other, proved Aristotelian cowards when they served as professional soldiers.

Apart from coinage, philosophical and political treatises, a survey of other evidence from the fourth century will quickly show the ubiquity, the acceptability and the positive nature of service abroad in certain circles of Greek public opinion. This is important for it illustrates the significance of mercenary and military service among certain Greeks of the fourth century BC. The aristocratic historian Xenophon wrote an account of a mercenary army hired to overthrow the Great King of Persia. Xenophon went on this expedition and has many biases as a member of the mercenary army and a friend to many on the expedition. Naturally, he painted a positive image of all the soldiers under his command, but his work remains an important source of information about the nature of mercenary service at the turn of the fifth century. In other historical works he is equally positive about mercenary armies as being well armed, disciplined and trained (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.5). Most important of all, perhaps, is Xenophon's image of the good ruler, Hieron, and his use of mercenaries (*misthophoroi*) to protect the state and himself from outside threats, to bear the brunt of toil and dangers on campaigns against enemies and to instill fear into a state's neighbours with regard to the military potential of the state (Xen. *Hier.* 10.1–8). The sole ruler often employed mercenaries, but not all rulers carried the stigma of tyranny and oppression through mercenary arms.

Fourth-century legal speeches are of great importance in providing contemporary images of mercenary service. This is true as much for the circumstantial nature of the references to mercenary activity as for the fact that the audiences for which they were produced were juries ready to indict any found wanting in their service to the community. In the first instance, two legal speeches from the mid-380s BC stated frankly that the speakers had sought military service abroad and not for the benefit of the Athenians (Isae. 2 *Meneclēs* and 4 *Nicostratus*). It is unlikely that, if mercenary service was in any way a controversial subject, such service would have been noted in court.

In a similar vein, plays reflected social norms and attitudes. The theatre



Figure 5 This terracotta statuette represents either a mercenary soldier (*misthophoros*, *stratiôtês*) or a mercenary's baggage carrier (*skenophoros*), a figure who became a stock character in new comedy plays in the late fourth century BC. Mercenaries had become a common feature of the Greek world at this time (Berlin, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, TC 7820).

was a very public arena and reflected social and political attitudes in Athens. Four fragments of a comedy play performed about 350 BC called *The Soldier*, the central figure of which is a mercenary, have survived (Kassel and Austin, *Antiphanes*, 200–3). Interestingly, this play had the alternative title of *Fortune's Child* (*Ho Tycheon*). This fictitious character is perhaps the first literal Soldier of Fortune. The Greeks were very conscious of the role of fortune (*tyche*) in their everyday lives and especially in military activity. The image one gleans from the two longer fragments preserved from this play is of a wanderer full of tales of wealth and luxury overseas. In one of the fragments the central character describes an elaborate dinner hosted by a king of Cyprus (Antiphanes, *apud* Athenaeus 6.258; Kassel and Austin, *Antiphanes*, 200). So ubiquitous was the professional soldier at the end of the fourth century that the character had become a stock figure of Athenian New Comedy and the soldier is often portrayed as both a drinker and a braggart. He is, however, a character of fun rather than of terror. Perhaps most significantly, the character of the itinerant soldier had become too commonplace to be out of the ordinary even on the stage.

One singularly important piece of evidence may illustrate that states feared the mercenary proclivities of their citizens in case they might embroil them in wars overseas. An Athenian decree recently discussed and translated by Toogood (1997: 295–7) and dated to 357/6 BC (Tod 2.154. 10–15) states that 'If anyone from henceforth attacks Eretria or any other of the allied *poleis*, whether he is from Athens or from one of the Athenians' allies, he is to be condemned to death and his property is to become the state's and a tithe is to be given to the goddess'. Toogood argues that the men this is aimed at are mercenaries. He cites the implication that Athenians had served on the Theban side in recent attacks on Eretria and includes the example of the Thebans who prohibited their citizens from enlisting with the Spartan army as it marched through Boeotia in 383 BC (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.27). Toogood suggests that this had the added effects of maintaining forces available at home by not having men serving others overseas, and of driving down their own rates of pay. He also adds that the inscription may represent a far from unique situation, which seems likely in the fourth century BC and adds to the arguments that citizens of the Greek mainland were very likely to find service in foreign armies in great numbers. As Toogood states, the inscription was one of many diplomatic instruments available to ancient states and bears interesting parallels with Elizabeth I's ban on joining Scottish naval expeditions against the Portuguese. There is, however, nothing pejorative about mercenary service in the inscription.

It was the Greek historical writers living centuries after the Classical age who painted the Greek mercenary as a perfidious and truly mercenary figure in the modern sense. Their perspective was different from that of those who lived through the fourth century. They lived after the establishment of the Roman Empire and they could reflect on the changes that had taken place in

the Mediterranean since the fourth century. By Hellenistic times, Alexander the Great had conquered the world, and money and mercenaries played a larger role in warfare than they had previously.

The wars of Alexander's successors did little to enhance the reputation of the professional soldier. Several factors played a role in this. The destruction of the enemy became detrimental to the mercenaries' future employment. Such destruction might bring an end to a campaign, and this would mean the end of service and therefore of payment. Professional soldiers hoped for lucrative and safe postings, like garrison duties, rather than arduous campaigns against distant opponents. The ease with which mercenaries might be induced to change sides, as happened to Eumenes at Gabiene in 316 BC, proved detrimental to their image in the Hellenistic world (Diod. 19.40–3.9; Plut. *Eum.* 17–19). Finally, the baggage train (*aposkeuê*) of the armies of the successors became the principal interest of most armies rather than simply the means by which they could fight wars (Parke 1933: 207; Griffith 1935: 50–1). Warfare had become so explicitly about plunder and recompense that professional soldiers were seen in a poor light. There can be little doubt that these post-Alexander images influenced later historians who wrote about mercenaries. Two of the principal sources for the history of Greece in the fourth century, Diodorus and Plutarch, wrote long after Alexander and long after Rome had conquered the Greeks in the second century BC. Not only did these writers have the perceived failure of the wars of the Successor Kingdoms on which to draw, but they also had the success and tradition of Roman warfare to influence them.

Roman Republican citizens were amateur soldiers like their Greek predecessors. The Romans had the aristocratic anti-wage-earning ethos of the Greeks (Cato, *Agr.* 1.1). Like the Greek *misthophoros*, the Roman term *mercenarius* has its roots in a word for wage, *merces*. The Romans used mercenaries in their campaigns but, unlike the Greeks, they are not found in mercenary service themselves. The absence of Romans serving foreign commanders is attributable to the continual success of Roman armies, the regularity with which Rome went to war successfully, and the plunder that could be taken following Roman standards rather than those of other employers. These all gave Romans no reason to seek service elsewhere.

Greeks writing under Roman rule, notably Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch, moralize about the disreputable nature of mercenaries and mercenary service in the Classical Greek past (e.g. Diod. 15.61.1–3; Plut. *Ages.* 36–7). Tyrants employed mercenaries to enslave citizen populations. Fifth-century BC Athenian *mentalité* regarding the wickedness of tyranny influenced later historians writing about other Greek cities. For example, Diodorus (14.65.2–3) makes a Syracusan citizen, Theodorus, claim that the newly established tyrant, Dionysius I, had gathered 'the multitude of mercenaries [*misthophoroi*] . . . to hold the Syracusans in slavery [*douleia*]'. Furthermore, by Diodorus and Plutarch's time, Rome had established an empire and ruled it with an army of

professionals. These professionals were drawn from the Roman citizen body and from Roman allies (*auxilia*). To Romans the concept that military service ought to be exclusively for the state from which a soldier came had become well established.

Roman attitudes also influenced these later Greek authors. Romans viewed the Greeks as a defeated people by the first century BC. Their early love of Greek culture had soured with prolonged contact. The Romans perceived that Greek infidelities and squabbling had resulted in bloody and violent upheavals on the Greek mainland. The Greek philosophers and teachers of rhetoric offended Roman conservative opinion. Romans saw Greeks as non-patriotic. They had plenty of historical illustrations upon which to draw. The activities of pragmatic Greek generals in their internecine wars of the fourth century showed rapacious individuals aiming at private gain. The complex international diplomacy of the Roman conquests in which all of the larger powers of the Greek world, at least from a Roman perspective, acted with little consistency or loyalty demonstrated Greek perfidy. It comes as little surprise that Diodorus, Plutarch and the Roman commentators viewed the Classical Greek mercenary poorly.

Diodorus Siculus provided a mass of important information about Greek mercenaries. He is invaluable for the fourth century, a century that saw an explosion in mercenary activity. He tried to produce a continuous narrative for that period. It is a period that is central to the phenomenon of mercenary service. The fourth century is better understood today thanks to the rehabilitation of Diodorus' reputation as a historian alongside his potential source, Ephorus, and the important contribution of the anonymous Hellenica Oxyrhynchus historian.¹⁸ Furthermore, Kenneth Sacks (1990) shows that Diodorus introduced original analysis of material relevant to the overall moral scheme of the history. Diodorus should be read with a critical eye, but the value of his histories should not be underestimated.

Regarding mercenaries specifically, Diodorus mentions them in specific instances and episodes throughout his *Library of History* (*Bibliothēke*). These references reflect the role of mercenaries in Greek history generally. For example, mercenaries appear only in books one and five in the early part of the *History* that he was writing. These appearances are brief. The first (Diod. 1.66.12, 67.1–3, 68.5; see Hdt. 2.152–4) is of the mercenaries (*misthophoroi*) summoned by the Pharaoh Psammetichus rather than of the freebooters forced ashore described in Herodotus, and the second (Diod. 5.11.1, 3–4) consists of sporadic notices with obscure and early tyrants in the west. There is one mention of *misthophoroi* at Corinth in the seventh century (Diod. 7.10.1). From the fifth century, however, mercenaries are far more prominent in his *History* and they receive mention in every book from book eleven through to the rise of Alexander's successors in books eighteen to twenty. Mercenaries in other Greek sources are not well attested before the later fifth century. From the later fifth century BC references to the numbers of mer-

cenaries increase in other source material. Diodorus reflects this steady growth in his work. Book fourteen, for example, has more references to mercenaries than all the other books relating to the Classical period. This illustrates the high point in mercenary growth and prominence in Greek history associated with the careers of Cyrus the Younger (Diod. 14.19.1–34.3) and Dionysius I of Syracuse (Diod. 14.7.5–8, 14.41.4–96.4). In book sixteen, Diodorus chose to give prominence to the story of the Phocians' attempt to hold Delphi using mercenary armies. Diodorus, therefore, has reflected trends in mercenary activity in Greek history in his *Bibliothēke*, consciously or otherwise. This has distinct ramifications for the way he should be regarded.

After the death of Alexander, mercenaries are harder to identify in Diodorus as specifically hired soldiers distinct from citizen militia. This may be because Diodorus' source, Hieronymus of Cardia, was not careful to distinguish professional soldiers from the specific retainers of the *Diadochoi*. Diodorus refers to all soldiers as *stratiōtai*, *pezoi* or *hippeis* for the successor wars. Hieronymus may have been aware of the blurred definition in the world after Alexander and chose to make little or no attempt to define the professional mercenary soldier as different from other servicemen. When Aristotle wrote about mercenaries he called them *stratiōtai*. As Parke recognized, it was the citizen-soldiers who now needed special identification (Parke 1933: 208–9). Of course, Diodorus could just be following this trend, copying from his source, and he may not have been aware enough to translate *stratiōtai* into *misthophoroi*. However, as the examples from Herodotus' account of the Ionians and Carians who found service in Egypt illustrate, Diodorus or his sources were capable of introducing terms into their own histories.

The mercenaries of the earlier Greek world had become stigmatized in the Roman one. The use of the term *misthophoros* is illustrative of this stigma, and Diodorus' negative attitude towards mercenaries is indicative of a stigma attached to mercenary service. Mercenaries throughout Diodorus' work are related to two phenomena. On the one hand, apart from their employment by non-Greek rulers like Psammetichus and Cyrus, they are often the employees of tyrants (*tyrannoi*). As the servants of tyrants they were the suppressors of freedom (Diod. 11.48.3, 53.3, 67.5; 14.65.2–3). On the other hand, they were also the servants of the morally reprehensible. The Phocian commanders, who hired men of the worst sort (*ponērotatoi*) by offering large sums of money (*misthos*), were able to loot the Delphic sanctuary at will to pay the worst of men. Diodorus implicated the mercenaries in the crime. Interestingly, even though they were not, the Phocian commanders were called tyrants by several of their contemporaries (Aisch. 2.130–1) as well as several of the later sources (Plut. *Mor.* 249F, 401F; Athenaeus, 6.231D; Polyaeus, 5.45), while Demosthenes (23.124) called one of the Phocian commanders, Phaullus, a *dynastēs*. In these instances, mercenaries helped Diodorus to achieve what he wanted with his history: to demonstrate through historical example that bad things happen to bad people. This is no more clearly

demonstrated than in his explanation of the painful and horrible deaths of the Phocian commanders and the mercenaries under their command during and after the Sacred War (Diod. 16.63.1–5).

As a universal historian, Diodorus reflects and is reflective of the themes and trends within Greek history. Although it has often been said that Diodorus is only as good as the sources that he used, he closely mirrors these sources. A good example is the steady growth of mercenary numbers in the fifth century BC. Roy's idea of the 'staged development' of mercenary service and mercenary numbers illustrates this (Roy 1967: 292–323). The explosion itself is well illustrated by other contemporary evidence. Several examples will suffice to demonstrate this. Isocrates lamented the growing numbers of outsiders fighting for their enemies against their friends, Demosthenes harassed the Athenians for their reliance upon mercenary soldiers and Aeneas Tacticus advised besieged citizens to ensure the suppression of potential mercenary problems (Isoc. 8.44; Dem. 6.46, 12.27; Aen. Tact. 10.7, 9, 12.2). What this means is that Diodorus is both reflecting and affirming what is now understood about the late fifth and fourth centuries BC. Notions of mercenary service change in the period of Alexander, and the fact that Diodorus refers to soldiers rather than wage-earners, soldiers who are clearly paid in some way and are therefore professionals, is suggestive of another change of focus for Greek historical understanding. The world of the citizen-soldier became the world of the Hellenistic monarch and his professional *stratiōtai*.

We have seen the important place of mercenaries in the history of the Greek world. They provide more than a useful heuristic device in understanding Greek history. They are also an integral part of that history. They were famous, infamous and ordinary men who fought for the agendas of others as their agents. This book seeks to do several things with respect to such men. It seeks to redefine the mercenary nature of the Greek mercenary. It also seeks to put the Greek mercenary into Greek society, both as part of internal and external political life and also as an important feature of foreign interaction. In short, it hopes to redefine the place and the importance of mercenaries and mercenary service in the Greek world and in Greek history.

In conclusion, Gabriel Herman's views of Greek national interaction ought to be reinforced when considering the image of the mercenary in the ancient Greek world. In his book addressing ritualized guest-friendships, he wrote that in the Greek world, 'considerations of nationalism . . . considerations which lend to modern concepts their most distinctive colouring – were almost entirely absent' (Herman 1987: 161). In such a climate it is hardly surprising that service for another power or foreign ruler was not the controversial phenomenon that it has been in modern times. From the aristocratic world of ritualized friendship to the political world of the fifth-century wage-earner and the distant Roman imperial memories of Greek failures the image of the Classical Greek mercenary has come down to the present. The

last two centuries have hailed patriotism and professionalism as paradigms of service. With the decline of the economic power of nation states combined with the rise of multinational corporations which witness the competition between nationalism and global economic interests, the image of the mercenary as both soldier of fortune and rapacious plunderer needs rethinking, in relation to the ancient as well as to the modern world.

WHAT MOTIVATED GREEK MERCENARY SERVICE?

Introduction

Mercenary activity in ancient Greece took several different forms. Each form involved different groups of people working in different kinds of military service and warfare. First were those Greeks who left the Greek mainland to take infantry service with the great powers of the Near East and the west: the kings and satraps of Persia, the pharaohs of Egypt and the tyrants of Sicily. These men were usually hoplites, as we shall see, recruited to serve alongside the native forces of armies outside the Greek mainland. Then there were the men who served within the Greek cities of the Aegean basin. They often provided the specialist troops of *poleis* armies: slingers, archers, cavalry and peltasts not commonly found within the hoplite-based armies of the Greek communities. Initially, in the fifth century BC, many of these men may not have been Greeks. Finally, there were those many thousands recruited for the fleets of the various Greek cities who crewed and rowed for a daily wage. These latter were harder to identify as true mercenaries, partly because many rowed for their own state or as subject allies of other states, even though their motivation was financial gain. Most rowers were poor and were very unlikely to serve without the prospect of pay; even national crews therefore had mercenary interests. The importance of money and pay to fifth- and fourth-century naval warfare was never underestimated. Thucydides and Xenophon make this only too clear in their accounts of the unfolding events of the Peloponnesian War. Athenian, Persian and Spartan beliefs that the Great Peloponnesian War hinged on the amount of daily wages of such men must imply that many rowers followed, or were likely to follow, the fleet that paid the most money per day. In the fourth century, forensic speeches illustrate well the woes of Athenian trierarchs, or ship commanders, having to pay better wages to hire and retain the best crews, even from amongst Athenian citizens. The image of naval warfare is of a very mercenary and capital-intensive system of supply and demand.

Identifying the kind of men who undertook mercenary service is important for understanding their motivation. The provenance and background of

the men in mercenary service often underpinned their reasons for becoming mercenaries and even the kind of mercenaries that they became: mariners or infantry, hoplites or peltasts, long- or short-term servicemen. Motivation can provide a useful heuristic device by which not only to assess the reasons for mercenary service in the ancient Greek world, but also to understand the nature of the men involved in that service. In theory, one assumes that poor men served from need, while rich men had grander ambitions; very poor men served in the fleets of the great powers, while those who could afford armour had a better chance of service as hoplites and even as commanders. The poor in the navies are often invisible, as are the mass of men in large infantry armies, and the level of true mercenary behaviour, as opposed to allied or national service, can only be inferred. What is clear is that mercenaries and money played major roles in Greek warfare by the later fifth century.

J. K. Davies (1992: 305) states of the later fifth and fourth centuries BC that:

Athenian citizen hoplite soldiers had followed their poorer counterparts in the fleet by no longer serving by property class from their own resources (albeit with a ration allowance) but instead by being assimilated to mercenaries in their relationship to the state as pay-master.

If money was already important for naval warfare at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, it became more important for land warfare by the war's end and was certainly extremely important in the fourth century. The numbers of mercenaries among infantrymen exploded in the later fifth and the fourth centuries BC. The reasons for this explosion require analysis. The environment of the Greek mainland and the historical context of warfare in the later fifth century underlie the available supply of mercenary soldiers from both the Greek mainland and the broader Aegean basin, as do the perceived attractions of mercenary service, sustenance, pay and booty. We shall see that the real reason that great numbers of Greek mercenaries entered into mercenary service in the fifth and fourth centuries BC was the demand of employers in the Near East and Sicily for Greeks from the mainland. The eastern Mediterranean descended into a cycle of violence and chaos in the later fifth and the fourth centuries BC and at the same time the Greek communities needed increasing numbers of lightly armed troops, specialists and professionals to bolster citizen levies of hoplites.

Of course, demand does not explain why any individual might seek mercenary service. By the fourth century BC mercenary service had become very common. The growth of mercenary service in the fifth century BC to its apex in the fourth provides a useful backdrop for any discussion of motivation in the later *polis* period. The nature and scope of this growth needs

attention because it is related to the pressures in the Greek mainland and the attractions of mercenary service that led so many Greeks to seek military service overseas. The conclusions provide a clearer understanding of the relationship of the Greek *poleis* to the eastern Mediterranean at a critical period in Greek history.

Personal motivation is rarely expressed in the sources. Ancient authors were more interested in the problems and practicalities facing the employers and commanders of mercenaries than in those of the men they led. Motives, therefore, often need to be inferred from the type and status of the men who took service or from the rewards that they received during and after service. The mercenary interests of the poor *thêtes* in naval crews in the Peloponnesian War did not interest Thucydides beyond the problems they created for Nicias at Syracuse by deserting, or Pericles' fear that this might tip the balance against the Athenians at the start of the war. Most of the literary evidence, therefore, provides a narrative of circumstantially related events.

Individuals must have undertaken mercenary service with personal gain in mind. The early poets, like Archilochus and Hybrias, sang that their arms and armour represented their food and drink but, despite its importance, sustenance was not all that mercenary service provided. Personal motivation for better rewards is best illustrated among Athenian naval crews, signing on for high fees and staying with commanders who paid higher rates. Desire for personal profit from war certainly drove others to become mercenaries. Thucydides associated personal and private gain (*kerdos*) specifically to mercenary activity with the Athenian campaign to Sicily of 414 BC (Thuc. 7.57.9–10). The wage-earners (*misthophoroi*) from Arcadia followed the fleet to Sicily for the sake of personal profit alone (*kerdos*). *Kerdos* is often contrasted with a desire for the public good of the state. It is private and barefaced greed that benefits the individual to the detriment of the many (Hdt. 3.71.4, 72.4; 6.100.2; 9.38.1; Thuc. 1.8.3; 2.44.4, 65.3; 3.38.2, 43.1). It is surprising that mercenaries are not associated with this kind of private greed more often in the sources. It must have driven many into service. Diodorus only once claims that men sought mercenary service for *kerdos*, when war was imminent on wealthy Cyprus in about 350 BC (Diod. 16.42.9). Oddly, Diodorus did not use *kerdos* to describe the greed of the mercenaries who had pillaged Delphi with the Phocians at about the same time. Xenophon claimed that many of the generals (*stratēgoi*) and captains (*lochagoi*) on the *anabasis* campaign had followed Cyrus because they believed they would receive 'better reward' (*kerdaleoteron*) from loyalty to him than from any monthly wage (*kerdos*), but he was alluding to their interest in benefits other than immediate gain, like land and associated powers (Xen. *An.* 1.9.17). Their interests lay in something bigger, better and less base than mere daily wages.

Personal gain did not underlie all mercenary service. Complex motivations and relationships beyond *kerdos* worked to drive mercenary activity. Xenophon presents us with the view that most of the men who followed the Persian

Prince Cyrus did so not from need, but from a belief in Cyrus' good qualities and his *arete* or nobility (Xen. *An.* 6.4.8; Parke 1933: 29; Roy 1967: 319). How far this can be trusted is questionable, especially as he claimed for his own motivations hopes of friendship (*philia*) with the prince. The other Greek commanders were the ritualized friends (*xenoi*) of Cyrus, not so much like hired *condottieri* as Cyrus' noble friends and allies. In persuading Xenophon to join with him, Seuthes, the Thracian prince, claims the kinship (*syngenes*) of Thracians and Athenians (Xen. *An.* 7.2.31). Friendship and ritualized friendship were common in otherwise seemingly mercenary relationships throughout the later fifth and fourth centuries BC. Similarly, mercenaries from the Peloponnese often served through the diplomatic relationships of Sparta with the rest of the Mediterranean and so were part of the network of alliances and friendships found at a state rather than a personal level. The Spartans sent men to aid Cyrus' expedition through their friendship with the prince, and regularly allowed Dionysius, the Tyrant of Syracuse, to recruit men from the Peloponnese. In this sense, the Greek mercenary's interests and those of allies had much in common.

Commanders are more prominent in the sources than the men. As a corollary, the reasons why they took service are discussed more fully than those of the men they led. Commanders had status at home and were usually wealthy and it is conceivable that their motivation was different from that of the men whom they employed and led. The treatment of specific individuals, therefore, should be regarded as less than representative of the whole picture. The ordinary soldiers appear only in groups and never as personalities. Poorer men were more likely to seek service for a wage and for sustenance. Naturally the commanders, the aristocrats of mercenary service, came into service for more noble and honourable reasons and on account of their international associations with the aristocrats of other states.

The rewards of mercenary service are frequently mentioned in the sources. The references are perhaps misleading if applied to the concerns of ordinary mercenary soldiers when they embarked on the campaign. The reward, whether that meant monetary short-term gain or something more substantial and longer lasting, is not the reason why men left their homes in the first place. It is important to realize also that the rewards might be incidental to service. Most remuneration was ongoing throughout a mercenary's career and was a means of survival rather than an end in itself. In some cases, final remuneration was the realization of the aspirations that induced men to leave their homes: a farm and status through the friendship and patronage of a powerful man. In others, it meant repatriation to their homes. In many cases, no doubt, mercenaries became trapped in a cycle of ongoing employment and unfulfilled aspirations. Monetary rewards were attractive to mercenaries and *kerdos* was important to them, but neither should distract us from the fact that mercenary service might yield more than pay alone.

Both negative and positive attractions motivated mercenary service. On

the one hand, negative forces like poverty and exile drove men into mercenary service; while on the other, positive forces, like high pay and booty, attracted men to become mercenaries. Factors that would have made men unwilling to stay in their homelands were not necessarily those factors that drew them into mercenary service. The former provided the context for mercenary service. They explain, in part, the availability of men for service. Much of this context, like most of the mercenaries in service, came from mainland Greece. Despite the evidence being extremely Atheno-centric, most of the Greek mercenary infantry came specifically from the Peloponnese in the late fifth and fourth centuries BC.

The explosion in mercenary numbers in the late fifth century

Before the fifth century BC, the only large number of Greek mercenaries known in service abroad were the 30,000 Carians and Ionians who took service with Psamettichus (Hdt. 2.152–4; Diod. 1.66.12, 67.1–3, 68.5).¹ The sources make this appear to be an isolated incident of mass Greek hiring. In Herodotus' account, these men seem much like freebooters who happen to be hired by the Egyptian pharaoh. Diodorus' version includes a more formal invitation from the pharaoh asking the Greeks to come to the Egyptians' aid. It is possible that ritualized friendships between Ionians and Carians facilitated the relationship with the Egyptians in this instance. Otherwise, mercenaries appear only in the service of Aegean and Sicilian tyrants down to the middle of the sixth century BC. Despite often being aggressively military men, the early tyrants employed mercenaries only as bodyguards. The spread of money from the mid-sixth century enabled more ambitious use of mercenary soldiers from abroad. Pisistratus used money (*chrēmata*) from the mines of Pangaeum to hire soldiers (*stratiôtai misthosamenoî*) from Thrace as well as troops from Argos and Thebes with which he defeated his opponents at Athens and reconstituted his tyranny (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 15.1–3). Polycrates of Samos had a large number of hired soldiers (*epikouroi misthôtai*) at about the same time (Hdt. 3.39.1, 45.3). The tyrants of Sicily, Hippocrates, Gelon and Hieron of Gela, all led the way towards the growing numbers of mercenaries and employed several thousands of them (Diod. 11.21.1, 48.3, 53.3, 62.3, 67.5–7, 72.3; Hdt. 7.154.1; Parke 1933: 10–13). In the chaos of late Archaic and early Classical Sicily it is often difficult to tell if these men were all genuine mercenaries or large numbers of wandering fugitives in search of land and a community. Certainly the dynasts of Syracuse were able to settle many of these men within their own community and those of their subject states. These tyrannies aside, the mercenaries of the later sixth century were far from ubiquitous and the Persian Wars were fought largely by non-mercenary Greek citizen militias and contributed greatly to an ideology based upon the ideal of the citizen-soldier.

The period 479–322 BC saw what Harvey Miller (1984: 153) called an explosion in the numbers of known mercenaries serving in the Mediterranean. The Persian Wars drew mainland Greece more closely into the orbit of the Near East. While Ionians had served the Great King in large numbers as tributary subjects in the later sixth and fifth centuries BC, mainland Greeks did not serve him or his satraps in great numbers until the later fifth century BC. The end of the Great Peloponnesian War provided a watershed in the use of mercenary Greeks serving overseas. Thucydides illustrates a steady rise in mercenary numbers through the last years of the fifth century. Thousands of men had already seen professional and mercenary service in the fleets of both sides in the war. From the end of the Peloponnesian War, however, there was a massive rise in mercenary infantry numbers and a new era had dawned in mercenary service. Accompanying and aiding research into such large mercenary numbers is a greater variety of source material available to modern historians. As the mercenary phenomenon continued through the fourth century BC it became a theme of contemporary speech-writers, philosophers and historians.

It is important to realize that there had been a steady increase in the numbers of mercenaries in service in the eastern Mediterranean throughout the fifth century BC. However, large mercenary armies only appeared for the first time after 404 BC. The first of these was the famous Ten Thousand, or Cyreans, which comprised 11,000 Greek hoplites and accompanying specialist troops, gathered by Cyrus the Younger for the purpose of overthrowing the Great King of Persia in 401 BC. Cyrus hired these men through his existing foreign ritualized friends (*xenoi*) and garrison commanders (*phrouarchoi*). He wanted Peloponnesians (Xen. *An.* 1.1.6). In 399 BC, the tyrant Dionysius I had gathered together an army of 80,000 men at Syracuse (Diod. 14.47.7; Parke 1933: 63–71). Many of these cannot have been Syracusans. H. W. Parke (1933: 68) assumes that 20,000–27,000 of these men were mercenaries, while Diodorus (14.43.2–3) noted that Dionysius had made 140,000 shields for the many men who had drifted into his service. According to Diodorus some Messenians went to join Dionysius in Sicily and a further 3,000 went to Cyrene (Diod. 14.34.3). Dionysius was a prolific employer of mercenaries from the Peloponnese in the early part of the fourth century BC, even allowing for the exaggeration in ancient figures of those who came to him.

As the fourth century BC developed other large armies appeared. Artaxerxes employed between 12,000 and 20,000 mainland Greeks for his planned invasion of Egypt in 380 BC (Nepos, *Iphicrates*, 11.2.4; Diod. 15.41.1). Ten thousand Greeks served with the Pharaoh Tachos in the 360s BC (Diod. 15.92.2); 10,000 under the Phocians in the 350s and 340s BC (Diod. 16.24–31); 20,000 with Nectanebo in Egypt in the 340s (Diod. 16.47.6); and Darius III employed an enormous 50,000 against Alexander in the 330s. Alexander himself may have employed as many as 42,000 Greeks in his conquest of the Near East (Parke 1933: 198). Many non-Greeks also

appeared in the armies of the Near Eastern rulers as, for example, Diodorus (15.91.2) mentions 20,000 unspecified mercenaries with the satrap of Cappadocia in 362/1 BC.

Prolific mercenary numbers and numerous mercenary armies are not the only illustrations that mercenary service became more common in the fourth century BC. Orators and philosophers commented upon the itinerant mercenary in their writings. Isocrates' works are full of references to mercenaries. For much of his career he was concerned about the growing number of outsiders driven to mercenary service. As early as 380 BC he had expressed (Isoc. 4.168) his concerns about men who were 'wandering with their women and children in strange lands, and many, compelled through lack of the necessities of life to enlist in foreign armies, are being slain fighting for their foes against their friends'. In his ninth letter written in 366/5 BC he expressed more concern about such outsiders (Isoc. *Epistle*, 9.9.8). His oration *On the Peace*, produced in 355 after the Social War, noted reprimandingly that the Athenians, like the Great King of Persia, employed mercenary armies full of men who 'when others offer higher pay will follow their leadership against us' (Isoc. 8.44–7).

Even Demosthenes advocated using mercenaries. His *First Philippic* detailed a plan to employ mercenary armies in Thrace (Dem. 4.28–9). Aischines strongly implied the growing reliance of the state upon professionals on the battlefield (Aisch. 2.148–51, 167–9; Dem. 19.113; Burckhardt 1996: *passim*; van Wees 1998: 376–8). Aristotle (*Nic. Mac.* 3.8.9) recognized the quality of professional soldiers in experience, skill and arms, though he claimed these men were more likely than their citizen counterparts to turn and flee from a desperate encounter than to conquer or die together. The orators and philosophers were not alone in their awareness of the growing number of mercenaries. Antiphanes wrote a comic play about a professional soldier around 351 BC (*apud* Athenaeus 6.258; Kassel and Austin vol. 2. fragment 2003). The ubiquity of mercenaries in the fourth century BC is further demonstrated by the appearance of the wandering soldier as a stock character of new comedy by the last quarter of the century. Aeneas Tacticus' treatise entitled *How to Survive under Siege* (10.7, 9, 12.2, 13.1–3) takes it very much for granted that a city thus endangered would have mercenaries within its walls.

Given the nature of the evidence it is safe to conclude that the later fifth and fourth centuries BC were different from earlier times. The appearance of large mercenary armies in the fourth century saw new terminology for mercenaries as well as new practices for payment in coinage in the Greek world.² Thus, the end of the fifth century was a new era in several respects. The reasons for this are related, but need further analysis of the types of soldiers involved in mercenary service and their provenance.

Provenance and type of soldier

The broadening horizons of the Greek cities during the sixth century BC and the Persian invasions at the beginning of the fifth had introduced the Greeks to new forms of warfare and new types of troops from outside the Greek mainland. Specialist troops like cavalry and various kinds of light troops (*psiloi*), javelin men (*akontistai*), slingers (*sphendonêtai*) and archers (*toxotai*) came from outside the Greek mainland to augment the hoplite infantry armies of the Greek cities. Often these troops were not Greeks at all, coming as they did from the periphery of the Greek world. Initially, all of these were hired mercenaries as the Greek cities did not have specialist light troops from amongst the lower classes of society until the Peloponnesian Wars. The different kind of troops in the army fell into two corps: heavily armed hoplites (*hoplitai*) and light troops (*gymnetes*, *psiloi*) which included the untrained support troops who carried no shields and simply threw missiles ranging from stones (*petroboloi*) and javelins (*akontistai*), and more specialist troops armed with a special kind of light wooden or wicker shield (*peltê*) without a rim, as well as either a thrusting spear or javelins and a sword, often of a slashing-cutting type (*machaira*) rather than one used for thrusting (Best 1969: 1). These men were peltasts (*peltastai*). The peltast is often seen as midway between the heavily armed hoplite and the lightly armed troops who had almost no protective equipment.

The peltasts initially came from Thrace. They appeared in service in the fifth century, and by the fourth century Athenians used such mercenaries extensively. Their influence on Greek warfare was significant and it is possible that many Greeks from within the cities armed themselves as peltasts by the early fourth century BC. The sources are prone to vagueness regarding peltasts. Questions arise as to the provenance of the peltasts. When the sources note 'the peltasts of the Athenians' they could easily mean 'Athenians who were peltasts' or (perhaps more accurately) Thracian or other foreign 'peltasts in the pay of the Athenians'. If the former was the case and Athenians were serving as peltasts under the likes of Iphicrates, then Athenians who were mercenaries would greatly increase in numbers. It would seem that the Athenians did have their own units of light troops before the Corinthian War of 395 BC (Best 1969: 40 contra Parke 1933: 48–57).

Light troops had always been a part of Greek warfare, but as hoplite warfare dominated the wars of the sixth century their role was marginalized. This began to change through the century. Light troops from Thrace appear in Greek warfare from the late sixth century BC. The tyrant Pisistratus may well have been the first to tap into the supply of light troops found in Thrace, and peltast troops specifically, to establish his tyranny once and for all in 546 BC. Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 15.1–3) illustrates the importance of these lightly armed Thracians when he writes:

In this way his [Pisistratus'] first return took place. Afterwards, as he was expelled a second time in about the seventh year after his return – for he did not maintain his hold for long, but came to be afraid of both the factions owing to his unwillingness to live with Megacles' daughter as his wife, and secretly withdrew—: and first he collected a settlement at a place near the gulf of Thermae called Rheacelus, but from there he went on to the neighbourhood of Pangaeus, from where he got money [*chremata*] and hired soldiers [*stratiôtai mithôsamenoî*], and in the eleventh year [546 BC] went again to Eretria and now for the first time set about an attempt to recover his power by force, being supported in this by a number of people, especially the Thebans and Lygdamis of Naxos.

Light troops (*psiloi*) supported the Spartans and Athenians in the Persian Wars, but do not seem to have played a regular role in hoplite warfare until after this time. They were becoming more important in the warfare of the fifth century. Light troops served the Athenians through the Peloponnesian War both from amongst the Athenian poorer classes and from outside sources of supply for pay. By the later fifth century light troops had begun to influence and play a greater role in Greek warfare. Best, following Thucydides, argues that no native light troops existed at Athens at the time of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 4.94.1; Best 1969: 36), while Parke (1933: 48) is adamant in his claims that there were no citizen light troops (*psiloi*) during the Peloponnesian War. Logic dictates that this was not entirely the case: for example, some Boeotians must have been among the 10,000 light troops (*psiloi*) who fought at Delium in 424 BC (Thuc. 4.93.3). The war stimulated a demand for specialist troops fighting in different, long-range and long-term conditions. Thucydides (2.29.5; 4.129.2; 5.6.4; 7.27.1) mentions Thracian peltasts several times. For example, the campaigns in Ambracia in 426 BC taught Demosthenes the hard way that Greek light troops could be effective against hoplites (Thuc. 3.94.3–3.98). Demosthenes learned his lesson and had light troops with him when he laid an ambush for the Spartans at Olpai (Thuc. 3.107–8). He armed the rowers from the ships at Sphacteria in 425 BC with simple twig-woven shields, making them instant light troops who could assail the Spartans from all sides in great numbers and at speed (Thuc. 4.9.1). By 411 BC, the Athenians had adapted their own human resources to provide levies of specialist troops and, by 409 BC, 5,000 sailors (*nautai*) appear equipped with peltast-type shields, though probably were not themselves specialist peltasts (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.1; Best 1969: 37). Some of those who fought in the revolt against the thirty tyrants were not hoplites, but a variety of lightly armed men including those carrying the peltast's shield (*peltophoroi*), light troops (*psiloi*) armed with javelins (*akontistai*) and stone-throwing *petroboloi* (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.15). Thus, by the end of the war some Athenians were armed as peltasts and as other kinds of light troops.

The march back to the sea of Xenophon's companions in 401 BC had demonstrated the usefulness of light troops fighting alongside hoplites on campaigns (Xen. *An.* 3.4.25–30; 4.1.17–19, 3.7–8; Best 1969: 78). Best notes the important role played by the light troops in the battles fought during the retreat by showing that 50 per cent of light troops died on the campaign as opposed to only 25 per cent of the hoplites. This high casualty rate certainly indicates the amount of fighting the light troops were engaged in on the campaign. No doubt the lightly armed troops were more vulnerable to mortal wounds than the hoplites. Several references show that there were light troops with the army that returned with Xenophon to the Hellespont including 200 Cretan archers and 800 Thracian peltasts (Xen. *An.* 1.2.9), 500 Dolopian, Aenianian and Olynthian peltasts (Xen. *An.* 1.2.6) and 300 peltasts with Pasion of Megara (Xen. *An.* 1.2.6). The most famous regiment of light troops became known simply as the foreign corps or *to xenikon*. (Ar. *Plout.* 173; Dem. 4.24; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 3.9.57; Best 1969: 93). This band fought at Corinth on the Isthmus during the Corinthian War. They were all mercenary peltasts. They famously defeated the Spartans near Corinth at Lechaemum in 390 BC (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.11–18; Plut. *Ages.* 22). These peltasts went with Iphicrates to the Hellespont (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.34–5). They remained part of the same unit when Chabrias took over their command and took them to Cyprus in 387 BC (Best 1969: 96). The success of Chabrias' regiment must have influenced others to want to fight alongside, or even as, peltasts. In 349 BC the Athenians employed 2,000 peltasts (Philochorus, *FHG* frag. 132). Peltasts appear more frequently in the sources as the fourth century continues. For example, 3,000 peltasts served with Euagoras in the 380s (Isoc. 4.141). Parke states there were unlikely to have been mercenaries in Spartan service prior to 386 BC and adds the likelihood that after the start of the Olynthian campaign in 383 BC Sparta hired only peltasts and not hoplites (Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.4; Parke 1933: 83). If this is true, it would support Best's claims that there was a high demand for peltasts on the Greek mainland specifically as opposed to Sicily and the northern Aegean. The force raised by Polytropus in 370/69 BC, among others, further demonstrates this need (Xen. *Hell.* 6.13–14, 17). The Phocian mercenary armies of the Sacred War also included 1,000 Greek peltasts hired by Philomelus, but Best has argued that many of the soldiers with the Phocians were from Phocis itself (Diod. 16.24.2; Best 1969: 106–7). In support of this argument, Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.4.9) states that the peltasts at Leuctra were Phocians.

By the mid-fourth century, many men in service were peltasts, including both Greeks and non-Greeks. Greek peltasts even served the satraps in the east by the middle of the fourth century (Nep. *Dat.* 14.8.2). Parke claims that light troops like peltasts were more common than hoplites by the beginning of the fourth century BC. This view is supported by a passage in Diodorus (15.44.3), repeated with less detail by Nepos (*Iph.* 11.1.3, 4), eulogizing the deeds of Iphicrates (see Parke 1933: 48–57, 79–83). It is a digression set in

374 BC in which Diodorus noted that Iphicrates introduced changes to the hoplite panoply:

For instance, the Greeks were using shields, which were large and consequently difficult to handle; these he discarded and made small oval ones of moderate size, thus successfully achieving both objects, to furnish the body with adequate cover and to enable the user of the small shield, on account of its lightness, to be completely free in his movements. After a trial of the new shield its easy manipulation secured its adoption, and the infantry who had previously been called hoplites because of their heavy shield [*aspis*], then had their name changed to peltasts from the light *pelta* they carried.

This presents intriguing problems. It is unclear when Iphicrates introduced these reforms. Does the historian mean that these reforms were introduced at the time of the eulogy or at some time in the life of Iphicrates? Of more importance is what Diodorus meant by hoplites being called peltasts. It is possible that he meant by this that all hoplites now adopted peltast equipment. After all, what would be the point of simply changing the name? Diodorus himself did not determine specific troop types often, preferring to use the generic terms *stratiôtês* for soldier or *misthophorôs* for mercenary without explanation. He continued to follow this preference even after his statement about the transformation of hoplites into peltasts.

Following this Diodorian passage, Griffith (1935: 17), like Parke, assumes that the majority of the mercenaries in the fourth century BC were peltasts. He supports this statement by citing Arrian (*Anab.* 3.18.1). Arrian claimed that when Alexander wanted speed from a unit of his army he took with him the Macedonian phalanx, but left behind the mercenaries and the heavy troops. Griffith realized this passage might suggest that the mercenaries with Alexander were more heavily armed. He added, however, that the phalanx itself might have been more lightly armed than the peltasts of its day and that the mercenaries were peltasts who were more heavily armed than the phalanx. Griffith, following Arrian and Diodorus, implied that Iphicrates' reforms, creating as they did a more heavily armed peltast, were prolifically adopted in Greece and especially by professional troops. According to several authorities most of the mercenaries in the fourth century BC, as Parke states, were peltasts. This has had very recent support as Peter Hunt (1998: 190) claims that 'in the fourth century mercenaries encroached [more] on the other divisions of the military [specialist troops] than amongst the hoplites. Many if not most mercenaries were peltasts especially from Thrace.'

Against these arguments, Jan Best (1969: 102–10) concludes that the reforms to which Diodorus (and Nepos) referred never took place. Peltasts were not uniformly armed in the fifth and fourth centuries; some carried a thrusting spear, others carried javelins. He believes that later authors linked

the reforms to the victory at Lechaeum and became confused by the difference in equipment displayed by peltasts. In short, there was no peltast reform and, if there had been, the reforms would have made no difference anyway. Hoplites did not become peltasts. As he states (104): 'the view – to be found in both Diodorus and Nepos – that Iphicrates turned the Greek hoplite into a peltast proves that both authors had no idea of the military situation in Iphicrates' time'.

Of course, we have seen that there were many peltasts in service in the Mediterranean basin in the fourth century BC. Certainly, the Greek cities of the mainland whose need for specialist troops to augment their citizen (hoplite) army was great hired them prolifically and seem unlikely to have had full-time specialist light troops ready for service. As Jan Best (1969: 134) claimed, 'the majority of mercenaries who fought in Spartan and Athenian armies in Greece proper in the fourth century were peltasts'.

Peltasts and other specialists then served the mainland Greek *poleis*, and are found serving throughout the Mediterranean. Peltasts provided very useful support to hoplite armies in reconnaissance, van and rearguard actions, fighting on irregular terrain, provisioning and, especially to mercenary armies, in plundering regions of enemy territory, which was often essential for paying mercenary soldiers. Nevertheless, hoplites remained a significant feature of the mercenary battlefields of the time, adding weight to the idea that Iphicrates' reforms, as reported by Diodorus, were not genuine.

The Greek mainland exported mercenaries in great numbers. The Greeks were noted for their use of hoplite warfare. The hoplite ethos, and its relationship to the freeborn citizen-farmer, meant that it was not socially acceptable for the citizen-landowner to fight as a lightly armed *psilos*. For these two reasons, it is unlikely that the first Greek mercenaries from the mainland were anything other than hoplites, and there is nothing to contradict this in the sources. Indeed, these early men fighting for others as hoplites may well have been wandering displaced citizens or former citizens (Kaplan 2002: 229–41). In later times, the fifth and fourth centuries BC, hoplites were in demand outside mainland Greece by the Persians and other eastern potentates (Xen. *An.* 1.1.6). This occurred, no doubt, because eastern rulers lacked numbers of heavy infantry as shock troops, as we shall see, but did not lack native levies of specialist cavalry and lightly armed troops (Hdt. 9.63; Pl. *Leg.* 697e; Xen. *Cyr.* 8.8.26). It is also worth noting that many troops in eastern service were not required for battlefield action. The Persians in particular required troops as permanent garrisons in regions of their vast empire (Xen. *An.* 1.1.6; Tuplin 1992: 67–70).

Mercenary hoplites persuaded by pay must have accompanied Aristeus of Corinth to Potidaea in 432 BC and Brasidas must have taken hoplites with him northbound to Chalcidice in 424 BC to fight in a region surrounded by lightly armed local troops, but not well supplied with (Greek) hoplites (Thuc. 1.60.1; 4.80.5). Later in the war it is almost unthinkable that the Greek

mercenaries with the satraps in the eastern Aegean were anything but hoplites from the Peloponnese and we know well that 11,000 Greek hoplites formed the core of Cyrus' army which travelled into the Near East when the combined armies of Xenias, Proxenus, Sopaenetus and Pasion (Xen. *An.* 1.2.3) along with those added by Menon (Xen. *An.* 1.2.6) and Clearchus (Xen. *An.* 1.2.9) are collated.

Hoplites were employed outside mainland Greece in the very areas that hired the majority of mercenaries throughout the fourth century BC in the Near East, Egypt and Sicily. Diodorus (14.99.2) described hoplite soldiers (*stratiôtai hoplitai*) – almost certainly mercenaries – serving with the Persian commander Struthas involved in Thibron's defeat in Asia in 390 BC (Parke 1933: 45 n. 2). After Diodorus' watershed date for Iphicrates' hoplite reforms, hoplites continued in service as mercenaries and soldiers generally. The Persians continued to employ such troops in number. Polyaeus, perhaps questionably because of the anecdotal nature of his material, noted that Pammenes' force which went to Asia in 353 BC contained few light troops and at about the same time Orontes commanded 10,000 hoplites (Polyaeus, *Strat.* 5.16.2; 7.14.3, 4). Darius employed 50,000 Greeks to fight Alexander. There is little to suggest that these were not hoplites. Arrian noted mercenaries armed with hoplite arms (*hopla*) at both Miletus and Issus (Arr. *Anab.* 1.19.4, 2.8.6). Indeed, the mercenaries at Miletus swam to the relative safety of an unnamed island in the backs of their upturned shields (*aspides*). Those at Issus were a hoplite battalion (*hoplitikon*), but at other places Arrian unhelpfully referred to the Macedonian phalangites simply as heavily armed *hoplitai* (e.g. Arr. *Anab.* 1.28.6). Sometimes he simply distinguished *hoplitai* as heavily armed from lightly armed or *psiloi* (Arr. *Anab.* 2.8.8), without meaning they were Greek hoplites. Clearly, not all hoplites had become peltasts after 374 BC.

Both hoplite and peltast mercenaries abounded in the fourth century. Even the Athenians with access to decent numbers of citizen-hoplites hired hoplites in the mid-fourth century BC (Isoc. 8.48). What is clear is that mercenary troops supplemented the needs of employers. The armies of the Great King required Greek heavily armed troops. There is nothing to suggest that the Persians went out of their way to hire mercenary peltasts from the Greek mainland. Hoplite mercenaries continued in service in defence of the Persian Empire during Alexander's invasion. Similarly, it is unlikely that a region like Thrace required many peltasts from outside its borders or that the Persians sought light troops in addition to the thousands they conscripted from the various native levies around the empire. In general, we can safely conclude, with Best, that peltasts and lightly armed specialists served the needs of the *poleis* of the mainland, while hoplites found service with the kings and satraps of the empires of the east.

Another aspect of mercenary service that was new in the late *polis* period was the provenance of Greek mercenaries in service. We have seen that

specialist troops came from specific regions: peltasts from Thrace and later from the peripheral regions of northern and central Greece, slingers from Rhodes and archers from Crete. The majority of the mercenaries serving as hoplites in the Mediterranean were from the Peloponnese and by far the greatest number of Peloponnesians came from Arcadia. Even as early as the fifth century BC the Arcadian mercenary had become proverbial. Hermippus (Kassel and Austin vol. 5, frag. 63, line 18) listed imports to Athens in 428 BC, among which were 'epikouroi from Arcadia'. Thucydides (1.60.1; 3.34.2; 4.80.5, 123, 129.3, 132, 7.19, 57.1–2, 58.3; 8.28.4) recorded only Peloponnesians as mercenary infantry, specifically the Arcadians. Xenophon thought that Cyrus demanded Peloponnesians specifically and so recruited soldiers from the Peloponnese (Xen. *An.* 1.1.6). A high proportion of the men on the campaign were Arcadians, perhaps as many as 4,000 of the 13,000 and a further large group, 2,700, came from Achaia, also in the Peloponnese (Roy 1967: 307–8; Nielsen 1999: 40–3). Furthermore twelve of fifteen generals came from the Peloponnese, fifteen of twenty-eight *lochagoi*, and seven of thirteen known enlisted men.

The *anabasis* may not be a representative sample of all mercenaries in service at the turn of the fifth century, but given corroborative evidence from other sources and trends in the period it seems to bear out a preponderance of Peloponnesians in mercenary service. For example, Peloponnesians also served Dionysius I, the tyrant of Syracuse, throughout his career in Sicily in the later fifth and early fourth centuries (Diod. 14.44.1–2, 58.1; 15.17.3; Parke 1933: 68). In response to Dionysius' successes the Carthaginians also sent to Europe to recruit mercenaries (Diod. 14.47.3) and having realized that the Peloponnesians were the fiercest warriors they sent ambassadors to hire them again in about 340 BC (Plut. *Tim.* 30). Alexander also sent to the Peloponnese to collect soldiers (Arr. *Anab.* 1.24.2; 2.20.5). The fact that Peloponnesians served in his mercenary forces is well attested (Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.8). Even inscriptions show Arcadians, probably in mercenary service, overseas in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. One illustrates seven Arcadians slain in a day by a Lycian dynast (Tod *GHI* 93). Another is an epitaph to Pantias of Tegea who the commentator concludes served with Leucon the ruler of Panticapaeum (*SEG* 37.676). Finally, a third represents an honorary decree set up by Arcadian mercenaries to Leucon (Hicks and Hill 136). Frederick Cooper considered that the Temple of Apollo Epikourios at Bassae was an Arcadian homage to its mercenary traditions, perhaps even financed from mercenary remuneration (Cooper 1978: 20–8 and 1996: 75–9; see also Fields 1994: 95–113). Aristophanes (*Hip.* 795–800) made Cleon explain away the bad treatment of the poor and the continuation of the war to the sausage-seller in the *Knights* (424 BC) in the following terms:

The purpose of this is that Demos may rule over all the Greeks; for the oracles predict that if he is patient, he must one day sit as judge

in Arcadia at five obols a day. Meanwhile, I will nourish him, look after him and, above all, I will ensure to him his three obols.

Athenian imports from Arcadia in wartime in the 420s BC were *epikouroi*, and the juxtaposition made is most obvious. In the peace that will follow, Athenian exports will be judges, on a better daily rate than they were in 424 BC. The Aristophanic joke is clear. The payment received by each is for the profession in which each is skilled: the Athenians at sitting in juries for the Arcadians, the Arcadians at fighting for the Athenians. Significantly, Xenophon made the Arcadian politician Lycomedes say that whenever anyone required mercenaries (*epikouroi*) they hired Arcadians 'because they were the bravest [*alkimotatos*]' of the Greek peoples (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.23). These later fifth- and fourth-century soldiers were exploiting what was probably a much older tradition of mercenary service. The Sicilian tyrant Gelon established relationships with several prominent Arcadians in the early fifth century. Perhaps he sought military assistants through friendship associations (Pind. *Ol.* 6.7, 74, 101–5; Paus. 5.27.1; Parke 1933: 11).

Most numerous after the Peloponnesians in infantry mercenary service outside the Greek mainland were Greeks from Attica and Boeotia. It cannot be a coincidence that the least numerous peoples found in mercenary service were the Ionians and Greeks who lived in Africa and Sicily. Later sources claimed that the Sicilians were proverbial mercenary soldiers, perhaps due to the predominant roles played by both tyranny and mercenary activity with which it was always associated in the island's history (Zenobius, 5.88; Macarius, *Cent.* 7.65; Parke 1933: 13). Of course, certain regions provided other types of mercenaries, like Thracian peltasts, Rhodian slingers and Cretan archers. Many of the crews of the Persian, Athenian and Spartan fleets came from the islands and the cities of Ionia. This leads to the conclusion that the mercenary explosion was regional in its nature as different regional peoples followed specific types of service. Most notably the Greek communities that were geographically nearest the big employers of mercenaries, the Persians and the Sicilian tyrants, did not find service with them in their land armies. Peloponnesians, on the other hand, especially from Arcadia, were prolific in mercenary employment in the later fifth and early fourth century BC. The reason that Ionian Greeks were not employed in great numbers by the Persians and why mainland Greeks were, is discussed more fully below and relates specifically to the need and demands of the employers of the great mercenary armies of the period.

Supply

The numbers of men taking mercenary service in the fourth century indicate that there was a decent supply of them ready and willing to take such service. Harvey Miller (1984: 153) frames his key questions about the motivation for

mercenary service in the following way: 'The main consideration of the professional soldier would have been the strength of the economic pressures causing him to hire out his sword instead of embracing a safer, more stable and comfortable civilian occupation.'

Miller's article focuses on the domestic pressures that would have taken men overseas in search of a livelihood. These pressures determined the supply of Greek mercenaries. This does not explain the reasons why military service overseas grew so much in the late *polis* period. Nevertheless, the factors that created supply were important as underlying the mercenary boom of the time. As Miller points out, the period saw environmental, military, political and economic factors all coming together at once (Miller 1984: 153) – population expansion (Parke 1933: 14 n. 1) combined with wars (Beloch 1912: 3.1 314; Parke 1933: 228), inflation (Parke 1933: 229–330) and exile (Parke 1933: 228 n. 1; McKechnie 1989: 22–9). McKechnie illustrates the rapid increase in the number of Greeks living outside their respective *poleis* after the Peloponnesian Wars. Before this time large-scale exilings were rare. The largest single figure of Greeks unable to return to their home state was the 3,000 Messenians who left the Peloponnese in 401 BC (Diod. 14.34.3 and 5). In general, McKechnie (1989: 28) points to the destruction of cities and the strife of the continued warfare of the fourth century BC which all served to destabilize the Greek mainland. He notes that men who left their *poleis* needed an income, and Geoffrey de Sainte Croix (1981: 182) claims that the first appearance in antiquity of hired labour on a large scale was in mercenary service. Parke (1933: 229–30) stresses economic decline after the great Peloponnesian War and points to the creation of larger estates as well. Miller (1984: 153) notes that the only available economic information comes from Attica during the Peloponnesian War and that there is nothing to suggest that conditions were different elsewhere. This argument, however, should not be overly stressed, for Attica suffered occupying Spartan armies throughout much of the war and the Peloponnese did not. Demosthenes (20.32 and 56.7) provides evidence that bread prices had fallen and that farmers needed capital to diversify their crops in order to survive in the fourth century BC. Some evidence suggests that this capital required the mortgaging of hereditary family estates (Xen. *Oec.* 3.6, 2.1). The result of such mortgaging was the decline of the citizen-farmer.

This evidence provides the basis for the assumption that mercenary service was a direct result of domestic pressures that pushed men abroad. Paul Cartledge (1987: 315) sees that '[i]nitially the numbers of men outstripped and therefore stimulated the demand'. But the supply of troops and the domestic factors that drove that supply do not go far enough in explaining why so many men left their homes in such great numbers to seek service abroad. They only illustrate why some Greeks would not have wanted or were unable to remain within the *polis*.

Other factors creating supply need to be mentioned. Military service was a

natural feature of the lives of Greek citizens (Ridley 1979: 511–13). The speaker in Isaeus 2 makes it seem normal for men having reached a certain age to do military service abroad (Isae. 2.5; Parke 1933: 232). Isaeus (9.14) is similarly matter-of-fact about service for the state or indeed, as the orator says of Astyphilus, ‘anywhere that he heard an army was being raised’. If the state did not require a citizen’s arms, there seems to have been no concern about serving another power. This phenomenon was borne out most prominently by the attitude of the Athenian commanders, and their attitude, no doubt, reflected that of the men who served with them. An Athenian inscription prohibiting citizens from taking service in Euboea suggests the Greek citizens were keenly joining the armies of others (Tod *GHI* 2.154, lines 10–15). Greeks were not by nature opposed to military service nor were they ideologically opposed to what appears to be mercenary service.

The armies of the various *poleis* were theoretically made up of hoplites, fighting in a phalanx. The great advantage of a hoplite phalanx, from a farmer’s perspective, was the minimal amount of training that it required.³ The ideal of the amateur warrior, therefore, was well ingrained in Greek psychology. This was true even in the later *polis* period (Vidal-Naquet 1986: 93–6; Hanson 1995: 305–6; Burckhardt 1996: 26–71, 76–9 and 86–138). Mercenary service was not always a daunting proposition, for often it involved bodyguard or garrison duties, neither of which required service in the front line (Thuc. 6.55.3; 8.28.4, 38.3; Xen. *An.* 1.7.3, 9; Tuplin 1992: 67–70). When the opportunity for service overseas appeared, it was natural to take it up. The warrior culture in which the Greeks operated made them ideal mercenary candidates. Potential foreign employers must have known that Greece was full of men able and willing to fight.

Other important factors in Greek society of the fifth and fourth centuries BC would have made mercenary service a natural consideration for any citizen in achieving his livelihood. The Greeks did not practise primogeniture; all the sons divided inherited property evenly amongst themselves (Pl. *Leg.* 740e; Lane Fox 1985: 211 and 222). When properties and available land were limited, friction and poverty resulted (Isae 6.10–11, 12.9; Dem. 40.10; Lys. 1; Just 1989: 33–9). The estate might be large enough to support only one household. In this case only one son might be able to marry and have a family. There is evidence for the practice of polyandry at Sparta (Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 1.7–10; Polyb. 12.6.B.8; Plut. *Lyc.* 15.12–13). Perhaps also the speaker’s brother in Isaeus 2 lived overseas due to the small size of their joint inheritance, while the speaker himself managed the family estate in Attica. Perhaps they had come to an arrangement that benefited the family. No doubt it was not uncommon for one or more sons to seek a livelihood abroad, and one such livelihood was in mercenary service.

Greece is a small and mountainous country prone to breeding more people than it can support. This situation underlay the great colonization movement of Greeks seeking new lands in the eighth through to the sixth

centuries BC. Nevertheless, by the early fifth century BC all the apparent avenues for colonization overseas had been exhausted (Murray 1980: 110–11) and while there were colonization attempts made through the fifth century BC, the movement of people to settle overseas had declined. Only imperial colonies were possible, for example Athenian military colonies (*klêruchoi*) in the Aegean basin. It was no coincidence that, with growing population pressures on the mainland, the Classical period found the Greeks embroiled in almost two centuries of warfare until Alexander set in motion the second wave of colonization in the East. Importantly, however, none of the sources indicates specifically that mercenaries sought land, and land was rarely used to pay mercenaries in the Classical age.

The Greek world had become economically more complex by the later fifth century BC than in any previous age. The introduction of coinage combined with a growth in trade had produced new economies and relationships. Nowhere was this better seen than in Athens. Sally Humphreys (1979: 15–16) argues that in the fifth century BC the economy of Athens became specialized and divided. Slaves worked for the production of food and artifacts, while citizens worked for the state and the empire. These latter received *misthos* for their service, whether it was in the military or in the law courts. The new Athenian Empire made this possible. The rich had opportunities in the Empire to further enrich themselves and to fight great wars. The result was a professionalized citizen body that became dependent on state pay and a wealthy aristocracy able to exploit a lucrative overseas empire. After the Athenian defeat these avenues for overseas income, though not for state pay, were closed. Because of these factors Athenians appeared in the Aegean on their own initiative throughout the fourth century BC. The situation in the Peloponnese was different. Changes to this region must have lagged behind those at Athens, and the war affected the region differently. Nevertheless, by 383 BC Sparta allowed states to provide cash, instead of men, to fulfil their obligations to the Peloponnesian League (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.21). This suggests some degree of monetization in the Peloponnese and a growing professionalization of military forces in the Spartan alliance. John K. Davies (1993: 187) observes that the economic forces of the fourth century BC dragged states ‘whose citizens had previously formed a seasonal unpaid army . . . willy nilly into a more monetary public economy and into endemic financial crisis’.

It is possible that mercenary service replaced national military incomes and economic production that was not met at home for individuals and for states as well. Athenian citizens were not found in service before the end of the fifth century BC. The reason, no doubt, lay with both the needs and benefits of imperial Athens. The Peloponnesian states were no doubt affected by an increased monetary economy and certainly by the general specialization of the Greek world after the Peloponnesian War, leading them to embrace a more professional approach to their military.

The Peloponnesian Wars have also been seen as a catalyst for mass mercenary service. Parke (1933: 20) stated this most clearly: '[T]he Peloponnesian War, through the damage which it inflicted on the greater part of Greece, was the proximate cause of Hellenic decline, and also by the consequent unrest produced an abundant supply of soldiers for hire.'

The war accustomed men to military service and they professionalized soldiering through long-term service that was no longer constrained by seasonal campaigns due to the length of overseas military commitments (Diod. 14.37.1). Specialist troops too were more plentiful in the later fifth century BC due to the Peloponnesian Wars (Grundy 1948: 262; Best 1969: 36). Many historians point to a relationship between the spread of warfare and the growth of mercenary activity (Mossé 1968: 223 and 229; Garlan 1975: 91–3; Loraux 1986: 98). Athens in the Classical period was at war two of every three years and never experienced ten years of continual peace (Garlan 1975: 15). Furthermore, it is thought that the wars were economically disastrous to small Greek farmers (Parke 1933: 229–30). While much of this was no doubt true, there are a number of points that need qualification. Mercenary service had existed long before the Peloponnesian Wars (Parke 1933: 3–19; Roy 1967: 323). The agricultural economy of Attica was damaged by Spartan and Theban invasions, but as Hanson and others have recently pointed out the damage is often exaggerated and Attica was quick to return to productivity (Strauss 1986: 43–5; Hanson 1998: 131–73 and esp. 161–73). Importantly, the bulk of the Peloponnesians remained unscathed by warfare, and it is from here that many of the mercenaries came throughout the Classical period. The Peloponnesian Wars, therefore, do not provide the full answer.

Social forces and social organization in the Greek world may also have acted as factors pushing men overseas, or at least making them available for mercenary service. Historians have identified the decline of the *polis* and its inability to provide employment for all its citizens to explain the mercenary explosion. Parke (1933: 20) states that '[t]he mercenary soldier would not have emerged prominently in fourth century history if the Greek states had not already begun to decline'. Conversely, in the fifth century BC, many of the states of the Peloponnese were still in transition from tribal organization to the *polis*. Elis is known to have become a *polis* (synoecized) in 470 BC. Tribal organization remained paramount in many regions. James Roy (1996: 110–11) indicates that tribal organizations predated the Classical age in Arcadia. Most recently Thomas Nielsen (1996: 117–63 and 1999: 16–79) examined the communities of Arcadia in some detail. These tribal and emerging *polis* identities may have made men more available for sporadic and haphazard campaigning and also assisted would-be employers in identifying, persuading and hiring groups of men under a chieftain more easily than disparate individuals or men from more socially stable or integrated communities. Louis Rawlings (1996: 81–2) saw this in terms of a distinction between

soldiers and warriors when referring to late third-century BC practices in the western Mediterranean.

The soldier subverts his own identity and will, and acts in the interest of the State and the other citizens as a body because the state undertakes to render protection to its citizens and their land.

In contrast, warriors are bound by obligations of patronage and deference to individual chieftains. Their status is defined partly by the relationship with these leaders, and partly through their own prowess and honour relative to the other members of the chieftain's war band. They may act contrary to the needs of the tribe by following their own interests, or those of their leader, who may be engaged in prestige competition with other nobles and their bands.

The tribal communities of Arcadia may have provided a similar context for men to serve others in mercenary adventures that, therefore, laid foundations for the supply of men available for service from the Peloponnese. Furthermore, the ongoing process of community formation and re-formation through the sixth and fifth centuries BC may have dissociated men from these communities and forced them to seek livelihoods away from their homes, like those driven out of communities in other periods of political dislocation, and so laid the foundations of what became a traditional means of living.

The Greeks often said that they lived in a poor country. This was true not only of the Greeks, however, but of many peoples of the Aegean basin as well. Jan Best (1969: 133) concluded that the Dioi of Thrace, who came to Athens for service with the Athenian expedition to Sicily, did so from 'extreme poverty'. The Aegean basin appeared especially poor when compared rhetorically to the wealth of the East. Certainly this imbalance in wealth between Greece and the Near Eastern kingdoms was a theme of the Greek writers. Arcadia was traditionally seen as one of the poorer regions of the Greek mainland. The actual poverty of the Greek world in itself, however, cannot explain the rise of the Greek mercenary phenomenon in spite of statements by orators like Demosthenes (14.31). It would seem likely that poverty was endemic in the Peloponnese throughout the fifth century BC. Even Athens had poor citizens at that time. But poverty was only a negative force that made men unwilling to stay in their circumstances at home. It was not necessarily the thing that attracted or enabled men to become mercenaries abroad.

Mercenaries came from all strata of Greek society. The generals who began campaigns with mercenary forces came from higher social and economic levels than the men whom they led. This was not always the case in the field as campaign deaths led to replacement officers and hierarchical changes. The sources rarely illustrate a mercenary's status within the community from which he came. In the earliest period nothing can be discerned for the rank

and file. The groups of men who followed the Peloponnesian nobles to Sicily no doubt came as part of tribal units. These men were the retainers (*oikétai*), but their ambitions and their relationships to the cause that they ultimately served had much in common with mercenaries.

Xenophon's *Anabasis*, as ever, provides the most detailed information on the status of mercenaries and, as a corollary, provides a context for the motivations that led men to enlist for a mercenary campaign. Clearly, there were rich and poor men in the army. Xenophon himself did not lack resources. He had a shield-bearer, probably a slave, with him on that campaign (Xen. *An.* 4.2.21). The other generals were also well-born. Clearchus at one time had been, and Chrisophus was, a Spartiate (Xen. *An.* 1.1.9, 4.3). Proxenus was a wealthy Boeotian (Xen. *An.* 1.1.11; 2.2.16). Philesius and Xanthicles were condemned to pay twenty minae and Sophaenetes ten minae, which presumably meant that they could afford such a sum from their private possessions (Xen. *An.* 5.8.1). All these men had resources and, therefore, the status to reflect these. Some men were of lower status. One man at least was a Laconian *perioikos* (Xen. *An.* 5.1.15). Another man on the *anabasis* was an ex-slave (Xen. *An.* 4.8.4). Xenophon noted that the men had no other resources at the time of their most desperate situation after the death of Cyrus than their arms and their valour (Xen. *An.* 2.1.12). He was, surely, only referring to the resources upon which they could draw at that moment of the campaign and not their personal or family fortunes.

In a crucial passage Xenophon (*An.* 6.4.8) referred to the character and status of the men who served with him and with Cyrus.

For most of the soldiers had sailed from Greece to undertake this service for pay, not because their means were scanty, but because they knew by report of the noble character of Cyrus; some brought other men with them, some had even spent money on the expedition while still another group had abandoned fathers and mothers or had left children behind with the idea of getting money to bring back to them, all because they had heard that the other people who served with Cyrus enjoyed abundant good fortune. Being men of this sort they longed to return in safety to Greece.

Xenophon wanted his readers to believe that his men were not from the lowest strata of society at all and, of course, had followed Cyrus neither from need nor greed. Importantly, to him, they had a stake in the societies from which they came. Xenophon saw his fellow mercenaries as upright members of the communities from which they came. The moment in the *Anabasis* when Xenophon introduces this passage may hold the key to its content. Xenophon has just suggested that the army found a large city on the coast near Trapezus, a suggestion rejected by the men. In one passage Xenophon gives a plausible explanation why the men rejected his suggestion, and at the

same time makes them seem well-to-do. But contrast Xenophon's views with those of Isocrates. He claimed that the men who served Cyrus were 'not picked men, but men who, owing to stress of circumstance, were unable to live in their own cities' (Isoc. 4.146).

In another speech, Isocrates (5.90) called them 'unlucky ones' (*etychekenai* from *etycheo*). He wished to draw attention to the success that these supposed failures had achieved against the Persians, to discredit Persian defences. To Isocrates and other orators the impoverished mercenary was a theme and a problem. At one time, Isocrates (4.168) highlighted mercenary poverty. At another, he noted that the Athenians employed vagabonds, deserters and fugitives (Isoc. 8.44). In one speech he was sympathetic to their plight, but only to remind his audience that such mercenaries were 'wanderers from want of their daily bread' (Isoc. 5.121). He was broadcasting his concerns that such desperate men were a danger to everyone in Asia. Demosthenes echoed Isocratic disdain for the general circumstance of mercenary service. He described mercenaries as both *atblioi* (wretched) and *aporoí* (pejoratively meant as lacking resources) and noted their poverty (Dem. 4.46, 12.27). Modern scholars have followed other passages of Demosthenes (14.31) to note the prevailing poverty of mercenaries. Before the Battle of Issus, Alexander recalled with much rhetoric the lowly status of Xenophon's men to emphasize the ease with which Persia could be beaten (Arr. *Anab.* 2.7.8). Neither Alexander nor Xenophon nor the orators provide an accurate picture of the status of Greek mercenaries within their respective native communities.

Mercenary communities in Egypt and the Near East were well armed. As we have seen, the majority of men in eastern overseas service were armed as hoplites. If the employer did not provide arms for them, their status, as members of the hoplite stratum of society in their original communities capable of buying their own equipment (*hopla*), was higher at least than the lower-class and in some cases property-less *thêtes*. In ancient Greek cities there were always strong associations between ownership of hoplite equipment and relatively higher civic status (Thuc. 8.97.1). The hoplites were idealized as the landholders in any community. But how high a status was enjoyed by those who could afford to participate in hoplite warfare is debatable. Very recently Hans van Wees (2001: 45–71) has argued that not all who served as hoplites were from the farming-landowning group called, according to Solon's property classifications, the *Zeugitai*. He considers that a reasonable number of *thêtes*, men who still might have had some property and annual income, formed part of the hoplite army at Athens. By the later fifth century and even more through the fourth, there is a strong suggestion that the hoplite's equipment and any high economic or social status had little relationship (Burke 1992: 220–2). Hoplites could easily have come from amongst the wealthier *thêtes* and still have been men who provided their own equipment.

There was no doubt a spectrum of rich and poor men within every mercenary community. Some mercenaries were far from poor and integrated within their communities to a high degree. Forensic speeches illustrate the lives of men who were neither generals nor groups who conformed to the generalizations of political oratory. The two brothers in Isaeus' *Meneclēs* (2.3–5) were able to give twenty minae as dowries to both of their sisters. This money was provided before the two men went off to serve with Iphicrates in Thrace. Schaps (1979: 74–81, esp. 75) concludes that the dowry represented as much as 18 per cent of the family estate, which would lead to the assumption that they came from a reasonable-sized property in Attica. This would put their estate at a value of about 200 minae, or over three talents, and put the brothers amongst the wealthiest Athenians. Nicostratus died abroad leaving the not inconsiderable estate of two talents (Isae. 4.). He died as an Athenian in good standing, illustrated by the fact that his testament was worthy of a trial at Athens.

Many mercenaries had been exiled by their communities. Exiles were a problem of the fourth century. That century saw an increase in exilings, along with an increase in the destruction of cities (McKechnie 1989: 101–60). With exile came loss of property at home and loss of any status (Dem. 18.48; Isoc. 5). Mercenary service provided one of the few avenues for income outside the *polis*. It created the opportunity for connections to be made abroad that might enable reinstatement at home. Exiles were themselves employers of mercenaries and, as early as the Peloponnesian War, they were hiring mercenaries to help reinstate themselves in their home cities (Thuc. 1.115.4; Diod. 12.27.3. See also Thuc. 3.34.2; 8.100.3). Milesian exiles fought with Cyrus in return for promises from the prince that he would assist in their rehabilitation at Miletus (Xen. *An.* 1.1.7, 2.2). Four of the known mercenaries with Cyrus were exiles (Xen. *An.* 1.1.9, 7.5; 4.2.13, 8.26). Exiles from Corinth served with Agesilaus in Asia (Plut. *Ages.* 21). Three thousand Messenians were driven from their territory (Diod. 14.34.3). Many of those who fought with Darius against Alexander were exiles. His satraps also had exiles in their armies (Arr. *Anab.* 2.1.5; Parke 1933: 180; Worthington 1987: 389–91). It has been suggested that Alexander's decree for the reinstatement of exiles in the city-states of the mainland was associated with his demand that his satraps disband their personal armies (Diod. 18.8.2; Griffith 1935: 34; Bosworth 1988: 148–9). If this was the case, then the implication is that many of the men who served in these armies were exiles. Alexander was aware of this fact. He may have hoped that the decree would prevent these men from wandering disruptively throughout Asia. Clearly, not all mercenaries were exiles and not all exiles were mercenaries. Those who were exiled had other choices than mercenary service as a means of survival abroad (McKechnie 1989: 101–60). In our most detailed account of a mercenary community, Xenophon mentions only a few exiled men with Cyrus.

The opportunities that the various *poleis* afforded to their members at all

levels of society must also be taken into consideration in any analysis of the background to mercenary service. As discussed above, Athens' empire had provided good opportunities for men to do well for themselves under its auspices. After its collapse, Athenians had to establish themselves abroad on their own initiative. This initiative was reflected in the activities of other states' citizens. Both Proxenus and Coeratadas, the Thebans, were not exiles and desired to be generals (Xen. *An.* 2.6.17–18; 7.1.33), so they sought out an army to lead. It must be asked why they felt that they could not achieve this through leading armies for Thebes. The process of selection and the opportunities presented by the *polis* may well have seemed limited. Sparta provides a good case in point. The Spartans are found all over the Mediterranean in the fourth century BC, indicating the limited opportunities available in their own *polis* at that time. Men like Clearchus, Brasidas and Lysander exercised far more power abroad, away from the Spartan state, than they did when at home. Ambitious men like Clearchus clearly felt compelled to leave their own states, at the risk of dire consequences, to make their names abroad.

The context of the Greek world in the fifth and fourth centuries BC goes far to explain the availability of men for service overseas in a variety of military capacities. It does not alone explain why Greeks and, specifically, why so many mainland Greeks found service abroad, nor does the cessation of the Peloponnesian Wars that had occupied all the Greek states for much of the later fifth century BC. The mainland was not at peace for long as Sparta was almost immediately at war with Elis, and Athens fell into civil war. J. K. Davies (1993: 186) points to the peace of 404 BC as providing context and opportunity for employment overseas. This is true, but the Peloponnesian League at the time had much on its plate, and the Athenians were busy with their own civil war. The Spartans were at war with Persia by 399, and the Corinthian War began in 395 BC and lasted until 387/6 BC, occupying much of the mainland for many years. The fact that both of these struggles provided employment for men *abroad* was incidental. Besides, it takes more than wars or their cessation to drive so many men into military service for other powers.

The attractions of mercenary service

There is a difference between men forced into mercenary service and men who chose mercenary service. The factors that made men available to take up the sword abroad, like poverty or exile, were one thing, but the factors that made wars abroad attractive were another. Attractions at the very basic level were sustenance and remuneration. Pay was a product of service and was provided during and at the end of a campaign. Pay, in reality, was low and often infrequent. If it was paid at all, it ranged between two obols and nine obols (one and a half *drachmae*) a day (Parke 1933: 231–3). This may not have had any relationship to the perception that would-be mercenaries had

towards foreign service. There is evidence to show that rowers were moved to serve by pay and offers of higher pay as well. Perceptions were crucial. The wealth of the east and of certain tyrants was legendary and this must have seemed attractive. A fragment of Antiphanes' play *The Soldier*, written in around 350 BC, about a mercenary who had served in Cyprus, survives among the writings of the second-century AD writer Athenaeus. It illustrates the images that eastern wealth and luxury (*tryphês*) implanted amongst the Greeks in a conversation between the soldier and an interested provocateur (Antiphanes, *apud* Athenaeus 6.258; Kassel and Austin, vol. 2, frag. 202).

A: Tell me, you say that you stayed a long time in Cyprus?

B: All the time the war lasted.

A: In what place were you most? Tell me.

B: In Paphos, where there was a practice extraordinarily luxurious to behold, and incredible [*apistos*] besides.

A: What was it?

B: The king when he dined was fanned by pigeons, ay, by nothing else.

A: How could that be? I will let other questions go and ask you that.

B: How, you ask? He would smear himself with Syrian perfume made of the kind of fruit which, they say, pigeons eat greedily. Attracted by the smell of this they came flying, ready to perch on his head; but slaves [*paides*] who sat by shooed them off. They would rise a little, not much – neither wholly this way nor yonder, as the saying is – and so would fan him in such a way as they made a breeze which was moderate and not too rough.

The audience would have dreamed of golden courts, wealthy palaces and enormous opportunities. But ordinary men were also attracted to service by the prospect of regular pay which meant regular food. Thucydides (1.60; 4.84.5; 7.57.9), as noted above, mentions men who had been persuaded by pay and *misthophoroi* who fought for private gain. Some of Dionysius I's mercenaries were certainly attracted to service by offers of pay (Diod. 14.44.2; 62.1). The same is true of all those who served Phocis (Diod. 16.30.1; 36.2). The Great King, Carthage (Diod. 16.81.4) and potentates of Egypt (Diod. 15.29.1) were equally adept at offering large sums to attract large numbers of Greeks. However, it is unlikely that pay by itself would make a man rich or provide a veteran with a pension at the end of service.

The desire for riches nevertheless played a role in the decision of mercenaries and commanders to take service overseas. The Cyrean general Menon's principal interest was the accumulation of *ploutos* or wealth (Xen. *An.* 2.6.21). As a general, he was unlikely to be poor and was motivated by greater rewards than subsistence. In his case it was greed rather than need that drove him into service. The creation of material wealth was a very different proposition from earning wages. The fabled wealth of the Great King and his

satraps must have led men to befriend them. Similarly, the motivation behind any activity even in Thrace was in part economic. Greece had a limited amount of mineral resources, and the mines and timber of Thrace must have attracted Greeks to the region. Borza (1995: 32–52) and Roy (1999: 321 and 338) acknowledge the lack of metals in Greece and Arcadia as creating a requirement for imports from overseas into the region. The Athenian tyrant Pisistratus was fortunate in having at his disposal natural resources with which to pay mercenaries (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 15.2). The access to the grain supplies of the Black Sea must also have been a serious consideration, particularly to Athenians. Hence Iphicrates' marriage into the family of Cotys left him in a splendid position to exploit these resources. He was not alone in currying favour in this part of the Aegean for cash (Dem. 23. 130–2).

The kings of Sparta also sought service abroad to generate wealth. Often, though, their motivation was to improve the income of their state. For example, at the end of his career either as an ally or as a mercenary, but certainly for recompense, Agesilaus appeared in Egypt with the intent of making money for the Spartan state (Plut. *Ages.* 36; Parke 1933: 90; Cartledge 1987: 314–30). Ironically, the money was required to pay Sparta's mercenaries in the Peloponnese (Cartledge 1987: 392). So the economic problems that were created by Sparta's declining Spartiate numbers, and the resultant need to pay mercenary troops to fight their wars in the Peloponnese, were alleviated by the expertise that Agesilaus and others could bring to the battlefield and the money that these wars provided. A strange cycle was established whereby war overseas became motivated by the need to finance war at home.

Even if men were not attracted to service by the prospect of pay, they were certainly motivated by offers of higher pay or bounties. These were usually offered to incite loyalty or to induce greater risk-taking. Lysander was aware of this lesson during the Peloponnesian War (Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.4). Forensic speeches illustrate the importance of a commander maintaining the confidence of his men by the prospect of payment of wages and rations in the fourth century BC (Dem. 49.6; 50.11, 14). Ships' crews often deserted their Athenian commanders when their money ran out and even Athenian crews did this from state ships (Dem. 50.23). Most of the men on the *anabasis* were motivated to stay on the campaign by donations or offers of payment (Xen. *An.* 1.2.11, 3.21, 4.13). Besides, motivation could change with circumstances. As Nussbaum (1967: 147–9, 154–5) rightly points out, with their employer dead, their motivation was only to get back to the sea alive. He sees three stages in their motivation: initially survival, then safe return to the Greek coasts with something in hand, and finally their future employment. Once survival and safety had been achieved they turned their attention to plunder. In the short term Xenophon's mercenaries, like any soldiers, desired food or food money (*sitêresion*) to survive (Xen. *An.* 1.2.19, 3.14, 5.6; 2.2.3, 3.26–7; 3.2.21). Among Clearchus' leadership qualities was his ability to provision the army (Xen. *An.* 1.6.8). Pay was only a prospect for the future (Xen.

An. 1.2.12, 3.21, 4.13). This short- and long-term motivation was demonstrated by the contract that was made with Seuthes. Xenophon's men were to receive rations while they served, and pay as a result of service (*Xen. An.* 7.2.36).

Payment of higher wages and financial rewards to men who had done good service or brave deeds were common in the more professional armies. Philip and Alexander used this incentive in their armies (Diod. 16.53.3). Dionysius exhorted his mercenaries with promises of bounties (Diod. 16.12.3). The army of Jason of Pherae discussed in the *Hellenica* demonstrates how successful and common this strategy was and how a professional army could be motivated by donations and more pay for ability (*Xen. Hell.* 6.1.5). In Jason's army pay was hierarchical and was based on the fitness and skills of each man.

There were better ways than day-to-day payment for a mercenary to make himself wealthy. There was not enough pay to allow a man to save for the future, and generals and employers often withheld payment anyway to tie their men to the army. This was true both of Cyrus (*Xen. An.* 1.2.12) and of Seuthes (*Xen. An.* 7.5.16, 6.27). Pay was not an adequate motivation for mercenary service; it was a means to living rather than an end in itself. Plunder was by far the most lucrative form of material reward. The desire for plunder drove those who returned from Cunaxa to some desperate actions. Aeneas of Stymphalus fell to his death attempting to catch an expensive robe (*Xen. An.* 4.7.13). Xenophon and his friends mounted a raid on a wealthy farmstead, no doubt for this very purpose (*Xen. An.* 7.8.11–19). Men followed the army of Epaminondas into the Peloponnese with plunder alone in mind and with no intention of fighting (Plut. *Ages.* 22). This desire must have been the case too with those men who entered Samos in the 360s and Cyprus in the 350s (Diod. 16.42.3–8; Arist. *Oec.* II; Isoc. 15.3; Parke 1933: 108). From the employers' perspective, plunder was an easy opportunity to pay the troops both directly and indirectly. Seuthes converted plunder into pay, which was quite common (*Xen. An.* 1.2.19, 7.2.36). Polyaeus (*Strat.* 2.10.9) and Aristotle (*Oec.* 2) described how Timotheus ironically sold food to the besieged Samians in order to pay his troops. According to Demosthenes, war plunder made the payment of Athens' mercenaries possible (Dem. 4.28–9). Clearly employers relied heavily on war paying for itself through plunder.

A strong motif in the *Iliad* is the stripping of a dead hero's armour by the victor (e.g. Hom. *Il.* 18.21). This prospect, accompanied by the establishment of a trophy strewn with captured arms at the end of the battle, must have motivated mercenaries as it did all soldiers (Pritchett 1974: 246–75). Men who had gained the opportunity to fight may well have had romantic ideas of gaining exotic arms to bedeck their homes and temples in later life (Plut. *Tim.* 29). Plunder in this sense took on a more symbolic value, and the desire for it would not have been merely economic, but the high value of bronze ought not to be overlooked. While the evidence for such symbolic motivation

amongst mercenaries is not good, it was, nonetheless, an important element of the ideology of the ancient soldier.

If land-hunger, poverty and exile were the negative forces that sent men overseas, property and citizenship abroad must have appealed greatly to men in foreign service. Evidently this was not what the majority of the men in Xenophon's *Anabasis* desired, at least on the march home, as they rejected Xenophon's proposal to create a city in northern Asia Minor (Xen. *An.* 5.6.15–19). On the other hand, the mercenaries of Dionysius I in Sicily accepted the prospect of land and citizenship when they were offered (Diod. 14.7.5, 78.1–3, 8.3). It should be noted that employers saw this as a last resort. The employers would not have resorted to offers of land or citizenship if they had had the ability to settle their problems in some other way. The appeal by Timoleon for Greeks to emigrate to Sicily yielded 60,000 people (Plut. *Tim.* 29). Chabrias' campaigns in Egypt appear to show that mercenaries had settled there, or at the very least lived there, in the fourth century (Burnett and Edmonson 1961: 74–91). Alexander's campaigns generated a vast colonization of the east. Some of these colonists were mercenaries. Clearly many settled because they could go no further because of wounds, age or fatigue, not because settlement was their ambition. The Bactrian revolt illustrated that not all the men were happy to be deposited in the east, but the fact that they followed the king so far east must say something about their relationship, or lack of relationship, to their homes. Diodorus (17.99.5–6) noted the discontent of those Greeks left in the far east who attempted to return to Greece, while Arrian (*Anab.* 5.27.5) stated that many of these Greeks stayed in the cities founded by Alexander against their will.

The quest for reputation and the attraction of those commanders with a good reputation were an important feature of military and mercenary service. Cyrus' *arete* was reputed to draw men to him (Xen. *An.* 6.4.8). For Greeks, military service was a normal part of life. The rewards for that service were not only material, they were also personal. Classical societies attached great honour to the successful soldier. Isaeus' speeches keenly demonstrate that it was important to distinguish oneself even in mercenary service. Xenophon's analysis of his mercenaries is also full of praise for the brave deeds done by his men (Xen. *An.* 2.6.30 and 4.7.12). The concept of 'manliness' (*andreia*) was important to all Greek societies. The crucial place of the *Iliad* in Greek ideology was not just theoretical and poetic, it extended onto the real battlefields of the Classical world.

The rewards for military glory (*kleos*) were even more extensive to the successful general than the successful soldier. The relationship between military leadership and political power at home was an important one. The love of honour (*philotimia*) can be identified at all levels of Greek society. The stigma of cowardice on the battlefield was, by contrast, repugnant (Tyrt. 8.11–12; Hdt. 1.63; Xen. *An.* 1.3.18, 5.2.11; Plut. *Tim.* 25). Clearchus, described by Xenophon as *philopolemos*, cannot have been alone in his love of war, and the

mercenaries under his command on more than one occasion are driven on by their fear of being perceived as cowards by their colleagues (Xen. *An.* 2.6.6–7).

Reputation must have played a role in mercenary service. The generals who served the Great King received their share of honour for their achievement either through his patronage or through the reflected honour bestowed by the people of their home state. This is best illustrated by the successes of Conon for the Great King (Diod. 14.39.3; Strauss 1986: 125–9). Through his victory at Cnidus, Conon was able to return to Athens, rebuild the Long Walls and re-establish Athenian power. The *Anabasis* mentions the search for fame and reputation as a motivator frequently. Xenophon realized the great name he might achieve through commanding Cyrus' mercenaries (Xen. *An.* 7.1.27). He was equally concerned that his name should not be besmirched (Xen. *An.* 6.1.21, see also 7.1.21, 6.7–10, 49). Proxenus campaigned for the fame and reputation that he would gain from being a general (Xen. *An.* 2.6.17–18). There were no doubt some men whose primary reason for mercenary service was reputation, but it is unlikely that this drove the majority of men into mercenary armies. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked as a factor in the decision, secondary though it may have been, to take service abroad.

Length of service

The length of time that a mercenary served may be a good indication of the original purpose of his enlistment. Two factors dictated short-term service. The first of these might be a specific goal, with the mercenary's hope to return to his *polis* assured from the outset, and service for only one or two, perhaps sporadic, campaigns. This would suggest the mercenary had something to which to return. The brothers in Isaeus' *Meneclēs* (2.12) provide an example of this type of service. One of these men owned land which he returned to Athens to manage. Agesilaus' short-term and financially driven campaigns in Egypt illustrate this point (Plut. *Ages.* 36–40). Apart from the generals of Athens, who frequently served for short periods in the Mediterranean, there is very little specific evidence of common soldiers appearing on campaign briefly and then returning to their homes.

The second factor that dictated short-term service was a change of circumstance resulting in involuntary cessation of mercenary activity. Defeat during a campaign or the loss of an employer might be reasons for service to be cut short. The Cyreans who went home as soon as they could get transportation represent men who fit this second category (Xen. *An.* 7.2.3). Many might have remained longer had Cyrus lived on as Great King. Clearchus offered to serve Artaxerxes in any capacity he may have wished after Cunaxa and Cyrus' death (Xen. *An.* 2.5.12–15). He was clearly in it for the long haul. At another time it is clear that not all of the Cyreans wanted to return to their

homes after the campaign, as their continued mercenary service with the Spartans demonstrated, though it has been suggested that their main interest was to return to the Aegean basin (Xen. *An.* 6.4.8; Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.6; Roy 1967: 320).

Long-term mercenary service was the product of several different circumstances. Some men were not able to return to their native states due to a legal prohibition or some other impingement. Exiles, for example, could not return home even if they wished. The Milesian exiles fought with Cyrus because of his promise to them that he would reinstate them in their home city (Xen. *An.* 1.1.7). In this case, their service was tied to their status as exiles. It is not surprising to find several exiles who chose the mercenary life until such time as they could be reinstated (Xen. *An.* 1.2.2).

There were other men who could return home, but had no intention of doing so from the start of their service. The earliest examples are found in Thucydides. After the Peloponnesians defeated Amorges, they hired his Peloponnesian *epikouroi* (Thuc. 8.28.4). This would suggest that these men were professional long-term soldiers. Commanding officers, like the Spartan Clearchus, left home never to return. Clearchus metaphorically burned his boats when he left Sparta and had been exiled. Not only did he seek to fulfil his ambitions in friendship with powerful men like Cyrus, but also he hoped to carve out a small tyranny in Thrace like many other autocrats of the period (Parke 1933: 100 n. 1).

Many mercenaries did not return home from short-term mercenary service. Some even died abroad. Nicostratus died abroad having served for eleven years (Isaeus 4.8). One of the brothers in Isaeus' *Meneclēs* lived away from Athens. His motivation is not stated, although a feature of his not living at Athens was his unmarried condition and the needs of his family's estate (Isaeus 2.12). Most of those who had served with Cyrus stayed with the army to fight with Seuthes and then with the Spartans after 399 BC, and this could also suggest that they had accepted the life of a soldier (Xen. *An.* 7.8.24; Diod. 14.37.1). Regrettably, the death of their employer changed their circumstances so drastically that there is no way of knowing what their original intention had been.

Finally, there were those who planned to return home, but remained in service. Perhaps they sought a specific goal, enough wealth upon which to retire or a foreign citizenship or powerful association. Perhaps some of those men with Xenophon on the *anabasis* fell into this category (see Parke 1933: 34). Defeat might discourage continued service, but there were also those for whom defeat meant no release from service, like the Greeks who had served with Darius III and feared Alexander's retribution. The mercenaries who served with the Phocians in the 350s and 340s BC faced condemnation and even death as temple-robbers, and the ongoing enmity of Philip of Macedon. Having survived the Sacred War, they followed Phalaecus into the Peloponnese in part, no doubt, to escape from central Greece. These men

stayed there for two years waiting for further employment. Of these, some went to Sicily with Timoleon and others went to Crete with Phalaecus. The latter found employment with Elean exiles until defeat led either to their enslavement or to their execution (Diod. 16.59.3, 63.5, 78.4; Plut. *Tim.* 30). No source states from whence most of these men originally came, but it is clear from their lengthy and distant campaigns that they were, or had become, long-term professional soldiers.

The mercenaries who followed Alexander east were numerous. The thought of a successful campaign in the rich Persian Empire must have attracted many men to Alexander. Parke's figures of 42,700 Greek mercenary foot soldiers and 5,180 cavalry may represent only a fraction of the mercenary forces used on Alexander's campaigns (Parke 1933: 197–8; Diod. 17.17.1, 45.1, 44.5; Arr. 1.29.3; 2.20.5; 3.5.1, 16.10, 25.4; 4.8.2; Curt. Ruf. 4.5.18, 8.4; 5.1.40, 43, 2.16, 6.11, 7.12; 6.6.35; 7.3.5, 10.11). The fact that they were taken so far east and that many served for long periods especially in eastern garrisons would suggest that their perception and their alienation from their communities were the same as many of those discussed above (Griffith 1935: 21–2). In a similar vein, the men who had served Darius were hired in the 330s BC, most of them specifically to defend the empire. They were still employed and loyal to Darius at the end of his life (Arr. *Anab.* 3.24.5). Some of Darius' mercenaries predated the League of Corinth (Diod. 16.89.3; Curt. Ruf. 6.5.6). Parke (1933: 185) estimates that some of these men had been in service for at least seven years. Alexander hired into his service those men who had served the Great King, many of whom had been serving since before the war began (Arr. *Anab.* 3.24.4–5). There is nothing to suggest that they did not wish to take this service. The evidence does not allow for analysis of changes in circumstances clearly or specifically, but most mercenaries' ambitions must have changed with their fortunes.

Political considerations

The turbulent political problems of the *polis* in the later fifth and fourth centuries BC led men into service overseas. Civil disorder resulted in men leaving their cities. But not all who left home in times of political strife to seek mercenary service were motivated solely by political considerations. For example, among the Athenians who took service overseas to escape the thirty tyrants was a man who sought service as a way to relieve his poverty (Aisch. 2.14.7). A speech by Demosthenes (49.6, 9, 25) accused Timotheus of undertaking service with the Great King to avoid the prosecution for which the speech was written. It is unlikely that Timotheus fled the Athenian courts, for they regularly tried generals in service of the state and most generals must have taken such trials as a part, albeit an unpleasant part, of the position. Pritchett (1974: 4–33) notes the regular and expected nature of such trials, while Hansen (1975: 59) likens the juries to a 'sword of Damocles' for the generals.

The attraction of service with the Great King probably outweighed any fears that Timotheus had of an Athenian jury. Conon was a refugee from Athens in the 390s and embarked upon mercenary service in order to assist his own government, as his actions subsequently proved (Diod. 14.39.3). Men like Charidemus left Athens to escape Alexander and in turn served the Great King (Diod. 17.30.2; Curt. Ruf. 3.2.10). Memnon and Mentor the Rhodians had far more options by serving the Persians than they did in service for their native Rhodes. As Persian power and influence reasserted itself in the Greek world, it is not surprising to find Greeks rising to positions of power and authority at the Persian court. These Greeks might look like mercenaries, but in reality they illustrate the fluidity with which the powerful men of the later Classical age could move within aristocratic circles from one relationship to another.

On occasion mercenaries found themselves serving the interests of their home states despite their apparent mercenary status. This was the case of many mercenaries who served Spartan commanders and were therefore fulfilling obligations of the Peloponnesian League. For example the 700 mercenaries on the *anabasis* under Chrisophus were probably Peloponnesians (Xen. *An.* 1.4.3). This, presumably, was more especially the case after 383 BC when Spartans recruited men on a daily wage rather than through the traditional conscription from amongst the allies (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.21). Other examples of mutual interest served by mercenary service are the Milesian exiles who served with Cyrus in the hope of having their citizenship restored (Xen. *An.* 1.2.2). No doubt some of the men who fled with Phalaecus at the end of the Sacred War and went into the Peloponnese were fellow Phocians who feared to remain in central Greece (Diod. 16.59.3). Many Greeks who fought against Alexander did so to avenge Chaeronea and to free the Greeks from the Macedonians. Arrian (1.29.5) mentioned an Athenian embassy requesting the release of Athenians who had fought at Granicus and had been enslaved in the mines at Macedonia. Alexander later pardoned Greeks still in Persian service in 330 BC who had enlisted with the Persians prior to the creation of the League of Corinth in 338 BC (Arr. *Anab.* 3.24.5; Heckel 1997: 195). These men were by now outcasts from the Greek world. Shunned by the most powerful man in Europe, they cannot have been encouraged to return to their homes individually. Their reinstatement in their cities could only come through a change in the political circumstances in the cities of the mainland and the Near East. They actively fought to achieve that change.

Alexander's 'Exiles Decree' can be regarded as only a political decision. In theory, it enabled all those involuntary wanderers and outsiders to return to their cities (Dittenberg, *SG* 3.1.312; Diod. 17.109.2; 18.8.1–7). There have been many theories as to Alexander's purpose.⁴ Ernst Badian points to the decree as directly relating to mercenaries (Badian 1961: 25–31). He is probably correct to do so. On the one hand, their status as outsiders of their respective cities made them likely beneficiaries of the decree, and, on the

other, the timing of the decree came directly after Alexander's order for his satraps to disband their mercenary armies.

Demand

The role played by the fifth-century BC wars in the explosion of mercenary numbers was not strictly socio-economic. It was also regional. It gave the Peloponnesians the opportunity to serve in large numbers in the Aegean basin for foreign employers. Lynette Mitchell made this point with respect to the Athenians in the mid-fifth century BC (1997: 75). She notes that the empire enabled Athenians to come into contact with people outside Athens whom they had not encountered previously. This must have been true for the Peloponnesians as well in the latter years of the Great Peloponnesian War. When the war ended, a great attempted coup in the Persian Empire which coincided with the needs of Dionysius I at Syracuse provided the opportunity for Greeks to find service abroad in great numbers as foot soldiers in both the east and the west. The political situation of the eastern Mediterranean now took precedence. This highlights the idea that it was demand that was the driving force for the explosion of mercenaries in the fourth century BC. Parke (1933: 20) noted the role of demand in a passing reference to the disturbances of the Great Peloponnesian War when he stated that

the War was also the cause of a new demand for professional soldiers in Greek warfare. By its long duration and by the distance and complexity of its campaigns it rendered the old type of citizen soldier gradually more obsolete.

There is more to this statement than simply the role the war played in the establishment of more men who saw military service as a career. Demand grew for Greek mercenaries through the fourth century BC as a whole. Demand, and not supply, was the key to mercenary service. There are, after all, no mercenaries without employers. This is illustrated by looking at the instances of large-scale mercenary employment in the fourth century BC outside mainland Greece. Greeks generally, and the Arcadians and other Peloponnesians specifically, were the Near Eastern rulers' preferred soldiers of the day and were sought out for their mercenary armies. The two major venues of employment for Greek mercenaries serving as hoplites in large numbers were regionally peripheral to the Greek mainland. The first, and by far the foremost, of these was the Persian Empire fighting either for or against the Great King. The second, but to a lesser extent, was the tyrants of Sicily and their enemies the Carthaginians in the west. In both cases, the sources state that these employers always sent to the Peloponnese on the Greek mainland for their mercenaries. There must have been a reason.

Greek writers regarded the quality of Greek hoplites as second to none (Bettalli 1995: 25). This was especially true of Greeks who fought against natives of Persia and the Persian Empire. The Persian Wars had demonstrated the quality of the Greek hoplite against the native troops of central Asia in a pitched battle. Many of those in the Persian forces were lightly armed infantry and cavalry whose primary weapons were missiles. Despite the great variety of troop types upon which the Great King might call from amongst his subject nations, there was nothing equivalent to a Greek *polis'* hoplite force. Herodotus (9.63) suggested that the closing stages of the Battle of Plataea illustrated that it was not the difference in bravery or strength between the two forces that affected the outcome, but the fact that it was a fight between armed Greek hoplites and unarmed men. It was also a struggle, he said, between men wise in the use of their arms and their opponents who lacked experience (*anepistēmenos*). Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* ends by lamenting the decline in the quality of Persian forces since the empire's creation (Xen. *Cyr.* 8.8.6; Seibt 1977, 121–62). Xenophon (*Cyr.* 8.8.25) even went so far as to suggest that the Persians could not function on the battlefield without a Greek contingent. This is not surprising given that Xenophon put into the mouth of Antiochus of Arcadia the statement that while the Great King had many servants he lacked men who could fight with Greeks (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.38). Isocrates (4.41) agreed that the most useful part of the Great King's army came from the Greek city-states. Plato (*Leg.* 3.697e) summed up the Persian dilemma:

And when [the Persians] come to need the people to fight in their support they find in them no patriotism or readiness to endanger their lives in battle; so that while they have countless myriads of men they are all useless for war, and they hire soldiers from abroad as though they were short of men, and imagine that their safety will be secured by hirelings and foreigners.

According to our Greek sources the Persians needed the heavy infantry of the *poleis* of Greece to augment their vast array of native troops on the battlefield, especially to fight against other Greeks. Thus the Persians hired Greeks in great numbers to fight their wars.

By the end of the fifth century things were changing in the western regions of the Persian Empire. The fifth century BC had been a period of relative stability for the empire. Of the western satrapies, only Egypt had been in revolt and had sought the aid of Greeks, in the form of an alliance with Athens. The Persian Empire in the first half of the fourth century BC ceased to be at all stable. At times it began to disintegrate. The career of Cyrus the Younger is a case in point. He was responsible for the western satrapies of the empire. His coup against the Persian king required Greek hoplites to form a cohesive and strong central corps on the battlefield around which

his native troops could quite literally swarm. The increasingly independent satraps of the western Persian Empire who followed Cyrus' time did the same. They sent ambassadors to the Greek mainland to enlist men to fight for them against the Great King. The satraps could send these men back to the Greek mainland and took no responsibility for them after their service ended. In turn the Persian king needed Greeks to fight the Greeks of his satraps, and so a vicious circle was created that promoted a huge Greek mercenary migration eastward (Briant 1996b: 806–7).

The same historical circumstance is illustrated in Sicily. Autocrats had disappeared from the *poleis* of the island just after the Persian Wars, but they reappeared in the last years of the fifth century BC. Greek tyrants were reluctant to use citizen troops for fear they would overthrow them or would interfere in the running of the state. To them, foreigners were both more convenient and more loyal than their citizen body. Dionysius I of Syracuse needed hoplites from the mainland first to prop up his regime and second, and more importantly on account of the numbers involved, to fight off successive Carthaginian invasions. The sources state that the Carthaginians felt that they, too, needed Greeks as a result of defeats they themselves suffered on the island. Plutarch (*Tim.* 30) noted that

Gisgo sailed across with a fleet of seventy ships. His force also included a force of Greek mercenaries; the Carthaginians had never before hired Greek soldiers, but by now they had come to admire them as irresistible troops and by far the most warlike anywhere.

As Carthaginians and Syracusans fought one another in Sicily so another cycle of demand created by Greek success pulled Peloponnesians westwards.

This cycle of demand explains why Greek hoplites were required for service. The reason for the employment of so many Peloponnesians in the fourth century BC is more complex. It lay again in the increased demand of employers on the periphery of the Greek world specifically for their services. It is true that aspects of the Peloponnese might have determined supply. The poverty of the region might explain the need for men to seek service abroad (Parke 1933: 20–1, 229; Roy 1967: 317; Bettalli 1995: 116), but Arcadian poverty should not be overstated. James Roy (1999: 320–81), in particular, and more recently N. Fields (2001: 102–30) have shown that Arcadia was not as poor as some Greek images made out. Poverty was a *topos* of many Greek communities juxtaposed with the wealth of the kings of the east. As has been suggested recently, the Arcadians may have adapted 'a highly distinctive social pattern as a response to the limited economic resources of their homeland' (Roy 1999: 349). Many cities and communities of the central Peloponnese remained relatively tribal (Nielsen 1996a; Roy 1996: 107–13). But these two features of the area, poverty and tribal organization, do not explain why so many Arcadians and Peloponnesians found

service overseas. They provide a useful context, but many regions of the Aegean were poor and tribal. Many areas must have been full of men who would have gratefully accepted mercenary employment. The northern regions of the Greek world had similar social conditions in the fifth century BC, particularly Aetolia, which later became a prominent source of Greek mercenaries in the Hellenistic age.

The Peloponnesians had a background that other regions did not which encouraged employers to demand their service. They had a tradition of mercenary service and had proven themselves as hoplites in hoplite warfare. No other region could provide men in anything like the same numbers. It was these hoplites that the eastern rulers required most in their armies. The bulk of the hoplites who had defeated the Persians in the Great War of 480/79 BC had come from the Peloponnese. Certain Greek traditions held that Arcadia was the birthplace of studying and teaching hoplite warfare, *hoplomachia* (Zenodotus, *FHG* 4.516 frag. 5; Ephorus, *FGrH* 70 frag. 54; Paus. 8.32.5, 36.2; Wheeler 1982: 225–6). Homer (*Il.* 2.611) noted that Arcadians were men skilled (*technē*) in fighting at close quarters (*aggymachetai*) which was a feature of hoplite warfare. Arcadians, like other Peloponnesians, could also point to their special relationship with the paradigm of excellence in hoplite warfare: Sparta. Sparta's reputation and involvement in the Aegean basin in the late fifth century gave exposure to the men who followed Spartan commanders outside the Peloponnese in the Great Peloponnesian War. Employers from outside the Greek mainland demanded Arcadians and Peloponnesians because it was hoplites that they needed on the battlefields of Sicily and Asia. Similarly, however, Spartan hegemony in the Peloponnese denied to most Peloponnesians the option to fight for their own states' causes. Sparta largely determined foreign policy. It is hardly surprising that Arcadians, in particular, willingly took service with others outside the Peloponnese. Tellingly, after the foundation of the Arcadian League, and with it the establishment of Arcadian autonomy in 369 BC, no named Arcadian is found in mercenary service down to the time of Alexander the Great. The Arcadians had returned to fight for their homeland rather than seeking mercenary service as tools of the Spartans and Sparta's allies.

Significantly, the employer or the commander was responsible for the employment and service of any mercenary. The employer regulated the terms and conditions under which he served, the nature of service he undertook, and the rewards that he received at the end of his service. The employer, more than any other factor, generated service for the mercenaries for it was through him that whatever motivated mercenary service, whether positive or negative, would be gained. Without his employment by a paymaster, the professional soldier, and therefore the mercenary soldier, had no professional status.

Some ancient commentators and philosophers eulogized the concept of service with a good king (Xen. *Hiero*, 10; Plut. *Mor.* 1043c–e and 1061d; Strab.

301, 310). Aristocratic connections known as ritualized friendship (*xenia*) transcended national or civic boundaries. The concept of ritualized friendship was established early in the Dark Ages. In the early fifth century Gelon encouraged prominent Arcadian families to come into his household. Three Arcadians of high status, Hagesias of Stymphalus, Phormis of Maenalus and Praxiteles of Mantinea, are found in Sicily in the early fifth century BC (Pind. *Ol.* VI; Paus. 5.27.1). Bettalli (1995: 26) discusses the role of Arcadian elites in the origins of mercenary service. Parke (1933: 11, 161–2) notes the parallel with Philip's policy of encouraging foreign companions (*hetairoi*) at his court. This parallel can also be seen in the men who followed the three adventurers Cyrus, Dion and Timoleon as their companions into Persia or Sicily respectively, who were neither relatives nor natives of the commanders' home states (Plut. *Dion*, 54). The attraction of all service must be seen in the light of mutual patronage. The influence Arcadian families must have had on the Peloponnesians to serve overseas in Sicily cannot have been negligible. The roots of mercenary service may lie with Dark Age ritualized guest-friendships modelled upon the connections of the kings in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* whose military obligations present an early picture of patron and client relationships through services rendered and received (Finley 1954: 111–13). The more personal relationships of Peloponnesian communities would no doubt have assisted in the formulation and running of these services in the form of mercenary activity.

Analysis of the *Anabasis* clearly displays patronage as a motivation for service. Lynette Mitchell recently noted that Cyrus created his army by 'a web of *xenia* friendships' (Mitchell 1997: 119). Even the Spartans officially on the campaign had *xenia* connections. Herman (1987: 100) sees Chrisophus as just like Cyrus' other *xenoi*, and Stephen Hodkinson (2000: 349) recently attests 'that Cheirisiphos used the opportunity of official Spartan support for Cyrus to fulfill his obligations to his *xenos* by supplying and commanding his mercenary contingent'. Hodkinson (2000: 344–6) sees *xenia* as closely connected to Spartan foreign policy and, in the case of mercenaries, it facilitated on occasions the recruitment of troops and the raising of money to pay for them. This is more thoroughly discussed below in Chapter Five. Classical Greek mercenary service was bound tightly to relationships between Greeks and powerful men outside Greece. The death of Cyrus left the generals to seek a new patron, Artaxerxes, through the mediation of Tissaphernes (Xen. *An.* 2.5.11–12). This need was made more pressing because they were in foreign territory. Once the army was safely back in the Greek world, Xenophon found a suitable patron in Seuthes. Seuthes proved invaluable to an army that otherwise would have had to winter in difficult country and without resources (Xen. *An.* 7.3.13). In the end, the Spartans presented themselves as employers and patrons acceptable to the men (Xen. *An.* 7.8.24; *Hell.* 3.1.6). The men entered this patronage through their *lochagoi*, and the *lochagoi*, through their generals, knew that their own worth depended upon this hier-

archy. Nussbaum (1967: 32, 36–8) sees the *lochagoi* as the hinge in the social organization of the army between the men and the *stratēgoi*.

Ultimately the man at the top not only dictated, but also motivated mercenary service. Cyrus represented all that the men hoped to achieve. The men realized that their personal goals could only be achieved through him, even if they were motivated by a specific desire like *kerdos* (Xen. *An.* 1.9.16–17). Their ‘better reward’ lay with Cyrus. Xenophon’s reason for attending the campaign was explicit: to befriend the Great King’s brother (Xen. *An.* 3.1.4). The patronage that Clearchus received as a result of his friendship with Cyrus was key in his efforts to dominate parts of the Hellespont (Xen. *An.* 2.6.4). Menon’s desire for wealth was made possible by his patron’s ability to provide him with the resources to achieve it (Xen. *An.* 2.6.21). Proxenus was given his opportunities to command and to gain reputation through Cyrus (Xen. *An.* 2.6.16–17). Xenophon was well aware of the benefits and rewards of friendship.

Subsequently, the generals of the fourth century BC were all keen to ingratiate themselves with the potentates of the Mediterranean basin to broaden their own power base and to further their political careers at home. In the case of some of these men, like Agesilaus, that which was good for them was also good for their states. Writers like Demosthenes reflect these relationships as cynical and detrimental (Dem. 23.129–32, 141, 149). Demosthenes’ view of Athenian mercenary commanders was highly charged, and his speech that damns Iphicrates and Charidemus illustrates this attitude (e.g. Dem. 2.28). It should not have been the case; Conon’s victory at Cnidus, achieved through the patronage of the Great King, enabled Athens to re-establish much of the city’s former prestige. No doubt the special relationships established by the generals with the great men of the east were perceived as good for the *poleis* from which they came as well as for themselves as individuals.

It is clear that overseas service for Athenian generals in the fourth century BC was normal and accepted behaviour. Almost all the prominent Athenian generals in the fourth century are found all over the eastern Mediterranean in service for someone other than their own state, at some point in their careers. This must be related to the decline of the Athenian Empire and the increased opportunities to gain the necessary glory, funds and connections outside a solely Athenian context to fuel political careers at home. The growth of non-Greek influences on the Greek cities in the period after the fall of Athens led many Greeks to establish stronger ties with the dynasts of the non-Greek world in this period. Similarly, the matter-of-fact nature of service for non-Greek powers, especially in the absence of a state obligation, must also be stressed. An offer of service with the Great King or any great man in the Mediterranean meant a great deal to anyone in the Greek world.

For any Greek, having a special relationship with the Great King of Persia indicated to others that he had himself become a great man. Thracian princes

were one thing and they had their uses, and the Egyptian pharaohs and western satraps were another, but a relationship with the Great King and his family must have meant so much more to the Athenian or other Greek generals of the fourth century. Relationships between great men were accepted and expected. The Great King provided more than just wealth for the men who sought service. His prestige represented the apogee of achievement and his friendship was worth a good deal of influence.

The mercenary general was motivated by desires for wealth, fame and reputation. He also wanted the status earned by campaigning in foreign wars that would reflect well at home. Buckler has pointed out that the Phocian generals had much greater freedom of action thanks to their 'private army' of mercenaries than they would have had they been regular commanders of a more national force (Buckler 1989: 37). This would have held true for all mercenary employers. Mercenary troops were free from the annual rhythm of farming schedules and so could prosecute longer campaigns. Generals who depended upon money for their armies, however, could only attain power and armies through the one thing that they sought more than anything else, the patronage of a powerful ruler. Like the men they commanded, commanders could only lead others abroad if there was an employer to finance their services. This was an important consideration, and on more than one occasion it was the employer who requested that a general be sent by a specific *polis*. Such requests were made for a particular general's expertise (for examples, see Diod. 15.42.4, 59.4, 92.3; Nepos 11.2.4; Plut. *Art.* 24.1). Only when generals were in trouble with their home states might they approach a foreign ruler themselves. Conon approached the generals of the Great King in these circumstances while in exile (Diod. 15.39.1–2). Relations between great men could be strained and even overturned. Agesilaus began his campaigns in Egypt in 362 BC in support of one Egyptian claimant to the throne, but soon realized that his better reward might come from another. He therefore assisted in removing the former and then fought for his rival (Plut. *Ages.* 36–40; Diod. 15.92.2). Here the usual order of things was reversed. Agesilaus' position as commander, ally and theoretical employee should have been established by his relationship to the Egyptian pharaoh-to-be, but in reality it was the Spartan who determined the position of his employer and ally.

In the fourth century BC the importance of patronage and of similar relationships was well illustrated in all the activities that can be called mercenary. Iphicrates' relationship with Cotys almost led him into a war with his own city. Memnon and Mentor found a patron in the Great King enabling them to become the most powerful Greeks of their day. The followers of Dion and Alexander were no doubt motivated by the rewards that their respective adventures would bring. The quest for patronage did not end with the generals. Mercenaries were so reliant on a good commander that their lives depended on him. Commanders could send them on difficult missions, place

them in the hottest part of the battlefield or even leave them stranded. As Diodorus (14.72.1–3) related, Dionysius placed the mercenaries most hostile to his regime in the most dangerous part of the battlefield. Employers and generals could dictate their futures through a bad campaign, or even their death by a cynical decision. Thus, Timoleon expelled from Syracuse the mercenaries who had deserted him at the Battle of Crimisus (Plut. *Tim.* 30; Diod. 16.82.1).

In conclusion, the employers and the commanders were the keys to mercenary service. These men determined the opportunities for service, for rewards and for final settlements. Without them, poor men remained poor in their native lands, exiles remained wanderers and glory-hunters waited for their state to give them the opportunity to fight. In the short term, pay and plunder were critical to a mercenary's survival. Domestic circumstances provided contextual background to that service, but the employer was paramount. The mercenary explosion of the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC is not merely explained by examining the effects of the Great Peloponnesian War on citizens growing accustomed to warfare or to the economic problems it created in Attica. Similarly, the explosion did not occur because of regional poverty and political exile. It was the need of employers for Peloponnesian Greeks, and specifically Arcadians, that motivated mercenary service. The growing fragility of the Western Persian Empire and the chaos of Dionysian Sicily, not to mention mainland Greece as well, created this need. Employers, the great men of the age and the competing *poleis* of the Greek world, needed mercenaries. The mercenaries they chose were Greeks. They were Greeks because the employers selected the provenance and type of men they required and hired thanks to a reputation and culture that showed Greeks to be unparalleled heavy infantry. Without this choice and consequent opportunity there would have been no explosion in the numbers of Greeks in mercenary service in the later fifth and fourth centuries BC.

PAYING GREEK MERCENARIES

Introduction

Remuneration for military activity is central to mercenary service. In principle, the true mercenary requires regular payment, although in reality, as has already been noted, pay was often irregular. Pay and the professional go hand-in-hand. A man who earned money in the service of the Athenian state was called a *misthophoros*, a word that was identified with mercenary service. It was not the job that he did, but the relationship he had to his remuneration (*misthos*) that gave him this name. Jurors, soldiers and rowers were all *misthophoroi* as, of course, were mercenaries (Parke 1933: 231). The Greeks had no specific word for money (Reden 1995: 173). Money was a tool (*chrêma*) by which things could be done, hence the common word for money was *chrêmata*. Remuneration, even financial remuneration, could be described in a variety of ways. The Greek mercenary was a professional, at least while he was in service, but his income could be gleaned in many different ways. Indeed, cash was not necessarily the primary goal of mercenaries nor was it always the purpose of mercenary service. A mercenary could make his living through other means of remuneration. Ancient societies were never totally cash economies. The Persian Empire, in particular, regularly operated a cashless exchange system, transferring livestock, grains and wine as regular remuneration for services rendered to the Great King (Hallock 1985: 588–611). The important, but not quantifiable, factor of booty is discussed thoroughly by Pritchett (1991: 68–203). How much a mercenary might expect to receive is also of central importance to this discussion of wages. On the other side of the employment equation, employers and generals found the resources that they needed to pay their troops from a variety of sources. The types of remuneration available to the mercenary were often dependent upon the means at the disposal of the employer. Employers resorted to various methods by which to raise the money with which to pay their troops. Whether the mercenaries received what they had hoped for when they began their service and how often employers provided even a living wage are important questions in understanding the relative conditions of the mercenary and of mercenary service.

The means

It was not cheap to pay mercenaries. Employers raised capital to pay their men in various ways (Miller 1984: 156–7). Tyrants exiled families and used their property for capital and land donations (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.45–6; Diod. 13.93.2). Some rulers had the luxury of revenues from a large taxation (*eisphora*) base. This was certainly true of the Persians (Hdt. 3.89–117; Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.69; Tuplin 1992: 67). Others, like Dionysius I, imposed increased taxes to pay their men (Arist. *Pol.* 1313 b; Parke 1933: 72). Some borrowed against the prospect of their success (Dem. 2.36 and 49.6). Borrowing seems to have been a common means by which trierarchs funded their campaigns even while at sea (Dem. 49.6–8, 11–12, 44, and 15; Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.11–12; Gabrielsen 1994: 116–17). Some commanders had natural resources at their disposal. Philip II improved the mines at Philippi (Diod. 16.8.7; Borza 1995: 37–55), while the Carthaginians tapped the mines of Iberia (Diod. 5.38.2–3). The Pisistratids had the silver mines at Pangaeum upon which to draw (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 15.2). Other commanders adopted sacrilegious methods, like temple robbing, to coin enough money to pay mercenaries. For example, Diodorus (15.13.1) described Dionysius plundering temple treasuries and the plundering of the Delphic dedications by the Phocian generals (Diod. 16.30.1). Aeneas Tacticus (13.1–3) advised using the wealthier citizens to provide or provision (*xenotrophein*) mercenaries. He recommended that the state and its citizens should share the cost of hiring, on the understanding that, once hostilities ended, the state would reimburse its citizens the costs that they had incurred. Agesilaus did much the same thing when he drew on loans (*daneizesthai*) and contributions (*syneranizesthai*) from his friends at Sparta (Plut. *Ages.* 35.3). The Athenians took similar contributions (*syntaxeis*) from their allies to pay troops (e.g. Dem. 8.26). The least responsible way to pay for mercenaries was to have them feed themselves from the lands in which they were serving and to have the war pay for itself. Booty taken from campaigns could be used as payment for the mercenaries (e.g. Xen. *An.* 7.3.10; Dem. 4.28–9; Krasilnikoff 1992: 24). It might go into a common fund from which the men would then be paid by the division of booty (Xen. *An.* 3.3.18; 5.1.12, 3.4; 6.6.37). This is best illustrated by the contractual arrangements of Seuthes with Xenophon and what men had remained in service of the army of Cyrus (Xen. *An.* 3.3.18), though the Spartans attest the same practice in the field (Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 13.11; Pritchett 1991: 90–2). The agents of the commanders would convert the booty into pay. The mercenaries had to gather their food from the land. Seuthes' responsibility was minimized and he benefited well by the arrangement. He paid the Greeks with resources derived from what they themselves had plundered (Xen. *An.* 7.7.53). Raising money to pay troops developed its own group of stories in ancient literature that highlighted the cleverness and trickery of generals in creatively paying their men. Thus, Jason of Pherae got money from his mother, who was very rich

(*polychrêmata*) by tricking her into believing that his soldiers were after him (Polyaenus, *Strat.* 6.1.2–3). Several stories highlight Themistocles, Cimon and Pericles, who all raised money through clever schemes in the field, and a great number of stratagems attributed to generals of the fourth century by Polyaeus involved raising money for pay (Pritchett 1974: 102; Gabrielsen 1994: 111).

Types of payment

Scholars have identified the types of payment that were available to both citizen and mercenary soldiers (Pritchett 1971: 3–30; Gabrielsen 1981: 151–5). The wages paid to mercenaries came in different forms. It was not necessary for an employer to discharge his responsibilities in coin alone. The late sixth-century BC drinking song (*skolion*) of the Cretan soldier-poet Hybrias (Athenaeus, 15.695f–6a; Parke 1933: 4) indicates not only the relationship between a man's occupation and his remuneration, but also the empathy he felt between his arms and his livelihood.

In my spear and sword and fine shield, body protection, there is my great wealth. For with this I sow, with this I reap, with this I tread the sweet wine from the grape, with this I am called master by vassals. Those who do not venture to bear spear and sword and fine shield, body protection, all bend the knee in fear and reverence to me, calling me master and Great King.

[my translation]

The discussion below concentrates on pay that employers provided to their men during campaigns particularly in the period after the introduction of coinage in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. Some men served for broader and more elusive rewards. We have already seen that the friendship and patronage of great men were considered better rewards than any wage that could be earned anywhere. The patronage offered by the rich and the powerful in the Mediterranean, and the prospect of their help in any future endeavour, must have been of crucial importance to all who served foreign princes, and made up for a lack of funds at the outset of campaign. Cyrus promised to restore the Milesian exiles to their city as soon as he was Great King (Xen. *An.* 1.2.2). If Alexander's 'Exiles Decree' is seen in this light, then such a pronouncement, supported by the power of a great man, was grand remuneration for services rendered by many of his mercenaries (Badian 1961: 16–43). Brian Bosworth (1988: 222; see Tod 201 and 202) suggested that Alexander's mercenaries may have petitioned him for such help.

Mercenaries often received wages in coin. The fifth-century BC Athenian hegemony had done much to monetize the Aegean basin and at the same



Figures 6 and 7 The obverse and reverse of a typical Athenian coin of the fifth century BC, depicting respectively the head of the goddess Athena and the Athenian symbols of the Attic owl, olive branch and letters standing for the coin belonging to the Athenians (London, British Museum, BMC 47).

time accustomed people to using coinage, especially in warfare. Naval warfare was particularly coin-intensive. This influenced the use of coins in the Athenian economy and the way that infantry as well as naval crews received coin in the long-drawn-out campaigns of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1.10.1, 1.13.1; Kallet-Marx 1993: 28–30). By the end of the fifth century coins had become a common medium through which mercenaries were hired and paid. Mercenaries and coinage are often associable in Classical antiquity. The minting and subsequent survival of coins used by great employers of mercenary armies in the later fifth and fourth centuries BC demonstrate the prolific use of coins for the payment of mercenaries. Phocian coins in the Third Sacred War illustrate this well. Diodorus (16.36.1 and 56.5) mentioned two separate mintings of coins for this war. The survival of coins with the names of the Phocian generals Phaullus and Onomarchus proves that these mintings took place. Other finds show coins minted for Greek military recipients in Thrace and Egypt. Hoards from Sicily show that itinerant mercenaries possessed money from all over the Mediterranean.

Coins had other ramifications for the growth of mercenary service. The spread of coinage in the Greek world facilitated the appearance of large mobile mercenary armies. Some evidence illustrates that the ancients felt that coins and mercenaries were related (Arist. *Pol.* 1285a, 1313b; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 15.1–3; Hdt. 1.61.3–4; Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.45–6). Margaret Miller (1997: 74) postulates that coins would have been one of the things that mercenaries might have brought back to Greece and placed in sanctuaries. Robert Knapp (2002: 183–96) considers that mercenary service in the Archaic age opened Greek communities of the mainland to more sophisticated economic and social interaction as soldiers returned from the east with new ideas about economies, payment and society. Ludmilla Marinovic (1988: 270–4) argues

that the salaries of mercenaries and the accumulation and circulation of coinage that resulted were important causes of the decline of the Greek *poleis*. Coinage and mercenary service were part of a trend towards a more professional and specialized age. The terms used for mercenaries in our texts illustrate this professionalization through the movement away from euphemisms, like *epikouros*, towards words for specialist soldiers, like *misthophoros*, in the later fifth and fourth centuries BC.

Coins did not constitute the only type of payment mercenaries received. Employers also provided food and other types of sustenance for their soldiers. Employers paid food costs (*sitêresion* or *sitarchia*) or money for travelling expenses (*ephodia*). Payments were made in kind for subsistence (*trophê* or *sitos*), purchased from markets or captured as booty. Mercenaries needed to eat before they needed to earn and, as Vincent Gabrielsen (1994: 110) states, payment and provisioning are best considered as ‘complementary’ rather than ‘differentiated’ terms. Bounties were handed over at times of success. The Syracusans presented Dion’s mercenaries with 100 minae after their success against the Dionysian tyranny in 357 BC (Plut. *Dion*, 31); Cyrus promised five minae to each mercenary once victorious (Xen. *An.* 1.4.13); Alexander gave his mercenaries two months’ pay along with large bounties to his regular troops after the Battle of Gaugamela in 331 BC (Diod. 17.64.6). There were also rewards for bravery, good service and individual deeds of heroism (e.g. Diod. 14.53.4). Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.1.6) stated that Jason of Pherae rewarded those mercenaries fond of toil (*philoponos*) or fond of danger (*philokindynos*). Finally, there was land. At one time, Dionysius gave Leontini’s territory to his mercenaries in 396 BC (Diod. 14.78.1–3).

Recent scholarship has centred upon the systems and terminology of payment in the Greek world. Jens Krasilnikoff (1993: 78) has noted, ‘it is a widely shared opinion that the terminology of payment separating regular and ration payment was not developed until the emergence of the great mercenary armies in the fourth century’. The relationship between the great mercenary armies and the appearance of more strict terminology for payment is significant. The basic terms are as follows. *Misthos* is described as a salary or wage for services rendered. *Chrêmata* means tools, but the word is often translated as money. It often related to the resources valued in monetary terms used to pay mercenaries. *Trophê*, deriving from the verb ‘to feed’ (*trechein*), meant food. *Sitos* was grain, the raw foodstuff used to feed the army. *Ephodia* often meant travelling expenses. Finally, *sitêresion* was money provided for the purchasing of food. All of these terms need further discussion.

It has been debated whether the Greeks applied any systematic meaning to remunerative terms. The debate hinges on the definition of the term *misthos* juxtaposed with the other terms for payment and provisioning of the army, specifically *trophê*. One group of scholars believes that *misthos* meant a salary (the implication being that it was paid in cash) and that *trophê* in particular was the raw material for subsistence (Griffith 1935: 268; Hansen 1979: 10). The

argument focuses upon the loose definitions of statements made by Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 42.3 and 62.6). Thus the two words meant different things. Another group claims that the ancient authors saw no specific difference in the terms that they used and that the words were, in effect, synonymous (Ehrenberg 1943: 229 n. 1). W. Kendrick Pritchett (1971: 4–6) tries to illustrate that these terms were synonymous in the fifth century BC, as found in Thucydides, but that they ceased to be in the fourth. Importantly, he suggests that the appearance of large mercenary armies was the reason for this transformation. Thus, Thucydides did not mean to distinguish between payments of coin (*misthos*) (Thuc. 6.8.1, 47.1; 8.36.1, 45.6) and food or rations (*trophê*) (Thuc. 8.5.5, 29.1, 29.2) as payments for troops. William Loomis (1998: 33 n. 7) states that only once does Thucydides (5.47.6) use *sitos* to mean a payment other than food, but even in that instance the *sitos* merely refers to supplies for troops for thirty days. All other instances of the word *sitos* Thucydides used to mean food or grain (Thuc. 1.48.1, 7.43.2) and thus they represented payments of rations of some kind just as a dikast in an Athenian courtroom received his money as maintenance rations. Philippe Gauthier (1971), in discussing the term *xenos* in Athenian texts, demonstrates the general synonymy of *trophê* and *misthos*. Most recently, however, William Loomis (1998: 33–5, esp. 35 n. 11) suggests that *misthos*, *trophê* and *sitos* need not be ration-money only. One argument he proposes shows that Thucydides used the word *misthos* for mercenary pay and mercenaries were unlikely to fight without gaining something. Hence they would not fight for ration-money only. He therefore concludes that *misthos/trophê* were gross pay plus ration-money (ibid.: 36). While this means that mercenaries received more than rations, it also, of course, had the effect of reducing the wages of servicemen drastically. In addition, theory and practice on campaigns were not always compatible. Gabrielsen (1994: 122; Thuc. 8.83.1–3) makes this point well when he highlights the way that Athenian naval crews would stay with a trierarch for food, but would desert him for better pay. As we shall see, this principle applied to land-bound mercenary activities as well.

In the fourth century BC, all of the terms used of payment were used for the provisioning of men on campaign and the differentiation should be played down. Even *misthos* could have been payment in kind for provisioning the men, despite the lack of synonymy in the period (e.g. Dem. 18.260). Men who received *misthos*, whether jurors or soldiers, were called *misthophoroi* because of their special relationship to a wage. *Misthos* alone defined the *misthophoros*. Remuneration in *misthos* was not always in cash, but on occasion it was entirely in cash. For example, *chrêmata* could be represented by *misthos* (Diod. 16.28.2, 30.1) and the author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (19.2) realized that *chrêmata* could be converted into *misthos*. The Phocians certainly paid their mercenaries in coin. The sources record that *chrêmata* were extracted from the Delphians to pay the mercenaries, and a number of coins minted by Phocis for the war have survived (Diod. 16.28.2; Williams 1976: 22–56).

Sitta von Reden (1995: 174), however, notes that *chrēmata* could be used of a variety of things. *Misthos* was often cash, however, and could be paid in a variety of currencies, Greek coins or Persian darics (Diod. 13.70.3).

A term for food (or perhaps provisions) was often used in relation to the amount of money that reflected its value (Thuc. 5.47.6; 8.29.1; Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.12–13). Food could be paid for in cash, although money for food (technically *sitêresion*) could have been part of a *misthos* payment as Loomis considered (1998: 33–5, esp. 35 n. 11; Krasilnikoff 1993: 80). The *Anabasis* provides a specific example of a *misthos* payment made to provide sustenance alone (Xen. *An.* 1.2.11–12; Krasilnikoff 1993: 84). Here, Cyrus paid the men four months' *misthos* at Caystru-Pedion, and it is unlikely that the men were in a position to save this payment. This *misthos* must have been spent on food on the subsequent march to Cunaxa. *Misthos*, therefore, effectively became food-money. If Xenophon saw *misthos* as a generic word for a wage, it would follow that it was used of pay for a rendered service and not, as here, in the middle of the job. Furthermore, at this juncture Cyrus paid four months' *misthos* when he only owed the men three, so here *misthos* could be used for wages for the previous three months and also food money for the coming month.

Misthos meant a wage or a salary. It was paid by the month (Xen. *An.* 1.1.10; 2.11; 3.21). It neither always represented money designed for a specific purpose, for example, provisions or armour, nor as we have previously stated did it need to be paid entirely in coin. It is, however, possible that some part of a *misthos* payment had to be made up of coin. *Misthos* may well have been something very different from a gift. Aristotle juxtaposed the *trophê* provided by Cimon to the Athenian people with the *misthos* provided by Pericles in the 'Radical Democracy' (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 27.3–4; Plut. *Cim.* 10.1–7). Tellingly, he made the same juxtaposition between the two terms regarding slaves who were not paid a wage (*amisthos*), but were fed *trophê* in payment's stead (Arist. *Oec.* 1344b.4). Scholars who note the synonymity of the terms *trophê* and *misthos* cannot prove that coinage was not required as part of a *misthos* payment. *Trophê*, on the other hand, could be paid, at least in part, in coin. Thus Demosthenes (4.28–9) stated that provisions (*trophê*) needed to be paid. He then proposed that ration-money (*sitêresion*) be paid to the men and that they should make up their full *misthos* from plunder. All payment terms are, therefore, inter-related, and yet coinage, in the form of the two obols paid to the men for *sitêresion*, was still part of their full *misthos* (see Gabrielsen 1981: 71). It is possible that *misthos* represented payment for specific services, both already or yet to be rendered. The word *misthos* was originally used for pay to state servants and soldiers. Hence Athenian troops received *misthos* at Potidea (Thuc. 3.17.4). This has recently been doubted, but it would not be incongruous with the times (Rhodes 1994a: 190–1). By the fourth century BC *misthos* was commonly paid to mercenaries. The influence of the great mercenary armies on payment systems and payment terms is clear. The appearance and spread of coinage in the Athenian Empire of the late fifth

century was coincidental with the appearance of both *misthos* and large numbers of professional soldiers and sailors.

Trophé was food or sustenance in a generic sense. It was used to cover a variety of terms and as we have seen Thucydides envisaged it as payments for food, just like certain *misthos* and *sitos* payments. The sources often assign it a cash value as they do for all payments (e.g. Dem. 5.28). Unsurprisingly, *trophé* as food was associated with *sitos* or grain (e.g. Diod. 14.63.3). *Trophé* might also be associated with travelling costs (*ephodia*) (Dem. 23.209.8; Plut. *Mor.* 79.160.B.2). The lexicographer Harpocration (*Lex.* 273.11–12) saw *trophé* as similar to the payments made to men for their subsistence. Thus, *sitéresion* (food money) in this sense was clearly akin to *trophé*, but not the same thing. In fact, the provision of *trophé* by employers indicated a responsibility for the men under their command, a burden many would, no doubt, have hoped not to bear.

More specific than *trophé* for food was *sitos* or grain. It was the staple on which much depended and was the costliest dietary commodity (Foxhall and Forbes 1982: 41–90). It is often referred to as essential to a campaign and for survival (Thuc. 3.27.3, 52.1; Xen. *Cyr.* IV.4.4; 5.1; Diod. 12.68.5; 16.41.4, 75.2; 19.106.2). Our sources were often specific in illustrating *sitos* as distinct from other forms of provisions. Thus, *sitos* was distinguished from *opson* (Xen. *An.* 2.2.16; 4.4.9; *Cyr.* 1.2.8; *Mem.* 1.3.5; 3.14.2, 3.1; Diod. 11.57.7). *Opson* was seen as the rich accompaniment to the two essential food groups of wine and grain (Davidson 1997: 20–6). *Sitos* was also differentiated from *probata* or sheep (Xen. *An.* 2.4.27; *Cyr.* 6.2.22; *Vect.* 4.45.2). On other occasions it is distinguished from *chrémata* (Thuc. 6.90.4; 7.24.2; Xen. *An.* 2.4.27; Isoc. 17.57.3–4; Lyc. *Leoc.* 18.8–9, 19.1; Dem. 32.15.2–3; Diod. 12.50.5; 15.3.3; 16.75.2; Plut. *Tim.* 18.4; *Dionys.* 41.1). Demosthenes (50.17.2–4) distinguished *sitos* from *misthos*. Andocides (*De Redit.* 11.10) distinguished *sitos* from bronze (*chalkon*). It is regularly distinguished from *oinos* or wine (Xen. *An.* 1.4.19; 2.3.14; 4.4.9; 5.8.3; *Hell.* 2.1.19; *Cyr.* 6.2.22, 28; *Mem.* 2.9.4; *Vect.* 4.6.3–5, 45.2; Dem. 42.20.6, 30.6; 31.2–3; Arr. *Anab.* 4.21.10; Diod. 19.94.3, 97.1). Thucydides (7.87.2) distinguished it from water. That it was not a term used to express simply all provisions, like *epitédeia*, is clear from the uses for both *sitos* and other goods. Xenophon (*An.* 2.3.14; *Cyr.* 4.4.1) used *epitédeia* for both *sitos* and *oinos*. Interestingly Arrian (*Anab.* 5.21.2) distinguished grain from the *epitédeia* gathered in India. Here the *sitos* was separate from the other food-stuffs, but still part of the *epitédeia*. *Sitos* is often referred to separately from the other provisions (e.g. Arr. *Anab.* 5.21.1; Diod. 13.88.6, 14.63.3, 16.67.2). The implication is that *sitos* was a part of the provisions of an army and this is more definitely proven by the fact that nowhere in the sources is grain juxtaposed with *ephodia*. Diodorus twice mentions *sitos* in connection with *trophé*, and this is hardly surprising given the derivation of the latter from provisioning or food, although it appears very like *epitédeia* in its relationship to grain in a passage of Diodorus (14.63.3).

Sitos might be supplied by the state (e.g. Thuc. 5.47.6; Diod. 14.79.4, 95.7), or by the commander at a price (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.56; Andoc. *De Redit.* 14.2–4; Dem. 50.17.2–4; Diod. 17.94.4). It might be procured by the individual soldiers on the campaign either by purchase from the market that accompanied the army (e.g. Xen. *An.* 1.5.5; *Hell.* 3.4.11), or from local inhabitants (Xen. *An.* 1.4.19, 5.10; Diod. 16.13.3). Finally *sitos* might be taken as plunder (e.g. Xen. *An.* 1.2.19; Diod. 12.63.1; 16.13.3, 56.2). It was rare for the commander to provide free *sitos*, and it seems that mercenaries purchased what they needed while on campaign (see Aristotle, *Oec.* 1350a32, 1350b7; Griffith 1935: 266). The commander's responsibilities ran only as far as ensuring that *sitos* was available to the men (see Arist. *Oec.* 1351b). As there is no direct evidence of *sitos* paid to soldiers, it is not possible to establish the regularity and amount of *sitos*, if it was used as remuneration. Nevertheless, the value of an army's *sitos* might be noted (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.56). Thucydides (7.87.2) recorded that the Athenians in the mines at Syracuse received just two *kotylai* (about one pint) of grain in eight months. This must have been the barest minimum required to survive. By comparison, the Spartans were allowed eight *kotylai* (about four pints) of grain by the truce on Sphacteria (Thuc. 4.16.1).

Sitêresion literally meant grain-money. It was most commonly money paid by the employer for the purchase of rations while on campaign. It was akin to *trophê* as it was used to feed the troops (Harp. *Lex.* 273.11–12). In the employers' perception it might even have substituted for *trophê*, but left responsibility for the purchase of rations in the men's hands (Dem. 4.28). It is found for the first time in Xenophon's *Anabasis* and is therefore an indicator of the scale of mercenary activity (Xen. *An.* 6.2.4; Griffith 1935: 267–8). Xenophon demonstrates that *sitêresion*, as an alternative to provisions, was important to the army's needs. It is juxtaposed specifically with *misthos* only once anywhere (Dem. 50.10.4–6). Demosthenes (4.28.1) distinguished between full pay (*misthon enteles*) and pay without *sitêresion*. He had previously stated that *sitêresion* would make up the shortfall of a full wage. In this speech he suggested that mercenaries in Thrace be given two obols a day ration-money. The figure is hypothetical, as the proposal for the campaign was not adopted. It tallies with most researchers' views of the basic requirements of men in service. It can be assumed, therefore, that a full salary in the mid-fourth century BC was higher than two obols a day. Loomis (1998: 57) thought that four obols per day was a 'minimum standard rate of *misthos* reflecting other wages for the century from 401–300 BC,' and therefore considers four obols more likely. Aristotle (*Oec.* 1350a32–1350b7) noted that it was, like *sitêresion*, a part of *misthos*. Vincent Gabrielsen (1981: 155) concludes that the amount spent on provisions was termed *misthos* by Aristotle and that the philosopher wanted to differentiate between 'monetary payment and rations in kind'. In the fourth century, Apollodorus (Dem. 50.10) tells us that the Athenian *stratêgoi* provided *sitêresion* to his crew and expected him, as trierarch, to make up the rest. All this would suggest that *sitêresion* could be

considered as part, but not all, of a full wage paid to sailors and mercenaries in the mid-fourth century BC. Demosthenes (4.28.1–29; 50.10.4–6) and Xenophon (*An.* 6.2.4) illustrate that the responsibility for the payment of *sitêresion* rested firmly with an employer, and the passage from Xenophon specifically illustrates that the army expected this. Demosthenes (4.28.3–4) differentiated *sitêresion* from both money (*chrêmata*) and silver bullion (*argyron*). It is almost certain, therefore, that *sitêresion* only refers to the purpose for which the payments were to be used and that was for the specific purchase of provisions for the campaign and nothing more general than that.

The employers were concerned at the amount of *sitêresion* paid as subsistence to their men. The amount was reflected in the number of days for which supply was held (Dem. 50.24.10–12). No ancient source explained when and how often the *sitêresion* might be paid. It would serve little purpose, however, to pay money specifically as *sitêresion* at the end of the month or at the end of service, because such a payment could not be used for the purpose for which it was given. Clearly, where food was available, either as plunder or in the employer's possession, it would have served in the place of *sitêresion* to spare the employer any further responsibilities (Xen. *An.* 1.2.19). This might explain why *sitêresion* appears so rarely in the sources and possibly is related closely to mercenary armies.

Ephodia literally meant supplies for campaigning and they were expressed primarily in terms of food, but also as the cost of the food. The word occurred often in Demosthenes, but sparingly in other authors. This must have been a necessity for any army (see Dem. 53.7.2–3; Ar. *Ach.* 53.4; Men. 39.472.2–3). Like other forms of remuneration it was difficult for the general to provide (Dem. 13.20.7–21.1). The sources referred to it in terms of the cost of the provisions (Aisch. 1.172.2–3), but it was clearly and primarily food (Andoc. *Alc.* 30.3–5). It is, therefore, not surprising that it can be identified with both *trophê* (rations) and provisions or *epitêdeia* (Dem. 23.209.8; Plut. *Mor.* 79.160.B.2). Demosthenes (25.56.6–8; 50.19.5–6; see also Lys. 12.11.3–4) implied that it was not *misthos*. A connection to money was possible (Plut. *Alex.* 15.2–3). Thus, Callicratidas gave his soldiers five drachmae of *ephodia*, perhaps meant as travelling expenses (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.12–3). It seems most likely that they received food to the value of five drachmae rather than that amount of money with which to purchase food.

Ephodia were often identified as a cash value if not in itself capital. In all such cases it was a lump sum held or given by the generals (Dem. 19.158.3–5; 25.56.6–8; 53.8.8–9; Plut. *Ages.* 10.5.4–5). There is, however, never any suggestion that it might be money for food (*sitêresion*). Demosthenes' decision not to use *sitêresion* in certain passages, combined with the fact that he did use *ephodia* often elsewhere, must lead to a belief that he saw them as different things. It may be that they were the same thing, but paid to different soldiers or for different reasons. In sum, *ephodia* were either food for a forthcoming campaign, expenses paid after a journey to join a campaign or the

provisions bought by the general for the men on a campaign. Employers determined the amount of *ephodia* that they had available to them in terms of days (e.g. Dem. 23.209.8–10), and even months (Dem. 19.158.3–5; Epicharmus, 4.85.5; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.24). The five drachmae paid by Callicratidas is the only known amount of *ephodia* (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.12–3). Regrettably, this lump sum gives no indication of the typical amounts paid to troops on or for other campaigns.

Time of payment

Regular remuneration was paid by the month, but the ancient sources often referred to such remuneration in terms of its value on a daily basis (Loomis 1998: 266–71). Notably, Xenophon (*An.* 1.3.21; 5.6.23; 7.2.36, 6.1) cited the arrangements of Cyrus, Seuthes and the Spartans in remunerating his men by the month. It is difficult to assess at what times in the month and how often wages and other remuneration were paid. A passage in the *Anabasis* (Xen. *An.* 5.6.23) refers to payments that will be made at the new moon. This might refer either to the start or the end of the month. Some forms of remuneration could only have been paid at the start of the month. Subsistence or food money (*sitêresion*) would have been useless to the man at the end of the month for which it was paid. However, travelling expenses could be paid in arrears; Callicratidas gave his men *ephodia* as expenses after they had arrived for the campaign and certainly before he led them to Methymna from Miletus (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.12–3). They must have spent money themselves to get to the campaign, just as some of Xenophon's troops were said to have done (Xen. *An.* 6.4.8). Wages, as today, were logically paid after services. *Misthos* would have been paid in this way, but it was not necessary that the money specifically paid at the end of the month for services rendered was always *misthos* (Griffith 1935: 265). The *misthos* paid by Cyrus to his Greeks near Tarsus included an advance payment of one month. It is clear that there was no set time for the payment of *misthos*.

The financial relationship created at a mercenary's hiring did much to establish the pattern of payment that would continue for the rest of his employment. The evidence is confusing with regard to whether money changed hands at the start of a mercenary's service. There are many passages stating that as soon as a general had secured funds he hired mercenaries (e.g. Diod. 15.15.2, 14.3, 70.3, 90.2; 17.14.1). Similarly, the great employers sent their ambassadors to Greece with large sums of cash in order to hire mercenaries (e.g. *ibid.*). Both these statements would suggest that money was required 'up front' in the hiring process. This was certainly true among the crews of the Athenian fleet, who appear to have been given a down payment prior to sailing (Dem. 50.7; Gabrielsen 1994: 122). At other times, however, a promise of the amount of wages to be paid was enough to hire a body of men (Diod. 14.44.2; 16.12.3; Xen. *An.* 1.4.11–12). Both signing fees and promises of cash

were no doubt used at one time or another to bring mercenaries into an army. The perception that a recruiter had money was often enough to draw men into service, even if no money was paid out (Dem. 40.36). The reverse, of course, was true as well, and men would desert if they thought there was no money available to their commander (Dem. 50.11).

Amount of payment

Determining the amount of pay that a mercenary received in the fifth and fourth centuries BC is complicated because of lack of data and the many different ways that a mercenary could expect to be paid. In addition, it is impossible to determine the difference between theory and practice. The sources may state that men were enrolled at one drachma a day, but the men may never have seen an obol of that payment. The problem discussed below pertains to the amount of pay that the employer gave to the mercenary. The presence of so many different kinds of pay makes it almost impossible to demonstrate the value of military service.

Most scholars agree that wages for mercenary service went down through the fourth century BC. Parke (1933: 231–3) notes the downward trend of wages, juxtaposed with the rising cost of living through that century. Griffith (1935: 273, 298) agrees, but solid conclusions remain difficult to draw. Generalizations across time and place are certainly dangerous and the evidence, specifically for standard of living, prices and inflation, is sparse indeed. Griffith (*ibid.*: 273) is very pessimistic as to the standard of living of the ordinary soldier. He sees the occasions on which mercenaries received lucrative remuneration as few and far between and suggests that, on the whole, mercenaries in the fourth century lived ‘from hand to mouth’. Like Parke, he views the high pay of Cyrus, Jason of Pherae, and the Phocian generals as ‘notable exceptions’ to the rule. Paul McKechnie (1989: 89), who is more interested in the level of prosperity of mercenaries, is less eager to pursue the deflation of mercenary wages in the middle of the fourth century BC than Parke and is almost positive in his assessment that mercenary pay was not all that bad. Jens Krasilnikoff (1993: 95), more recently, supports his position. Harvey Miller (1984: 155), avoiding the downward trend, while not overlooking it entirely, relates the available manpower to the amount of wages paid and he concludes that, ‘on the whole formal wages were low’. He blames the failure of wages to keep pace with inflation on the fact that they decreased in real terms in the fifth and fourth centuries BC rather than that they declined in themselves. Most recently, William Loomis (1998: 47–8) sees Cyrus, in particular, as extraordinary, but is more inclined to see ups and downs in the amount of payment for all workers in the later *polis* period related to the context of broader historical events (*ibid.*: 32–61, 257–8, 266–70). Thus, when Athens was at its most powerful, wages amongst Athenians were high while, during the crisis at the end of the Peloponnesian Wars, wages declined.

It seems logical that in the fifth century BC the amount a mercenary received in wages was linked to the amount of money paid to troops on citizen service overseas. Griffith (1935: 294–7) thought that this was not the case and that mercenary pay was lower in some cases after food payment deductions, but, as Loomis (1998: 60) has recently noted, this is all speculation. The precedent set by the Athenian payment to troops and jurors is reflected in the one drachma a day paid to a hoplite in 428/7 BC (Thuc. 3.17.4). Ancient Greek mercenaries often received the same as their citizen counterparts, although clearly their rewards when serving the dynasts of the east were much greater than the native levies of these rulers, as Xenophon (*An.* 1.7.3–8) demonstrates in the *Anabasis*. The development of the payment of citizens had a long history through the fifth century BC. Indeed, James Roy (1967: 316) believes that the contract between Cyrus and these Greeks in 401 BC reflects a tradition that dates back through the fifth century and was not simply created for the campaign, despite its extraordinary nature. This is borne out by the close relationship between mercenary payments and those made to their citizen counterparts in the fifth century BC.

Plutarch's *Life of Themistocles* contains what may be the first instance of payment to men in the service of the state (Plut. *Them.* 10.6–7; see Cleidemus 323 *FGrH*, 21; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 23.1). Plutarch stated that in 480 BC each Athenian family was given two obols a day by the people of Troezen and that the Areopagus gave each soldier an advance of eight drachmae (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 23.1; Pritchett 1971: 11). Following a passage in Plutarch's *Pericles* (11.4; Pritchett 1971: 8), it could be argued that one and a half drachmae a day was paid to citizens training on triremes in the 450s. On the whole, the evidence prior to the Peloponnesian War for money paid to citizens of Athens is very patchy. Pritchett concluded that payment was introduced between 460 and 450 BC. There are several potential instances of payment to soldiers and sailors prior to the start of the Peloponnesian War in 431 BC. If all of this evidence reflects payments then the amount varies from four obols to one drachma a day (see Pritchett 1971: 12; Loomis 1998: 36–9).

Thucydides cited nine examples of the amount of *misthos* paid to soldiers and sailors serving in the Peloponnesian War. One drachma a day was the common rate, a figure supported as regular for the fifth century BC by several scholars (Dover *HCT* 4: 293; Andrewes *HCT* 5: 97–8; Rhodes 1981: 306; Loomis 1998: 55). Nevertheless in 412 BC *nautai* in the fleet received a meagre three obols a day (Thuc. 3.17.4; 6.8.1, 31.3; 7.27.2, 8.29; 8.45.2, 101.13). A line from Aristophanes' *Acharnians* (159) confirms the accepted one drachma for service in the year 425, though some suggest that this represents a combination of *misthos* and *sitos* and is thus two-thirds of a hoplite's income (Griffith 1935: 295). In the following year, the *Wasps* (682–5, 1188–9) indicates that three and two obols a day were a wage. As a minimum, two obols tallies with the food money (*sitêresion*) suggested by Demosthenes for subsistence in Thrace in the mid-fourth century BC (Dem. 4.28–9), though

Plutarch (*Alc.* 35.4) noted that in 408 BC Alcibiades paid his sailors three obols a day. Xenophon (*Hell.* 1.5.4) wrote of Lysander's ambassadors trying to get Cyrus to pay one Attic drachma a day to *nautai* in order to attract sailors of the Athenian fleet to their cause in 407. The Persians agreed to four obols a day *misthos* in place of three (Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.7). This would suggest that, for sailors at least, the amount of four obols was above the basic *misthos* that they could expect in the fifth century. At the very end of the fifth century BC the money that Cyrus paid to his *xenoi*, one drachma a day, was, therefore, well above the average amounts noted for other types of military service.

The employers of the great mercenary armies appeared at the end of the fifth and the beginning of the fourth century BC. There are no figures for what Dionysius I paid to his mercenaries, although he was said to be generous in his payments especially in times of need (Diod. 14.8.6, 44.2, 62.1; 15.47.7, 91.4). The first large mobile army of mercenaries also provides the first real glimpse at the rate of pay for mercenaries in the field. Cyrus' army of Greeks was contracted at a daric each month, which was valued at about five obols a day. This was raised to seven and a half obols a day, or a daric and a half a month, when the men began thinking that the real target of the expedition was the Great King (Xen. *An.* 1.3.21), though Loomis (1998: 47–8) rightly points out that this was an extraordinary situation. Timasion (Xen. *An.* 5.6.23) and Seuthes (Xen. *An.* 7.2.36), by stipulating one cyzicene a month, promised them the same as Cyrus had done originally. Xenophon (*An.* 7.6.1) also pointed out that Thibron said that he would also pay them a daric a month. Cyrus' payment of a daric a month was clearly less of a precedent, generous perhaps, but more likely to have been accepted practice for mercenaries in the eastern Mediterranean (Roy 1967: 309–10).

There is another problem with regard to determining the amount of payment provided to the mercenaries with Xenophon and Cyrus, indeed to all soldiers. The money provided to the men would have been high had it been *misthos* in addition to expenses paid while on the campaign, like food and equipment. Once deductions for expenses are taken into consideration, the daric a month represents a much lower income, and Loomis (1998: 36) considers that a drachma covered more than simply ration-money. Griffith (1935: 267) suggests that Cyrus gave his men free *sitos*. However, nowhere in the *Anabasis* are the men given free *sitos*. The same is true of *sitéresion*, which was not paid to Xenophon's men by any of their commanding officers, or at least, if it was, it was not named as such (Xen. *An.* 6.5.4). No doubt the men had to pay for their food themselves from the markets that were available to them. Only occasionally on the outward march were they allowed to plunder the countryside (Xen. *An.* 1.2.19).

The evidence for payment of mercenaries in the period 399–322 BC is poor. Most recently William Loomis (1998: 57) thought four obols was the minimum standard rate, with an additional two obols for *sitéresion*. He relates his figures to non-military wages. For mercenaries there are only two

pieces of textual evidence that have any value at all. The first comes from Xenophon's *Hellenica* (5.2.21) and concerns the Spartan decision to allow their allies in the Peloponnesian League to furnish money instead of men to the Peloponnesian League. The League decreed the payment of three Aeginetan obols (about four and a half Attic obols) for each man that each state would otherwise have to provide. The figure of three Aeginetan obols may represent pay for mercenaries who would replace the troops normally sent by member states. This is supported by the fact that Xenophon uses *misthos* in the passage (see Griffith 1935: 296). There are, however, problems with this. *Misthos* is only used with regard to the cavalry and not the infantry (Xen. *Hell.* 5.21.4). The money is not necessarily related to the pay of mercenaries. Williams (1976: 54 n. 2) thinks that it was intended for Spartan citizens and not mercenaries. The Athenian League assessed its taxes in relation to the amount a state could afford. The Spartans probably welcomed this new system, in much the same way in which the Athenians in charge of the Delian League saw it as a benefit in the fifth century for their own citizens' pockets as well as for the control of their League. The Spartans could have used the money to pay fewer professionals, some of whom no doubt came from Laconia, who would also be a more effective fighting force than amateur citizens. The professional cores of citizen levies were becoming more common through the fourth century BC. The Thebans established their Sacred Band and the Arcadian League the *eparittoi* probably in this period. Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.4.13) noted the 'Eleian Three Hundred' and the Athenians even had *epilektoi* at Tamynae in 349 BC. In any case, this figure of four and a third Attic obols (three Aeginetan obols) a day as *misthos* might be used as a baseline for the payment of mercenaries in 383 BC. If so then it seems to Loomis less than contemporary gross payments at Athens and he cites the possibility that life might have been cheaper in the 'more rural' Peloponnese (Parke 1933: 232; Loomis 1998: 49–50).

The other piece of evidence concerns mercenaries directly, but payment only theoretically. In the *First Philippic* (Dem. 4.28), produced in 351 BC, Demosthenes outlines a plan for financing an Athenian army in Thrace by which the state will provide an army of mercenaries with two obols per day ration-money (*sitêresion*) and make up their full pay (*misthon entele*) from plunder. Paul McKechnie (1989: 89) believes that this evidence is of no value because it is only hypothetical. Parke (1933: 232) also questions its value, but he willingly uses it to strengthen his argument that mercenaries were poorly paid, advising that 'Demosthenes is trying to be as economical as possible'. Roderick Williams (1976: 53–4), more ingeniously, tries to use Demosthenes' figure of two obols to provide a model to demonstrate the rate of pay given to Phocian mercenaries in the Third Sacred War, which was fought at the same time that the speech was produced. He states that it is hard to see how '[i]t might be argued that this sum is a ration allowance not pay (*sitêresion* not *misthos*) and that regular pay would be expected in addition'. Nowhere did Demosthenes

say that the money to be paid was anything but *sitêresion*. Williams here seems correct to suggest that Demosthenes was arguing 'that the mercenary soldier [was] guaranteed subsistence and transport (the ten triremes) to an area where by plunder he could make up his full pay (*misthon enteles*)'. Demosthenes (4.28–9) juxtaposed *misthos*, and full *misthos* at that, with ration-money. Hence, *misthos* was generally higher than two obols per day. Significantly, the mercenaries' primary income was to come from plunder (Dem. 4.29). Griffith (1935: 297) speculatively assumed that *misthos* and *sitos* can be combined in Demosthenes' plan to produce a wage of between four obols and one drachma a day, but Demosthenes mentioned only *sitêresion* to be paid to the men; the state had no responsibility for any other provision for the men.

The Third Sacred War kept thousands of mercenaries employed in central Greece at the same time as Demosthenes produced his *First Philippic*. It is regrettable that Diodorus, the main source, never wrote how much the Phocian mercenaries were paid. They were probably paid above the average, for on several occasions the generals raised the rate of *misthos* by half as much again and to double its original amount, and so they attracted a considerable army of mercenaries (Diod. 16.25.1, 30.1, 36.1). Roderick Williams (1976: 54), using Demosthenes' figure of two obols a day, concludes that, if this had been a daily rate, the total wages bill for the Phocian mercenaries would have been 1,622 talents. His equation assumes there were 8,000 mercenaries serving for ten years. Thus 8,000 (men) multiplied by $\frac{1}{3}$ drachma (two obols per day) multiplied by 3,650 days (the duration of the war) produces a total of 9,733,332.3 drachmae or 1,622 talents. A higher figure for the wages paid to each mercenary may be countenanced, based on the fact that Demosthenes' 351 BC figure was low, as it did not consider the special increments, and the mercenaries might not have been employed all year round. Williams further conjectures that Isocrates' statement that Athens had spent more than 1,000 talents on mercenaries in the Social War would make mercenary wages higher in the middle of the fourth century BC (Isoc. 15.111). Williams further deduces that if Timotheus had with him 8,000 peltasts for the ten-month siege of Samos and only 1,000 talents to prosecute the war then their wages would have been high. A simple calculation reveals that had all this money been paid to the peltasts during the siege then each man of them would have earned two and a half drachmae a day. It is necessary to consider other variables in this campaign as Timotheus also had thirty triremes under his command. Unfortunately, neither of Williams' sources referred to the Phocian situation, while Demosthenes was dealing with *sitêresion* and not *misthos*, and, furthermore, it is not known how many mercenaries Athens employed during the Social War.

Williams (1976: 54) believes that 1,000 men with Timotheus on Samos were the only mercenaries employed by the Athenians in that war, but there could easily have been more. Accordingly, he proposes that the daily wage for the 8,000 Phocian mercenaries was conceivably four Attic obols a day, the

same figure that Loomis thought likely in the fourth century BC. Williams therefore suggests the following calculation for the cost of the Phocian war: 8,000 (men) multiplied by 3,650 (days) multiplied by four Attic obols (daily wage) provides a wages bill of 19,466,664 drachmae or 3,244.4 talents. The total for the ten years of the Phocian war would therefore be less than 3,500 talents. He supports this answer by drawing on a play of Menander produced in 313 BC (*Peri Keiromene* 190 in Edmonds 1134; Williams 1976: 54, n. 6; see also Menander, *Olyntia*, frag. 357 in Edmonds 698–9).

McKechnie (1989: 89; see also Krasilnikoff 1993: 93), primarily following the evidence for the Phocian campaigns, postulates that mercenaries were not that badly paid in the middle of the fourth century BC. As we have noted, Diodorus (16.25.1, 30.1, 36.1) stated that in order to raise troops quickly the Phocian generals three times offered wage increases, the third time doubling the daily base rate of salaries (Diod. 16.36.1). It is regrettable that the basic wage, upon which the subsequent increases were entirely dependant, is never mentioned. It can be concluded that the worst that the Phocian mercenaries received after their increased wages was four Attic obols a day. The highest that they could have been paid cannot be known. If it is assumed that they received no more than those who followed Cyrus fifty years previously, then the remarkable figure of two drachmae a day might be postulated.

The evidence for later in the fourth century BC provides little more information for mercenary remuneration. In the fourth century, Macedonian hypaspists received no less than forty drachmae a month (Parke 1933: 233). Alexander paid his allies one drachma a day and Parke rightly says there is no reason to believe that he paid his mercenaries more or less. Parke states that '[t]he only safe conclusion is that the Macedonian common soldier received definitely less than four staters a month (probably Attic, and so equal to forty drachmae) which was pay of a higher rank' (ibid.: n. 1). The allies were paid one drachma *per diem*. There is nothing to suggest what Alexander paid to his mercenaries. By the end of his Persian campaigns, money was not an object for him and his wealth would have been astronomical. It is possible that the mercenaries received almost as much as the Macedonians did, if not more, and that the great successes of Alexander in the east left all who accompanied the Macedonians (and survived) well rewarded from pay, donations and plunder. Plutarch (*Alex.* 36 and 40) recorded the great indulgences of Alexander's followers after his victories (see also Diod. 17.64.6, 66.1, 71.1; Justin 11.14.9; Curt. 5.2.11, 6.9; Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.7; Plut. *Alex.* 42). Plutarch's name for Alexander of 'greatest gift giver' (*megalodotatos*) was not misplaced (Plut. *Alex.* 39; Mitchell 1997: 167–77).

The wage that a mercenary received in the fifth and fourth centuries BC stemmed from what their citizen counterparts could hope to be paid by the state and the needs of the commanders at the time. Cyrus and the Phocians paid more when their need was greater, just as the forensic speeches illustrate trierarchs paying more for crews in manpower crises. At the same time, these

citizen-soldiers were not the only men in receipt of *misthos*. There was a definite relationship between wage-earning in the service of the state as a hoplite and service of the state as a juror (Parke 1933: 231), ranging from two obols (Ar. *Ecc.* 180–8, 204–7, 282–4, 289–92, 300–10, 377–93) to three obols a day (Ar. *Eq.* 795) for jury service. The figures for skilled and unskilled labour demonstrate an approximation to mercenary wages, ranging as they do between three obols and two drachmae a day (Burford 1969: 106, 140–1, 164; Loomis 1998: *passim*). The worker might be paid piecemeal rather than by the amount of time that it took to do the job. The status of the employee might also have played a role in the amount received rather than the job that they did. Labourers were very similar to Greek mercenaries in this respect. Mercenaries were paid both for their success on campaign and for their status within it, as an officer or an ordinary soldier.

The *lochagoi* and *stratēgoi* received twice and four times as much pay respectively as regular troops did in mercenary armies (Xen. *An.* 7.3.10, 6.1). Some men were awarded double or even triple pay for their military prowess or efficiency in the armies of Jason of Pherae and Alexander (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.1; Arr. *Anab.* 6.10.1). Similarly, rewards and bounties for successes were regularly associated with campaigns and clearly boosted the income that soldiers may have expected. For example, promises were made to the Cyreans (Xen. *An.* 1.4.11), and Plutarch (*Dion.* 31) recorded that the Syracusans gave Dion's mercenaries 100 minae each.

Moses Finley (1973: 65–6) notes the abstract nature of both labour and wages for work done, as opposed to the value of a product. Military service did not produce a product that could be purchased and carried away. A soldier's value was determined in less tangible ways. Alison Burford (1972: 121) stresses that there was little correlation between a profession and a wage. Professionals were not paid for what they did, but were paid according to their status. Mercenaries were professionals only in so far as they could expect remuneration for a service that they rendered to an employer. The fact that some soldiers were remunerated with higher rewards than others after their successes on campaigns demonstrates that there was a value that could be placed on success. The rowers in a trireme were paid by status. *Thranitai* were of higher social status than their rowing companions on the lower decks and were better paid. Even if the *thranites* received money for his status rather than his ability, there is enough evidence to suggest that value was placed on the better rowers and that they were paid the best wages (Thuc. 6.31.3; Dem. 45.85, 50.1–30; Lysias 21.10). In land warfare, also, the sources demonstrate that the rewards were more for bravery (*andreia*) and physical fitness than actual individual skill (*technē*) at waging war. Thus, by the fourth century, men might be paid for their abilities and willingness to fight. Isocrates (5.I.9) saw that men who risked more received higher wages and Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.1.6) recorded that Jason of Pherae better rewarded the lover of toil (*philoponos*) and danger (*philokindynos*) in war.

The two attributes for which rewards were given to the infantry, bravery and fitness, were both expected of the Greek citizen in pursuit of normally acceptable goals within the city-state. Hoplite warfare was an expected attribute of the model citizen within the state. The speakers in Plato's *Laches* (181d–182e) portrayed hoplite warfare as something that could not be taught or learned. However, in Nicias' opinion, fighting in single combat required knowledge, training or learning. Payment was not made on the basis of skill, but on status. The level of pay for the officers further bears this point out. The onus placed upon these men was great. They were supposed to set an example of bravery (*andreia*) in times of war (Xen. *An.* 5.2.11).

The monies paid to mercenaries ranged from a massive one and a half drachmae a day paid to Xenophon's mercenaries in 401 BC to a paltry two obols a day proposed by Demosthenes. On the face of it, this suggests that wages declined during the period despite specific moments of greater prosperity; however, this decline, which is often referred to by historians, may not be as glaring as they surmise. If Cyrus' men, while on the *anabasis*, did not receive expenses in addition to *misthos*, then mercenary wages were low even at the start of the fourth century. Provisions might have cost at least two obols; thus in real terms Xenophon's colleagues received three to four obols a day and these figures are borne out in other sources (Dem. 4.28; Ar. *Vesp.* 682–5). Some mercenaries, like Nicostratus, died wealthy, but most did not (Isae. 4.1). Inevitably, supply and demand affected the amount that mercenaries were paid. No doubt demand, such as during hiring booms, dictated the payment of mercenaries as well as the type of mercenaries who served. Clearly, those who fought with the Phocians and Dionysius I were better remunerated than those unlucky enough to serve less desperate or less wealthy paymasters.

Commanders regularly found themselves in arrears with payments to their men (e.g. Xen. *An.* 1.2.11; Diod. 16.17.3, 72.1). Persian employers were particularly at fault in this regard (*Hell. Oxy.* 19.2). The problem of arrears in the Greek world of the fifth and fourth centuries BC would suggest that the men stayed on the campaign in spite of the lack of pay. We have seen that men stayed for food and deserted for the prospect of payment or better payment. They were paid towards the end of their service for services rendered and so did not expect payments in advance. This kept the soldiers with their commanders who they knew owed them money. Similarly, their hopes for their future must have lain with factors other than pay. It was rare for mercenaries to revolt from their employer over pay (e.g. Plut. *Dion.* 50; Xen. *An.* 1.3.21, 4.11). They were clearly more interested in sustenance than in payment while on campaign, but for most mercenaries booty was no doubt paramount. The amount of payment, while an important consideration, was therefore secondary to the real interests of mercenary soldiers. It was booty that was the crucial lure. Booty, like large donations from their employers, made those mercenaries who died wealthy, the wealthy men they were.

Booty

Booty was of varying quantity and quality to the successful soldier (see Parke 1933: 233; Griffith 1935: 273; Pritchett 1971: 53–92 and especially 1991: 68–203; Krasilnikoff 1992: 23–36; 1993: 77–95; Hanson 1998: 185–94). It was of paramount importance to the mercenary's income. In particular, the perception of the wealth he might make from warfare, especially in the very wealthy kingdoms and principalities of the east, was critical in much mercenary (and indeed military) motivation. It potentially provided a release from the daily grind and the means to return home instantly wealthy. The majority of mercenaries can never have achieved enough of this kind of wealth to return home. If many had, the Greek cities would have been littered with wealthy men returning from campaigns and we would hear more about them, instead of the majority of men wandering desperately in Asia. A minority did make money from campaigns abroad. Xenophon seems to have done so, as he noted that his plunder from the final phases of the *anabasis* was enough to make a dedication to Apollo at Delphi and buy a plot of ground and build a temple and an altar for the goddess Artemis at Scylla in the Peloponnese (Xen. *An.* 5.3.6–10). In addition the Spartans arranged for him to receive the pick of the animals plundered from the Persian Asidates (Xen. *An.* 7.8.23). This was no small sum. But Xenophon had status already and, as the redistributive arrangements made for the estate of the noble Persian Asidates illustrate, the commanders on the spot determined that Xenophon should receive a sizeable portion of the goods taken. As an officer and an Athenian aristocrat himself, Xenophon was well placed to take advantage of such rich pickings. The men may well have been low down in the pecking order. The Athenian Nicostratus died overseas in the early fourth century BC, leaving two talents of property which was contested at his death, hence we have the forensic speech that Isaeus wrote for the trial (Isae. 4). No doubt this sum was generated principally through booty rather than daily wages of even one drachma a day. If he had saved every cent of this wage it would have taken him thirty-two years to amass this fortune.

Plundered goods fell into two types, the despoiled arms (*skula*) of the enemy and the plundered goods (*leia*) of a territory (see Pritchett 1971: 55–6 and 1991: 58–152). Selling captured civilians into slavery was the main source of revenue for armies in the field (Pritchett 1971: 82). Ransoming cannot have been uncommon either in the fourth century BC (Bielman 1994: 13–18). In antiquity no one questioned that a victorious army owned the property and even the persons of the defeated side. Nevertheless, among armies in the field, there were still question marks about which body or bodies within an army hierarchy owned what booty specifically. W. K. Pritchett (1971: 85) identifies a series of rules governing who might receive booty after a successful campaign. In most instances the general owned all booty and then redistributed it according to these rules. This might

be done according to the size of the various contingents within the army (Diod. 11.33.1), or by the acclaimed winners of the award for displaying the greatest valour in battle (*aristeia*) or by avenues of patronage and status hierarchies. The state owned any booty a general subsequently brought home, and while this was inapplicable for most purely mercenary armies, some generals of mercenaries acted in the interests of their native cities. Finally, the individuals within the army might keep whatever they plundered off their own bat. Hence at the end of the *anabasis* campaign Xenophon organized a raid on a wealthy estate with his friends and most trusted comrades in order to do them a good turn. The product of this raid they each could keep, independent of any common store of the army as a whole (Xen. *An.* 7.8.9–24). Mercenaries were employed and paid professionals, but their interest in booty as a means of revenue creation meant that they were never far removed from plunderers in the Greek world. Their regular pay through employment separated them from the plunderer by the thinnest of threads.

W. K. Pritchett (1974: 102) concludes that in the fourth century men signed on for service in the knowledge that their commanders had little money and that the majority of their payment would come from booty. This view has recently been challenged with respect to Athenian naval crews where pay was a significant interest (Gabrielsen 1994: 124). Booty was of paramount importance in the provisioning and financing of fleets and field armies. This was true even for non-mercenary armies in the field. In 406 BC, impoverished *nautai* and *stratiôtai*, having planned to attack the allied city of Chios, eventually forced their commander Eteonicus to threaten the Chians to provide money for their pay (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.1–5). For mercenary armies this was most certainly the case, as levels of state responsibility were lessened and the men's personal interest in reward was higher than in warfare involving citizens of the states in conflict. Thus, once the men with Xenophon's *anabasis* had achieved the relative safety of the Black Sea, their interest in plundering to return home with a profit increased dramatically (Xen. *An.* 5.1.8, 17; 6.6.2; 7.4.2, 5.2, 8.9–19; Nussbaum 1967: 147–9, 154–5).

Plunder worked to the advantage of both employers and their men. It lifted the responsibilities of payment from the employers and increased the opportunities for real wealth creation among the men. However, there were also negative aspects to plundering. It slowed armies down, both in the process and in the management of large numbers of captured goods and persons. It made armies unpopular with the native peoples and it distracted the troops from the real business of prosecuting wars. Xenophon's *Anabasis* illustrates many of the benefits and pitfalls of plunder. Thus, plunder lay at the heart of the financial relationships between Xenophon's men and the Thracian Seuthes, as plunder would pay the troops their wages, thus alleviating any responsibilities that either commander had to the men (Xen. *An.* 7.3.10–11). Cyrus prohibited his army from plundering territories that were friendly to his cause on the march to Cunaxa, but let the men plunder

Lyaconia which he considered hostile (Xen. *An.* 1.2.19). We have already seen, in the case of Chios in 406 BC, that armies with interests in plunder became a liability to friend and foe alike.

Unscrupulous commanders, like Dionysius I of Syracuse, could make massive profits from plundering for themselves to finance their campaigns and pay their men (Diod. 14.111.4; 15.14.3–4; Justin 20.5). So that the war could continue and wages be paid as the army moved, and to avoid the problem of burdensome wagon-trains of slaves and captured goods, armies looked to booty-sellers to provide them with money and, presumably, provisions in return for taking the booty off their hands. Pritchett (1971: 87; Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.15, 4.5.8, 6.6) suggested that such booty-sellers (*laphyropoloi*) appeared only with the Sparta army in the fourth century. He discerned that the Spartans were reluctant to take their booty home with them because of the economic impact such wealth would have in Laconia (ibid.: 91). Mercenary armies sold booty in the field as well (Pritchett 1991: 425). Seuthes sold booty in order to pay Xenophon's men near Byzantium (Xen. *An.* 7.4.2). Mercenary armies needed to sell booty for cash to enable quick distribution of more portable coins or provisions amongst the regiments and men. Nevertheless the sale of booty in the field and not at a market yielded less income for the army (Pritchett 1971: 77; 1991: 434–5). The booty-seller for Xenophon's Ten Thousand at Cerasus (Xen. *An.* 5.3.1–6) and for Seuthes (Xen. *An.* 7.5.1) at Byzantium no doubt made more money in a city market than he would out in the countryside. Of course, the booty-sellers, as middlemen, took their sizeable cut. Incidentally, Pritchett (1971: 77–8), following Thucydides (8.28), reckons that the Peloponnesians received from Tissaphernes 10 per cent of the market value of slaves taken from Iasus in saving themselves the inconvenience of selling them themselves.

War generated wealth in the ancient world. As we have seen, booty lay at the heart of much mercenary pay. Mercenary wars encouraged offensive and aggressive strategies. Defensive wars did not generate booty. But this created a vicious cycle between the mercenary employer needing the army to take booty so that he might pay the men, and the increased amount of warfare requiring more mercenaries who in turn needed to be paid from the plunder. As the generals in theory owned and distributed the communal plunder of an army, a semblance of professional service was maintained even within mercenary armies, but stealing booty for its own sake and for the needs of payment severely dislocated the mercenary from being a regularly paid and professional soldier. As a plunderer, he was no different from a raider or a pirate. As a soldier, he sought a beneficial end to his term of service, as surely most mercenaries did not see constant military service as an end in itself. Ironically, given the vicious cycle of plunder and warfare in which mercenaries were trapped, it was that very plunder that might have assisted the mercenary in escaping his mercenary life and getting home wealthy enough to retire.

Conclusion: theory and practice

Theoretical payments in the sources were a far cry from the reality for the men of the line. We have already discussed the importance of patronage in mercenary service. The general's success or failure meant a great deal to everyone in the army. Lack of confidence in the general's ability to provision and feed the troops under his command led to defections even among citizen-soldiers and sailors (Dem. 50.7–11; 40.36). The mere possibility that a commander was running low on resources was enough to cause men to desert to another employer, as often happened to the Athenian trierarchs, or even to abandon them in favour of returning home. Of course, naval crews had more options than land-based forces, by virtue of sea travel's mobility. Infantry had to walk, often long distances, to find employment elsewhere. Naval personnel saw new opportunities at every port. Nevertheless, the commander walked a tightrope between paying his men too much, and so empowering them to leave his service, and providing them with too little, and so forcing them to seek other options.

Mercenary infantry were entirely dependent on their employers for their pay and often for communal booty distribution. Despite the appalling way in which commanders processed payments, provisioned slowly, withheld pay for months (e.g. Polyaeus, *Strat.* 3.9.51), encouraged their men to spend their money when they had it and not to have opportunities to spend when they did not (Polyaeus, *Strat.* 3.9.35), the men still stayed with them. Mercenaries rarely rebelled and they never killed their officers over issues of payment. They knew that rebellion or desertion left them with nothing at all of what was owed to them. Cyrus withheld payment for three months from his men before he was 'forced' to hand over wages (*misthos*). However, Cyrus was a Persian prince and potentially Great King. His person alone, not to mention his cause, must surely have been enough to keep the troops loyal to him while on the campaign. There is no concrete evidence that Cyrus gave the mercenaries anything after he paid them four months' *misthos* at Caystrupedion (Diod. 14.19.9, 21.6). He made promises to them all of donations and pay once the war was won. These promises evaporated with his death. Here is a perfect illustration of the bind in which the mercenaries often found themselves. If they succeeded in putting Cyrus on the throne they would be well rewarded. Defeat would leave them with nothing. At the same time, the employer had everything to gain in the event of victory. Seuthes was a different matter, but still indicative of the men's bind with an employer. He provided nothing material for those who served with him. Nevertheless, his Thracian peltasts would have been helpful to the army of hoplites with Xenophon. Jan Best (1969: 75) has noticed that peltasts were useful to armies in gathering plunder. Seuthes' contract with Xenophon was more like an alliance than employment (Xen. *An.* 7.3.10). The army foraged for their own food and Seuthes paid them from the booty that they had seized from the

war. Seuthes, on the other hand, got a crack fighting force of heavy infantry that enabled him to enlarge his kingdom in Thrace. He paid them from the booty that they raised for him. And, incidentally, he still reneged on that agreement. It took a great deal of shrewd negotiation from Xenophon to get any money out of the Thracian (Xen. *An.* 7.7.25–46).

Similar scenarios are found elsewhere among Greek mercenaries. The author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* illustrates that poor payment was the result of the system of the Persian imperial government. But clearly again this system was designed to bind the men to the employers and their cause. Accordingly, the Great King provided a little money (*oliga chrēmata*) when the decision had been made to go to war, but made no planning for the future (*Hell. Oxy.* 19.2). The funds inevitably dried up. Specifically, the passage relates to the time of the Decelean War and describes the Great King as mean (*phaulos*) and miserly (*glyschros*). Clearly, the employer provided money to sign men onto a cause and once they had signed saw no need to keep them provisioned with payments. Once again, the men had been ensnared in what must have been the classic bind. They could continue in service in the hopes of payment and final remuneration, or cut their losses and desert, leaving behind any hope of money and reward. With no state answerable to any charges of poor treatment or negligence, the mercenaries were on their own, trapped by promises of wages, or of one-off up-front payments.

In reality, the payment to mercenaries was patchy and irregular. Commanders needed a good cash flow and good supplies. No wonder Demosthenes hoped to pay the men he planned to send to Thrace only food money (*sitêresion monon*) and have them make up the rest of their wages with plunder (Dem. 4.29.1; Parke 1933: 232). The fact that poverty would keep the men loyal, mean and hungry no doubt appealed to commanders and employers alike. In the final analysis, the mercenary as an individual was exploited. There were no pensions and no responsibilities placed upon the employers for the men under their command. If a mercenary died, that was one fewer man to pay. Mercenaries were an efficient way to run a military campaign especially in view of the employer's ability to hire and fire when and if the situation demanded and to use the proceeds from the mercenaries' fighting with which to pay the men. Unsurprisingly, mercenaries became common in the Greek world of the fourth century, employed by both states and powerful individuals. Mercenaries were an irresponsible means to wage wars in an enemy's territory.

HIRING GREEK MERCENARIES

Introduction

Mercenaries were readily available throughout the later fifth and fourth centuries BC. Nowhere in the sources is there a suggestion that commanders have problems in hiring men because of a lack of availability. Even when they were in the most unlikely of settings, for example outside urban centres or away from the coast, commanders could hire men quickly and easily, even for relatively unannounced, spur-of-the-moment campaigns. For example, Pelopidas hired mercenaries in Thessaly when he could not take the Theban citizenry north in 364 BC (Plut. *Pel.* 27). James Roy (1967: 316) considers that mercenary hiring systems developed long before the mass hiring of the Ten Thousand by Cyrus the Younger in 401 and other commanders in the fourth century BC. Ludmilla Marinovic (1988: 267) concludes that a more formal system of hiring developed through the fourth century with third parties, both *poleis* and individuals, acting as go-betweens in the process. There is strong evidence to support this idea and that Sparta, particularly, was involved in facilitating the employment of Peloponnesians well beyond the Peloponnese.

Becoming a mercenary involved several steps. Employers and potential mercenaries required means of making contact and then effecting a contract at the start of employment. Potential soldiers required the arms, armour and possibly training that were necessary to become a mercenary. If they didn't have their own military equipment, questions about the provision of armour by employers become important. With respect to this last problem, we need to establish who, if anyone, was excluded from mercenary service in the late *polis* period.

The hiring process

There were four different interest groups concerned with the hiring process: paymasters (*misthodontai*), generals (*stratēgoi*), commanders (*lochagoi*, *phourarchoi* and *archontes*) and soldiers (*stratiōtai*, *misthophoroi*, *xenoi*). On occasion the

employing paymaster and the general were one and the same person. But paymasters could equally be distant providers, holding the purse-strings and the fortunes of both commanders and men. No paymaster meant no mercenary service. The opportunity for employment was central to the hiring process. Without a war to fight, or some other necessity like garrison duties, men found no employment. Some mercenaries, like bodyguards (*doryphoroi*, *korynéphoroi*) and garrison troops (*phrouroi*), would have had permanent employment. Bodyguards in particular were trusted and were not always foreigners. Thus, the club-men (*korynéphoroi*) of Pisistratus were Athenian citizens (Hdt. 1.59). Such groups of professionals were smaller in number than the great armies of the later fifth and fourth centuries BC. The large-scale hiring of mercenaries took place in the period after the later fifth century BC and did not provide permanent employment, but only service for a specific campaign objective. Armies were, therefore, created instantly for Cyrus' tilt at the Persian crown or his brother the Great King Artaxerxes' attempts to conquer Egypt. Hiring required a variety of apparatus to create armies and hierarchies for field campaigns. Long-established links were exploited, such as aristocratic alliances and diplomatic relationships (*proxenia*, *xenia*, *philia*) outside the community, in order to make contact with potential groups of mercenaries. Once established, traditional patron–client and other networks and relationships (*philia*, *betairia*, *phratiria*) within the community served to enlist the necessary manpower. Of course, some mercenaries, as we have seen, acted as individuals, lone wanderers, like the Athenian Astyphilus who signed up for service wherever he wished, but the majority of mercenaries came with and as part of a larger and already established communal structure, hired through and by aristocrats and *poleis* acting as their agents. It may not be stretching a point too far to see some mass mercenary hiring in the fifth and fourth centuries as harking back to the Homeric bands of retainers who followed individual and noble heroes to Troy. This goes far to explain why certain regions, namely Arcadia, Crete and Rhodes, figured so prominently in mercenary service.

As a result of the very personal nature of all connections in the ancient world, it was natural that the soldier would associate his service with the individual with whom he had served or for whom he was serving. Xenophon saw his relationship with both Proxenus and then Cyrus as more than that of a mercenary to an employer. Xenophon was a *xenos* of Proxenus, who was the reason that Xenophon went on the campaign into Asia (Xen. *An.* 3.1.4). He wrote that many men brought others with them, implying a hiring network of personal connections (Xen. *An.* 6.4.8). Cyrus relied on his overseas friends (*xenoi*) for recruiting men for the *anabasis*. Xenophon called Proxenus, Sophænetus, Socrates and Aristippus '*xenoi*' (Herman 1987: 97–108; Mitchell 1997: 119). The speaker of Isaeus 2 and his brother claimed to the court that they had taken themselves off to Thrace with Iphicrates and not with a specific military unit (Isae. 2.1). The man with whom they associated on the

campaign was their commander, and the fact that he was an Athenian, like them, is significant; they became mercenaries by exploiting relationships within the *polis* to serve with a man well known enough to have relationships outside it. Other states than Athens utilized the foreign connections of their nobility to tap mercenary markets. Stephen Hodkinson (2000: 344–52) shows most recently the important place of *xeniai* relationships in the movement of men and resources outside Sparta to serve both the state's and individual Spartans' interests overseas. He also illustrates the important place of mercenaries in military aid (ibid.: 348–50). These relationships aided the hiring process, and trusted companions would no doubt be recalled to serve many times over. The aristocratic commanders provided the connections that gave opportunity for service from employers to generals to the men of the line. Xenophon (*An.* 1.7.4) made Cyrus say explicitly that many of the men would not wish to return home, but remain in the prince's service.

The paymaster dealt with mercenaries through intermediaries. For their part, the generals held a high enough profile to have personal dealings with major employers: kings and princes. Potential mercenary commanders could approach the employer themselves, as Conon had done after Aegospotami (Isoc. 5.61–2), and like Aristippus (Xen. *An.* 1.1.10) and Clearchus (Xen. *An.* 1.3.3) who found service with Cyrus the Younger. Some employers might use their networks of foreign friends to hire mercenaries (e.g. Xen. *An.* 1.1.9–11). They might request a specific general to command armies for them as the Persians occasionally did from the Greek cities. Thus, Pharnabazus, while acting for Artaxerxes, requested Iphicrates the Athenian command his invasion of Egypt (Diod., 15.29.3). Achoris the Egyptian sent for Chabrias from Athens (Diod. 15.29.1). Agesilaus was also offered a command in Egypt (Plut. *Ages.* 36). The presence of intermediaries between the employer, the general and the men is well attested. These might be the *phrouarchoi*, or garrison commanders, of the Persians in Asia Minor (Xen. *An.* 1.1.6), their deputies (*boi hairetoi*) who acted as go-betweens for Cyrus and the men (Xen. *An.* 1.3.20) and the various *archontes* or commanders of mercenary units (e.g. Diod. 16.62.1). More specifically these might be the hiring officers or *xenologoi* themselves (Xen. *An.* 1.16; Isoc. 5.96). Ambassadors (*proxenoi*) might also assist relations between the state and the mercenaries (Aen. *Tact.* 22.29). The importance of such a role is demonstrated by the kinds of men sent on these expeditions. For example, the Carthaginians sent senior ambassadors (*presbeis*) to hire Greek mercenaries (Diod. 14.47.3). Knossian *presbeis* also hired those who had fled with Phalaecus at the end of the Sacred War (Diod. 16.62.3). Even the *poleis* themselves were not above acting as intermediaries for and controlling the employment of mercenary troops. This was certainly true of the Spartans, as Xenophon (*An.* 1.4.3) noted that they sent a Spartan officer with 700 mercenaries from the Peloponnese under his command to assist Cyrus. Diodorus (14.58.1) also noted that they gave their permission to employers to hire in the Peloponnese and Dionysius I hired mercenaries

through Spartan permission and assistance (Diod. 14.44.1–2). The Spartans themselves needed permission from the ephors before serving outside the Peloponnese (Isoc. 11.18). They also may well have exercised some control over the activities of the commanders of mercenaries abroad, as Diodorus (14.78.1) recorded that Dionysius I sent a Spartan commander named Aristotle back to Sparta to be tried for an unspecified misdeed.

Sparta was not alone in such activities, as the sources also imply that Thebes (Diod. 16.34.1, 44.2; Dem. 23.183) and Argos did the same thing (Diod. 16.44.2). The powerful men of the east are often found exchanging hired Greeks. Thus, the Egyptian king Tachos sent Tennes 4,000 Greeks (Diod. 16.42.2). It would be of great interest to know how states collected the mercenaries that they sent overseas and whether they were their own citizens or even the disenfranchised men from within their communities. Were they press-ganged or volunteers? Did the state merely act as the loosest of go-betweens? Were the mercenaries paid by the employer for whom they fought or the state from which they came? In the case of Sparta, some control over the Peloponnesians was exercised from home (Diod. 14.78.1). In most cases it would have been impossible for states to prevent their citizens from taking overseas service, though an inscription (see page 34 above) attempted to prohibit Athenian citizens from taking service in Euboea in 357/6 BC (Tod *GHI* 2.154, lines 10–15; Toogood 1997: 295–7).

Individual hiring officers (*xenologoi*) appear in the sources at the end of the fifth century, though they no doubt existed earlier, specifically to facilitate hiring mercenaries. Isocrates described the *xenologos* as a prominent figure in the early fourth century BC (Isoc. 5.96; Xen. *An.* 1.1.6). This man made his living by acting as the intermediary between the employer and the employee. It is not clear whether he was a soldier himself or simply a professional recruiter. It could be that Isocrates was making a point in his usual rhetorical way against the general trend towards specialists and professionals. Cyrus commissioned his own foreign friends, *xenoi*, to recruit his army. Only one man amongst these was called a *xenologos*: Clearchus (Xen. *An.* 1.1.9; Diod. 14.12.9). Diodorus often used the verb from which *xenologos* derives for the act of hiring mercenaries (e.g. Diod. 14.12.9; 15.2.4, 90.2, 91.1). While ancient writers did not use the noun prolifically, such personal intermediaries were clearly heavily involved in the process of hiring mercenaries in the Classical world.

Aeneas Tacticus (13.1) preserved a formula regarding how states ought to hire mercenaries through intermediaries in his manual on how to survive under siege, written in the middle of the fourth century BC. On recruiting mercenaries for the campaign he wrote,

[t]he wealthiest citizens [*euporotatoi*] should be required to provide mercenaries [*xenoi*] each according to his means, some three, some two, others one. When as many as you need are assembled, they should be divided into companies [*lochoi*] and the most trustworthy

of the citizens placed over them as captains [*lochagoi*]. Pay and maintenance the mercenaries should receive from their employers [*misthosamenôn lambenóntôn*], partly at the private expense of the latter, partly from funds contributed by the state. And each group of them should board in the houses of their employers [*tôn misthosamenôn*], but they should be assembled by their captains for the performance of public services, night watches, and other tasks assigned by the authorities. Reimbursement should be made in due time to those who have incurred expense for the mercenaries [*xenoi*].

Thus, the responsibilities for hiring and then funding mercenaries ought to fall upon the wealthy class, that stratum of society that would normally have performed liturgies for the community. This class should also, according to Aeneas, house the mercenaries inside the city, but they are not to command them. This task, Aeneas stated, should fall to the most trustworthy of the citizens. Of course the wealthiest men in the community did not hire the mercenaries themselves despite the implication that they gathered them together and then persuaded them by payment. Aeneas (22.29) makes this clear in a much later passage that illustrates how the hired soldiers were held accountable to the state.

Whenever a man who has a turn at the watch does not report for duty, his *lochagos* should at once sell his position [*autou parachrêma ten phylaken apodosthō*] for whatever it may bring and put another man on guard to take his place. Then the *proxenos*, the same day, should pay the money to the man who has purchased the post, and on the following day the *taxiarchos* should impose on the *proxenos* the customary [*nomizomenē*] fine.

At first this seems complicated. We know from the earlier passage that the *lochagos* was a citizen of the state. It seems likely too that the man who ‘purchased the post’ was one of the wealthiest citizens, but not clearly the same one who was responsible for the mercenary who had failed to report. Who then was the *proxenos*? Given that he ends up shouldering the responsibility for the delinquent mercenary, both in paying for his position and in paying a fine, he was not simply a citizen of the community charged with looking after the interests of foreigners in general. He was surely the intermediary who hired the mercenaries for the wealthiest citizens.

Furthermore, while Aeneas’ manual was admittedly designed to teach potentially unknown procedures to those in need of help while besieged, his belief that fines for errant mercenaries were customary strongly implies that a common and well established procedure existed between contractors and hiring officers in the fourth century. The absence of figures for payments or fines further suggests a commonly understood arrangement. Similarly, the

fact illustrated in both passages that those who hired the mercenaries were held responsible for their conduct in service would suggest that mercenaries commonly could not be relied upon. Other contemporary agreements relating to mercenaries may underscore similar procedures, though without anything like the precision or detailed information provided by Aeneas. For example, the Peloponnesian League in 383 BC enabled states to provide cash instead of soldiers for the League's army. The Spartans presumably hired men directly with the money provided by the member states (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.21). Indeed, they probably hired the men from the Peloponnesian states who had previously fought for them under obligations of alliance. In almost every respect from Sparta's alliances to Aeneas' advice, Marinovic's system of *louage* as underpinning mercenary service in the Greek world is strongly supported in the sources.

The *Anabasis* demonstrates that the man who recruited, whether a *xenos* or a *xenologos*, was also the man who commanded in the field. Gerry Nussbaum (1959: 16–29 and 1967: 33) and James Roy (1967: 317) following Xenophon (*An.* 6.4.8) believe that the *lochagoi* enlisted the very *lochoi* that they led on the *anabasis*. There is no explicit evidence that confirms this, but it is more than a probability. Cyrus commanded his garrison commanders (*phrouarchoi*) to enlist men for him in the cities that they garrisoned (Xen. *An.* 1.1.6). Xenias and Pasion, both of whom had served Cyrus for some time and probably as garrison commanders, were initially on the campaign with their own contingents. The generals in the cities of Ionia must themselves have delegated to lower-ranking officers the task of finding men to fill the ranks of the Ten Thousand. The relationship between generals, as recruiters, and men need not have been national or regional. Several of the officers that we read about on the campaign came from states that did not provide large contingents to the army. Only two of the five original generals solicited by Cyrus came with men hired from the Peloponnese, the region that provided the majority of the army. Although Xenophon implies that Aristippus, a Thessalian, secured and maintained an army in Thessaly, we read little of Thessalians on the campaign (Xen. *An.* 1.1.10). Unsurprisingly, Aristippus also had a man claiming to be a Boeotian in his command (Xen. *An.* 3.1.30–1). Xenophon, an Athenian, took over the command of his former friend's contingent and established a close relationship with at least one captain within it. This tells us much about the intricate networking between communities in the Greek mainland. How did Agasias, a captain from Stymphalus, or Hieronymus of Elis, another captain, make the association with their general, the Theban Proxenus? Perhaps there were other unmentioned middlemen who effected these connections, or perhaps they were themselves their own *xenologoi*. These captains, the *lochagoi*, as middle-ranking officers were very close to the men themselves and very influential in the course of campaigns.

The role of intermediate officers (*lochagoi*, *phrouarchoi*, *archontes* and *xenologoi*) ought not to be underestimated. Men of intermediate rank had great

influence in what might be termed 'contractual' relationships established between the employer and the army. This was most noticeable when there was friction between army and paymaster. Nussbaum (1959: 16–29) documents the critical role of the captains in the *anabasis* as intermediaries and protagonists in the field. Roy (1967: 315) rightly argues that all the disputes were politico-geographic. The complaints of the men, through the medium of their officers, were not about pay, but about where and against which enemies the men would be required to serve. The importance of mercenary field commanders is demonstrated in other instances of contractual difficulties in mercenary service of the fourth century. When the mercenaries who escaped with Phalaecus the Phocian were unhappy about his choice of their destination for service, the officers forced him to rethink his strategy and made him return to the Peloponnese (Diod. 16.62.1). These commanders (*archontes*) then attended the meeting that decided where the men would serve (Diod. 16.62.3). Charidemus deserted the Athenian army upon the appointment of Timotheus as commander-in-chief of the Athenian forces in Thrace in the 370s BC (Dem. 23.149). He took the men under his command with him. There were clearly bonds between men and their field commanders that were more important than the men's identification with and friendship towards their paymaster.

Individual ties and networks between officers and men were sometimes superseded by more random opportunities for employment. An employer who needed mercenaries might be able to rely on the fortune of time or place to provide him with the men that he needed. Thus a group of hungry, desperate Arcadians appeared and offered their services to Xerxes during his invasion of Greece (Hdt. 8.24). There are plenty of other instances of such happenstance. Seuthes had a similar chance encounter when Xenophon's army arrived in his region (Xen. *An.* 7.2.2, 36). Plutarch (*Dion.* 40) noted the surprise arrival and hiring of mercenaries at Leontini. Agis hired the bulk of those who had fled from the Battle of Issus in 333/2 BC to make common cause against Macedon (Arr. *Anab.* 2.13.2–4; Diod. 17.48.1–2). The Athenians used Harpalus' mercenaries, who had surprisingly become available for service, for their last attempt to revolt from Macedonian hegemony in 323 BC (Diod. 17.9.1–2).

Reputation of character rather than friendship was a major factor that drew men to another man's service. Xenophon's statement (*An.* 6.4.8) that many men had followed other men in the knowledge of the high personal qualities and generosity of Cyrus the Younger illustrates this well. A great autocrat like Dionysius would also have drawn men from the Greek world into his orbit (Diod. 14.34.3). The Persian Great King and his satraps must also have exerted influence in attracting men to them in the knowledge of their great power (e.g. Diod. 14.39.1–2; Isoc. 5.61–2).

Money was a strong drawing-point. The thought that a potential employer had access to money, either through his connections or through his prospects,

was enough to cause men to seek out a potential employer whether their services were wanted or not. Great Kings certainly commanded such reputations, and Egyptian pharaohs also were thought of as good sources of wealth (Xen. *An.* 1.1.9–10; 6.4.8; Diod. 14.64.1; 15.15.2, 29.1, 90.2; 17.61.2, 64.5; Dem. 49.36, 50.14; Plut. *Ages.* 36). In addition, mercenaries were drawn to areas of strife, especially if they were perceived to provide good opportunities for plunder. Thus, men came in great numbers to both Samos and Cyprus when war threatened these areas (Isoc. 15.3; Diod. 16.42.3). Cyrus must have commanded great loyalty because in the event of his victory he would have become Great King of Persia himself and so would have been able to pay off all his creditors handsomely. Seuthes needed to pay in advance in his dealings with the Cyreans, as would anyone who had hired men for service and who did not command a reputation. Conversely, men who did not have confidence in their employer's abilities to pay them would desert. Demosthenes (50.14–15) demonstrates this clearly with Athenian members of the fleet deserting destitute commanders on campaign, while Polyaeus (*Strat.* 3.9.51) explained how Iphicrates kept back a quarter of the men's pay to keep them in his service. Nevertheless desertion was not common in mercenary armies and the men who opted for such action cannot have known their employer well, if at all. Anonymous, purely business relationships, if such can truly have existed, may have afforded the men some protection from punishment for desertion, but they lessened the likelihood that commanders would reward highly at the end of campaigns or prolong relationships that were costly or burdensome.

Many men who became mercenaries were already outsiders from their own Greek communities as too were those who hired them. These mercenaries-in-waiting were found on the periphery of the Greek world. Isocrates was concerned about groups of men, whom he called wanderers (*planomenoi*), accompanied by their families, roaming about Asia (Isoc. 5.120–1). He saw them as a threat to the stability of the region. Paul McKechnie (1989: 90) notes this phenomenon and identified that these *planomenoi* came together to form larger groups of men. It was perhaps these large and organized groups that Isocrates feared. They were armies in their own right. Isocrates identified this when he used the term *syllaxis* to describe a band of 3,000 men 'joining together' for service under Dracon of Pellene (Isoc. 4.144). No doubt many wanderers saw their safety in numbers, and employers saw convenience in being able to hire many men at one time.

As there was no chance for large-scale service without an employer, the opportunity for service for those interested was paramount. There were long periods when would-be mercenaries were waiting for employment. Some men had farms to which they could return at these times (Isae. 2). Others used specific gathering places, such as port cities, at which hiring became commonplace. Thibron and Agesilaus used Ephesus as a hiring centre (Diod. 14.36.2, 79.1–2). Alexander hired men from Halicarnassus (Arr. *Anab.*

1.20.2). The Peloponnese generally was considered a good source for mercenaries (Arr. *Anab.* 1.24.2; 2.20.5; Diod. 14.58.1, 62.1). Corinth, with its naval access both west and east, was ideal (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.11–12, 5.11; Diod. 15.6.5; 16.66.2). Taenarum became a locus of men waiting for mercenary employment in the age of Alexander (Diod. 17.9.1, 21.1, 111.1). Like Corinth, its geographic location was ideal for travel east or west, but Taenarum is also far from Sparta and other Greek political centres, in what is today known as the Mani, and even now remains remote from central authority. Cities were good gathering-places for hire, but mercenaries seem to have been available everywhere, even in isolated, rural places or far from the Greek mainland. Dionysius I and the Carthaginians had little trouble hiring in Sicily (Plut. *Tim.* 30), Pelopidas collected men in the Thessalian countryside (Plut. *Pel.* 27), and Clearchus was able to raise men in the Chersonesus (Xen. *An.* 1.1.9).

Diodorus' account of the raising of the Phocian mercenary armies in the Third Sacred War, perhaps the most famous sustained use of mercenaries during the fourth century BC, demonstrates clearly a synthesis of the factors listed above. The chance happening of a war provided the opportunity for enlistment (Diod. 16.23.1). The perception of the wealth of Delphi's treasures, the offers of high pay, the opportunities for plunder and the area of strife located in the heart of the Greek world all made the hiring of large numbers of men easy (Diod. 16.25.1, 30.1, 36.1). Diodorus would have agreed that this was the paradigm of mercenary behaviour from Greek history. Nowhere did the sources suggest that Philomelus and his successors had difficulty in hiring men for their campaigns (Diod. 16.30.1, 32.4, 37.2). Delphi was the most sacred sanctuary in the Greek world and the men who flocked to the Phocian standard did so knowing that their pay would come directly from funds stolen from the god. Of course, the reality was more complicated. The Phocians had allies abroad and the Spartans sent mercenaries to aid the Phocian cause (Diod. 16.24.2).

Word of mouth was enough to assemble men for a campaign. Diodorus (15.29.1) noted that Achoris did many good deeds (*energeteō*) for the Greeks in his service and so attracted more to join him. Rumours like this can only have come through the connections of those Greeks in his service. The verb *akouein* (to hear) may not always be evident, but many passages imply that news went abroad when potential employers were hiring men (Xen. *An.* 6.4.8). Many men literally heard and answered the call (*hypakouontō*) of Philomelus and the Phocians in 354/3 BC when they needed to replenish their army. Even when the call for troops was not sent out, men would hear about wars brewing and appear. Phocion and Euagoras in wealthy Cyprus were inundated with mercenaries (Diod. 16.42.3). They neither needed nor wanted many of these men who had crossed to the island when war broke out, drawn by word of mouth or rumour. The activities of Astyphilus highlighted by Isaeus (9.14) bear this out. This man always signed up for service with the Athenian army and anywhere else that he sensed (*aisthanomai*) that

an army was being collected (*syllagô*). Clearly these were mercenary armies. It is well attested that Greeks passed on to other Greeks the news of good employment opportunities and information about good commanders.

Once contact had been made with a group of men, some organization must have been applied to regulate and account for the number of men in each company before bringing them under contract. For this reason, special assessors were required who would count the number of men in an army and so balance the amount of money paid to the general with the number of men on the payroll. These assessors were called *exetastai* (Aisch. 1.113; Parke 1933: 149). Although there is no evidence that *poleis* other than Athens employed such men, a Spartan named Herippidas is described as an *exetastês* by Plutarch (*Ages.* 11.4) while he oversaw the booty captured in Phrygia from Pharnabazus. *Exetastai* would have been a necessity for all paymasters. These men were open to bribery by the generals whose goal was to exaggerate their army's numbers in order to augment the amount of pay and provisions given by the employer for their men.

The employer next needed a means of effecting a contract between himself and his mercenaries. This must have been done personally and individually through chains of command. Nussbaum's (1959: 16–29) point about the *lochagoi* hiring the men has relevance here. The *lochagoi* provided a link between employer, general and soldier. There must have been something more tangible, however, than just a personal contact who 'contracted' the men to their commanders. Were lists of the names of those in service taken at the time of hiring, for example? The Athenian trierarchs kept lists of those who received payments aboard triremes and this would have included even the numerous oarsmen (Dem. 50.10; Strauss 2000: 272). A passage in Diodorus (16.30.2) stated that the Phocians signed on (*apographô*) their mercenaries in the Sacred War. This can be a legal term used of enrolment or registration on a list (*LSJ s.v. apographô*). It could suggest that, in this instance, employers or the commanders physically registered their mercenaries. Signing on is not well attested and the sources more commonly use simply the verbs for recruit, *xenologeô* (Diod. 15.2.4, 90.2, 91.1; 16.73.3), or to gather, *lambanô* (Xen. *An.* 1.1.9; Diod. 14.34.4), or to collect, *syllago* (Xen. *An.* 1.1.9), or to hire or maintain, *xenotropheô* (Dem. 11.18; Gabrielsen 1981: 154). It seems logical, however, that records of those mercenaries who would become recipients of pay and rations would have been kept to satisfy the accounting practices of both sides.

The term 'contract' must be used with care, because it implies a modern legal relationship. Before the age of Alexander's successors no known document between an employer and his mercenaries describes conditions of service (*OGIS* 266). The sources detail those terms only circumstantially. A very loose definition of a modern contract may serve to illustrate mercenary practice before 322 BC. The components of this are (1) an offer; (2) an acceptance; and (3) consideration (Cheshire and Fifoot 1993). Mercenaries

served for one kind of benefit or another, even if it was simply food and shelter at any specific moment. This benefit would loosely constitute the consideration which would have applied, whether equally or differentially, to all those in a single unit of recruits. As consideration must always have been the result of an offer and acceptance of agreed terms of service, then something resembling a spoken contract applied.

What symbolized this contract? Mercenary service could have emerged through ritualized friendships formed by Arcadian nobles and other Greeks overseas. These relationships between the nobility of the early Greek world were governed by strict codes of action and reaction. Gifts and communal dining reciprocated between family groups recognized and guaranteed ritualized friendship (*xenia*) and more formal diplomatic friendship (*proxenia*). The gift symbolized and witnessed the relationship between households (Finley 1954: 66; Murray 1980: 48). Gifts often recognized alliances as with the Spartans and Croesus of Lydia (Hdt. 1.69). Apart from the gift there were other ritualized phenomena that secured the friendship of outsiders. The ritual handshake (*dexiosis*) would be one example, and this was used to bind mercenaries and foreign commanders together in friendship (Xen. *An.* 2.3.28, 4.7; 3.1.21–2, 2.10; Herman 1987: 41–54). In the examples that we have from Xenophon's *Anabasis*, oaths were also taken in conjunction with the handshake. The formulation of Xenophon's friendship with Seuthes the Thracian followed similar patterns (Xen. *An.* 7.3.20). Gifts exchanged between Agesilaus and the Egyptians in 361 BC and Dion and his mercenaries in the 340s at Syracuse further illustrate the point of these rituals (Plut. *Ages.* 31; Plut. *Dion.* 31).

By the time of the mercenary explosion in the later fifth and fourth centuries BC, mercenary service must have needed more formal methods for hiring. Individuals who took up service, rather than tribal groups following their chieftain, must have needed some way of demonstrating their status as employed. Coins may provide an answer. The Greek cities introduced coinage in the sixth century BC. Most scholars reject the idea that coins were introduced to ease trading (Kraay 1964: 74–91; Wallace 1987), though they may have been connected to Archaic gift-giving economics (Burke 1992: 213). Recently arguments have centred around the relationship of coinage to the growing *poleis* and their needs for public rather than private projects and networks (Martin 1996: 257–82; von Reden 1997: 154–76). R. M. Cook suggests that the original purpose of coinage in Western Asia Minor was the hiring and payment of mercenaries (Cook 1958: 257–62; Bettalli 1995: 78–9).

Whatever its origins, by the later fifth century coinage was commonplace and warfare provided an impetus for the minting and use of coins in Greek society. Naval warfare led the way in Athens, but several scholars have commented upon the increased minting of coins as a result of military crises in other parts of the Greek world. Williams (1976: 22) states that 'in the fifth century Arkadian [*sic*] confederate coinage exceptional mint activity was often

connected with military campaigns'. Jenkins (1972: 175) claims of Sicilian cities at the end of the fifth century that it

was probably in the connection of the crisis [of the Carthaginian invasion] and for the hiring of mercenaries that . . . [Sicilian] . . . cities had recourse to the mintage of gold coins, usually a sign of emergency measures as at Athens in the same period.

The prevalence of coins at this time solved problems other than simply paying troops. It enabled mercenaries and their commanders to denote whether a man was in the service of another man or not. The coins paid to individual soldiers symbolized that they were wage-earners within the military community. Signing fees and up-front payments were certainly common practice among naval crews and oarsmen in the fourth century. Apollodorus stated in a forensic speech that he provided substantial (hiring) gifts and advance payments in order to secure the loyalty of his crew (Dem. 50.7, 10, 12, 14). Members of Apollodorus' crew, in fact, deserted his ship in the Hellespont, some even to take military service on land, because of promises of high pay and, most importantly, because of substantial advance payments from another paymaster (Dem. 50.14). It is possible that coins in mercenary contexts established some kind of a contract between mercenary and employer.

Coins have acted as such symbols elsewhere. The coin indicated a contractual arrangement in the practice of the Royal Navy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Rodger 1988: 145–83). The press gang attempted to secure a man's service through the giving and receiving of a coin. 'Taking the king's shilling' was synonymous with taking military service. A man who had taken such a coin, whether by accident or design, was deemed to have contracted for service. The ancient Greek mercenary may also have recognized such a contract by taking the coin of a *polis* or an individual representing his employer. Even if employers could not provide mercenaries with their own coins or those of their community, they frequently had to raise money in order to hire mercenaries or other military personnel (e.g. Xen. *An.* 1.1.9–10; *Hell.* 6.1.27; Diod. 12.14.1, 15.2; 14.44.2, 62.1; 15.2.4, 14.3, 15.2; 16.73.3, 30, 91.1; Dem. 50.7).

Large-scale mercenary service and the appearance of the names and images on coins of individuals based in the Aegean basin coincided at the end of the fifth century. Personal names and symbols on coins became common through the fourth century. Before this time only the Great King or images associated with communities or magistrates of communities had appeared on coins. Tissaphernes (see Figures 8 and 9) minted a coin with his own image on one side and Greek symbols on the other, probably in order to pay the Greeks in his employ. The head of Tissaphernes may appear on a coin minted at Miletus in 411 BC (Jenkins 1972: 103, Plates 218 and 219). The reverse shows an Attic owl next to the letters *ΒΑΣ* for Great King. Pharnabazus



Figures 8 and 9 A coin minted around 411 BC possibly by Tissaphernes for Greek oarsmen or soldiers in Persian service. The obverse depicts the head of a Persian satrap and the reverse shows Athenian symbols, the owl and the olive, juxtaposed with the letters representing that the coin belonged to the Great King of Persia (*Basileus*) (London, British Museum 1947–7–6–4).

minted coins in a similar fashion (Kraay 1966: Plate 718). The coin has the face of a satrap on one side and the prow of a ship on the other. Simon Hornblower (1982: 155) thinks that this coin was minted for Greek sailors who fought at the Battle of Cnidus. Recently doubts have arisen over the identity of the images on these coins (Harrison 2002: 301–19). Whether or not these coins are those of Tissaphernes or Pharnabazus there is little doubt that they were minted by non-Greeks for Greek recipients. A coin of Mausolus illustrates this Greek influence on the coins of Asia Minor, and the coin implies a relationship with the Mausolan building programme at Labraunda (Jenkins 1972: 136, Plate 319, BMC 7) as it carries a Greek image, that of Zeus Labraundus (see Hornblower 1982: 277, 309–12). Thracian kings at the end of the fifth and early fourth centuries BC demonstrate the interest in personal symbols and Greek characters on the obverse and reverse of the same coin. Coins of Seuthes carried Greek letters *SEUTHA ARGYRION* (Youroukova 1976: 13) and those for Cotys are represented by *KOTYS* and *KOTYOS* (ibid.: 17). A coin of Tachos of Egypt is also evidence for this (Jenkins 1972: 141).

The most important evidence for the developing practice of personal images and identifying devices comes from the Phocian generals, Phaullus, Onomarchus and Phalaecus, in their production of silver and bronze coinages for the Sacred War. Some of the surviving Phocian coinage from the Third Sacred War bears their names. Williams (1976: 50–2) states that

‘[t]he presence of the general’s name on these coins suggests that they were to be used for mercenaries and must therefore be rated as part of their wage’. The name or personal image or legend reminded the recipient of who had paid and employed them and symbolized the relationship between employer and employed. In addition, the presence of personalized marks on coins was part of a growing trend in some parts of the Greek world towards powerful individuals. The soldier held the coin as a gift to symbolize his relationship to his employer. The possession of coins minted by the Phocians after the Sacred War was a criminal offence (Diod. 16.60.1). Coinage, therefore, had two functions, one remunerative and the other symbolic. The coins paid to mercenaries functioned rather like the coins minted by the *polis*. They were symbols of power and relationships as well as of economic value.

Mercenary contracts were far more complex than simply how much money was to be paid at what time and to whom. James Roy (1967: 313; Xen. *An.* 1.3.1) suggested that contracts between employers and mercenaries were closely connected to issues of a geopolitical nature rather than simply money. The men under Cyrus were concerned not just with their wage, but with the job for which they had been hired and the distances, particularly from the coastlines of the Aegean, and hence the Greek, world. The renegotiations that occurred after the campaigns had begun changed the circumstances of their employment (consideration) with respect both to their mission and, as a result of that, the amount of money that they received for their work. Even more telling was the ‘contract’ established with Seuthes (Xen. *An.* 7.3; Roy 1967: 315). Seelinger (1997: 27) has recently pointed out that everybody party to the agreement between Seuthes and the mercenaries, except Xenophon, saw the arrangements in the light of a *quid pro quo*. A clause within it specifically set limits upon the geographical areas within which the men would serve in relation to the coastline. Other examples illustrate the politico-geographical factors in contracts with hired men. The mercenaries who fled from the Sacred War would not follow Phalaecus to Magna Graecia in 346 BC (Diod. 16.61.4). Similarly, Athenian crewmen considered that deserting Apollodorus’ ship rather than staying with it gave them a better chance of returning to Athens (Dem. 50.14). Contractual disputes were never restricted to the amount of pay provided. The biggest disputes occurred in times of major crisis or fear and it was then that the men demonstrated a lack of confidence in their commander (e.g. Xen. *An.* 1.3.1; Plut. *Tim.* 25; Diod. 16.62.1). Money was rarely an issue. In the Classical period, terms and conditions about booty and professional treatment were probably well understood by convention and tradition that do not appear in the sources and have yet to be found on inscriptions. The ordinary mercenary relied on his commanders through their connections to the paymaster to see that his interests were represented to the end of the campaign.

Equipment

The relationship between mercenaries and their equipment is critical. Naval warfare was open to all. The destitute rowed in the fleets of the major naval states for pay and sustenance. Even slaves could be compelled into the bottom rows of Athenian ships by their masters. The need to purchase equipment to serve as infantrymen, specifically heavily armoured infantrymen, restricted certain groups and classes of men from specific kinds of military and, by association, mercenary service. Very light troops like stone-throwers (*petroboloi*) and other kinds of missile throwers might more easily make up the numbers in armies on Greek battlefields. The lack of skills and training restricted service as archers, slingers and peltasts, as even these needed the requisite weapons with which to fight. The question of the original ownership and provisioning of mercenaries' equipment has received much attention recently. This discussion is principally concerned with whether service in hoplite mercenary armies was open to anyone, no matter what their resource base. Hoplites required at least a minimum of arms to take service in an army, making it a more financially prohibitive discipline. By the fourth century BC that minimum was lower than it had been in the early fifth, but whether it was enough to exclude the very poor from mercenary service is an important consideration. Similarly, with other kinds of mercenaries, it is unclear that anyone, trained or untrained, experienced or inexperienced, could fight in specialized mercenary units of light infantry, archers or slingers.

We have seen that most of the Greeks who took mercenary service outside the Greek mainland were hoplites in the Classical period (Diod. 15.44.1–3). The lighter specialist troops found service wherever there was need. As demand drove mercenary service, it was unlikely that a peltast would find service with a Thracian king or a bowman with a Cretan community. Hence there was probably a greater number of these specialists serving with the Greek cities of the mainland, though some have suggested that the difference between the hoplite and the peltast was becoming harder to discern as the former's equipment grew lighter and the latter's heavier (Snodgrass 1967 [1999]: 110–11). These communities generally had a core of hoplite troops drawn from their citizen body. We have already seen that Cretan archers, Rhodian slingers and Thracian peltasts were famous as specialists in the Greek world. The Athenian campaign in Sicily required a variety of troop types to deal with the Syracusan cavalry and the varied terrain. Nicias needed light specialists, notably slingers, but he took plenty of Cretan archers as well, to complement the Athenian hoplites in their campaign against the Sicilians (Thuc. 6.22.1, 25.2, 43.1). Xenophon too recognized the need for specialist archers and slingers with his predominantly hoplite army to counteract the Persian bowmen and slingers of the enemy (Xen. *An.* 3.3.7). Several pieces of evidence from the period of the Pelopon-

nesian War show Athenian commanders equipping poorer troops, notably oarsmen, with light and rudimentary shields. Demosthenes provided twig-weave shields at Sphacteria and the Athenians gave *peltai* to 5,000 sailors (*nautai*) in 409 BC so they might fight as light troops (Thuc. 4.9.1; Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.1). Interestingly, Parke saw these and other state provision of light arms to poorer men as due to the high cost of hiring specialist troops in the period, though it seems that these instances specifically look like good strategic use of all available manpower (Parke 1933: 18; Best 1969: 40).

If hoplites were the standard infantry to leave the Greek mainland in the fifth and fourth centuries BC to undertake mercenary service, it is likely that many poorer men from Greek cities, those who could not afford hoplite arms and armour, would have been excluded from this kind of mercenary service altogether. The hoplite or heavy infantryman is described by historians from Herodotus onwards and has been depicted on Greek pottery from as early as 675 BC (Lorimer 1947: 76–138; Salmon 1977: 84–101; Hurwitt 2002: 1–22). The hoplite's name came from the whole panoply of arms (*hopla*) carried by the heavy infantrymen (Diod. 15.44.1–4; Lazenby and Whitehead 1996: 27–33). Traditionally, hoplites were armed with bronze bell cuirasses, helmets and greaves. Some evidence for arm, foot and thigh guards exists as well. A thrusting spear provided offensive capabilities; javelins and a short thrusting or slashing sword were also available. All of these pieces of equipment underwent changes as a result of individual preference or fashion from the seventh through to the fourth century BC. The key piece of equipment that all hoplites had in common was the *aspis* (Cartledge 1977: 12; Lazenby 1985: 30; Lazenby and Whitehead 1996: 87). This was a round concave shield made of wood fronted by bronze and backed by leather. The shield was held on the left arm by a central armband (*porpax*) and a handgrip (*antilabê*) found just inside the shield's rim (Hanson 1989: 67–8). The presence of both *porpax* and *antilabê* defined the *aspis* used in hoplite warfare and the way that it was used (Lorimer 1947: 83; Snodgrass 1967 [1999]: 53–4; Krentz 1985: 53; Hanson 1989: 65–71).

The hoplite's equipment determined the kind of military engagement that was possible. The hoplite's *aspis* must have been at its best employed as part of a group. Aristotle explains that the hoplite was all but useless without *synaxis* or formation (Arist. *Pol.* 1297b17). Thucydides (5.71.1) noted the need for hoplites to stay in a tight formation at the Battle of First Mantinea in 418 BC. But hoplites did far more than just fight pitched battles so it is unlikely that the hoplite was entirely useless without his formation, and A. Frazer, George Cawkwell and Peter Krentz have all suggested that the hoplite could fight in single combat (Frazer 1942: 15–16; Cawkwell 1978: 150–3; Krentz 1985: 51–61; 1994: 45–9; see also Hanson 2000: 201–32; Rawlings 2000: 233–59; Wees 2000).

The amount of training required for hoplite encounters has been much discussed. The arguments rest on a passage from Plato's *Republic* (374d) that

stated that the well armoured hoplite was useless without knowledge of the use of his equipment. The philosopher's *Laches* (Pl. *Lach.* 183c–184d) implies a distinction between the terms, fighting in arms (*boplomachia*) and single combat (*monomachia*). *Hoplomachia* must have been a very different prospect to single combat (Wheeler 1982: 224; Vidal-Naquet 1986: 111). Hoplite warfare was therefore a communal effort (Snodgrass 1967 [1999]: 44–77; Hanson 1989: 29, 32–8; Wees 2000: 125–66). Skill and training were subordinate to morale, agility and bodily strength (Wheeler 1982: 229–30; Krentz 1985: 58; Hanson 1989: 38). All each hoplite needed was his armour, a group of other hoplites around him and the bravery to stand his ground no matter what.

According to those who see the group ethos as dominant in hoplite warfare, subordinating individual skills and training, the phalanx was only effective *en masse*. Thus, the hoplite's shield could not be manoeuvred quickly because of its weight. It could only protect part of the left side of its holder's torso and upper legs. In this group it protected both the left side of the man who held it and the right part of the man to the holder's left. This overlapping protection occurred all the way down the unbroken line. There was, therefore, no need to protect the flanks and the backs of individual hoplites with a manoeuvrable shield. The wall that the *aspides* of each rank presented not only created a solid defensive front, but also allowed for the rear rankers to push their companions forward. In turn, however, this placed a great responsibility on each man to hold his place in the line so as to maintain the integrity of the phalanx (Tyrt. 7.11–12; Thuc. 4.96; 5.70.2–71.1; Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.3–15; Diod. 15.53–6; Plut. *Pel.* 20–3). In an *othismos*, the hoplite phalanx made a concerted effort to push back the enemy (e.g. Thuc. 1.6.70; 4.96; Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.3–15; Diod. 15.53–6; Plut. *Pel.* 20–3).¹

Hoplites in such a group conformed in their equipment, but there is plenty of evidence to show that individual preferences, fashions and resources played their part in determining how each hoplite was armed within any phalanx. Even citizen-hoplites of the later Archaic period displayed their own styles of panoply (Chase 1902: 61–127). Officers, in particular, distinguished themselves from others in the line (e.g. Thuc. 6.31; see Ridley 1979: 520; Wheeler 1993: 141–2; Hodkinson 2000: 222–5). Phalanxes of citizen troops would have revealed a variety of armour and weaponry, with men carrying both old and new arms, some elaborate, others simple. Just as any community of hoplites, even Sparta, contained variations of wealth within its citizen body, so these variations were reflected in the equipment of the citizen soldiers. Hence men like Nicias and Alcibiades were noted for the outstanding quality of their arms, while Agesilaus, King of Sparta, was praised for his traditional use of unadorned weapons. Some poorer men served in the phalanx along with the so-called middling group (*mezoí*) of farmers (*zeugitai*) who could produce more than 200 bushels (*medimnoi*) per year and were able to afford the requisite hoplite equipment. Thus the wealthier *thêtes* of Athens might have served in the Athenian phalanx (Wees 2001: 45–71).

Aiding the entrance of poorer men into the military community of hoplites was the tendency for hoplite equipment to lighten and lessen over time. Equipment deemed superfluous, like foot, thigh and arm guards, was eventually dispensed with entirely (Lorimer 1947: 132–3; Snodgrass 1967 [1999]: 89–93, 110; Connolly 1981: 52). The hoplites seen on the seventh-century BC Chigi vase in Figure 1 (page 11) were much more heavily armed than their fifth- and fourth-century counterparts. In time, metal body armour was abandoned. By 490 BC the panoply had become light enough for a sustained charge like the one at Marathon, and by the end of the fifth century BC the linen cuirass had replaced those of bronze, and the men on Xenophon's *anabasis* wore a *spolas*, or light jerkin (Xen. *An.* 3.2.20; Snodgrass 1967 [1999]: 100). Even greaves start to disappear in the fourth century. Shedding equipment was a trend that continued through the fourth century BC (Hanson 1989: 70; 1993: 64). Ridley (1979: 520) states that this is connected to a lessening of hoplite status, while Sekunda (1986: 13) cites the influence of peltasts on hoplite warfare. Even those who still wore armour had the option of a semi-thorax or half-cuirass in the fourth century (Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.3.13). The hoplite's *aspis*, however, remained integral to the phalanx and to the hoplite, as Snodgrass has stated, a monument to the conservatism of the Greeks (Snodgrass 1967 [1999]: 105). Several mantras demonstrate the shield's centrality to hoplite ideology and the phalanx itself. Plutarch, who preserves many of these, specifically with the Spartans in mind, wrote 'Men wear their helmets and their breastplates for their own needs . . . but they carry their shields for the men of the entire line' (Plut. *Mor.* 241. f. 16). The shield, notwithstanding the trend towards lighter equipment, made hoplite panoplies cheaper and made hoplite warfare more accessible to increasing numbers of the poorer members of the community.

It was impossible, then, for any man to become a hoplite without possessing at least a serviceable *aspis*. Representations on vases of shields display the variety of blazons used by individual Greeks on their shields. This makes it difficult to discern the material they represent. Extant archaeological remains, most notably from Italy, and also from Olympia, demonstrate the importance of bronze to the facings of shields of the period, and literary references illustrate this importance as well. Shields that were not bronze-faced would not have survived from antiquity. There could have been many used in war and not dedicated in sanctuaries like Olympia (Paus. 2.21.4; 9.16.3; Diod. 17.18; Shear 1937: 140–3; Jackson 1991: 228–41; Morgan 2001: 20–44). There are many instances in the sources where shields were shattered by the clash of battle (Xen. *Ages.* 1.26; Polyaenus, *Strat.* 3.8; Diod. 17.34.2). Perhaps this is a testimony to their weakness, their lack of a metal face, or that the metal came away from the other materials in the clash of arms. Anthony Snodgrass suggested that some shields were simply wooden, even though the majority of shields found (as dedications) had bronze fronts (Snodgrass 1964a: 61–4). Whatever the nature of the shield, it remained integral to the hoplite soldier

as long as such soldiers were still fighting on the battlefields of the Mediterranean basin.

State provision

Another means by which poorer citizens might gain access into the hoplite army of a Greek *polis* was through the state's or another citizen's provision of their equipment. The citizen had traditionally provided his own equipment for service in the civic phalanx. The shield hanging above the hearth was a symbol of civic identity: the household provided a hoplite to defend the city (Ar. *Ach.* 57, 278; Plut. *Mor.* 241). It also proved that he had the resources to provide such equipment. Traditionally, there was a relationship between citizenship, hoplite status and the economic resources sufficient to furnish the necessary arms for hoplite status. Ideally, these resources were founded on land so the title of farmer-estate-overseer can be added to that of hoplite (Ar. *Ban.* frag. 232; Ridley 1979: 519; Burke 1992: 222). These traditional relationships, if they ever existed as more than an ideal in the realities of *polis* warfare, certainly began to break down in the fifth century BC. The dislocation of the citizen-farmer from his traditional role as sole defender of the state in *polis* warfare aided this breakdown, as did the introduction of an increasing number of non-farmers and poorer men with less stake in their societies. At the same time, the breakdown was assisted by the appearance of specialist and full-time soldiers from outside the *polis*.

New hoplites from the non-land-owning classes, and not just from amongst wealthy *thêtes* who may well have owned some land themselves, would have made ideal candidates for mercenary service overseas, but if they were very poor the provenance of their equipment remains a problem. We know that the Athenian state provided some military equipment to specific groups of its citizens in the fourth century. It is unclear that this practice went further back into the fifth. By the 380s BC the state provided a panoply to the sons of war dead (Pl. *Men.* 249 a). The author of the *Athenian Constitution* noted that a shield and spear, the two key arms of the hoplite, were presented to second-year ephebes in the second half of the fourth century (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 42.4). Wealthy citizens provided equipment both to the state and to poorer members of the community. Pasion dedicated 1,000 shields to the city in the Corinthian War. The inventories still listed a large proportion of these shields (778) twenty years later (Dem. 45.85). Some of these were perhaps used to arm citizens, although they may also have had a dedicatory and non-practical function. Diodorus mentioned that the Thebans received extraordinary donations from Demosthenes, and with these they equipped all of their citizens who lacked heavy armour (Diod. 17.8.5; Dem. 23.1).

The majority of mercenary hoplites came from the Peloponnesians. Spartan evidence may be useful, despite not being necessarily typical of the practices of other Peloponnesian states. Sparta's military position in the Peloponnesians

from the mid-fifth century BC was significant and certainly influential. Stephen Hodkinson (2000: 233, n. 29) following Xenophon (*An.* 1.2.16) and Plutarch (*Ages.* 2.7) notes this influence on the equipment of mercenary armies specifically. But there must have been a good deal of reciprocity between members of the Peloponnesian League and the Spartan army. From the inception of its sociopolitical system Sparta created a special relationship between the citizen as a member of the hoplite army and the citizen as a full member of the state. The hoplite shield (*aspis*) at Sparta, as at other states, had a symbolic value for citizenship (Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 11.3.4; Plut. *Pel.* 1). A story that Spartiates removed the central armband (*porpax*) from the shield when not in use for fear that others, like their helots, might use it illustrates this relationship. The Spartiates, however, did not have a monopoly on hoplite equipment. Men other than Spartiate hoplites were, no doubt, allowed to carry arms. Even the lowest-status group of the helots did serve the Spartans in some capacity on the battlefield, even possibly, as Peter Hunt recently suggests, as hoplites (Hunt 1997: 129–44; 1998, 31–41, 56–62). Many helots served in the army in other capacities and clearly did have their own weapons (Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.5–7). Non-Spartiate Laconians, who included the semi-enfranchised *neodamodeis*, the obscure *mothakes* and *perioikitai*, used hoplite shields in campaigns to places like Thrace with Spartan commanders and are found on overseas campaigns increasingly in the fourth century BC (Thuc. 4.80.5). Helots and other non-citizen Laconians must have received arms from somewhere, unless we are to assume they could afford their own equipment. This might be true of the relatively independent *perioikitai*, but helots and other poorer Laconians might have struggled to do so. If they could not, the state or wealthy Spartiates must have provided arms for them.

The state might have provided equipment to the Spartiates themselves. The Spartiates did not manufacture their own military equipment. This came from outside the community, supposedly from the *perioikitai*. The Spartiates were theoretically *homoioi* socially and militarily, but there were differences in status among them. The Spartan ideal related to the hoplite ideal and with it the conformity of the hoplites' arms. Xenophon reinforced this image of conformity saying that Lycurgus provided each Spartan with a red cloak and a shield (Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 10.3; Trendall and Cambitoglou 1978–82: Plates 2, 5; Sekunda 1986: 23). It may be worth noting that other Peloponnesian states not only had tribal affinities within them like Sparta, but dressed their armies in common also (e.g. Plut. *Ages.* 2.7; Xen. *An.* 1.2.26, 5.2.28–32). But Stephen Hodkinson (2000: 222–5) has illustrated the gross inequalities present within Classical Spartan society. He has shown that some Spartans demonstrated their own identity and wealth through their equipment (see also Cartledge 1977: 11–27). We have seen that Plutarch (*Ages.* 19.5, 36.5) recorded the praise given to Agesilaus for not augmenting his arms with ornaments, and thus implied that there was an ideal of uniformity and that some individuals had better arms and armour than others. It is unknown from what resources,

whether state or private, Spartiates paid for these arms, though given the discrepancies in equipment probably these were private. If Spartiates had a regulation issue and did not provide their own arms, there can be no doubt that some *homoioi* would still have been better armed than others. By the fourth century BC, Spartans, like other Greek hoplites, had shed much of their heavy body armour (Hodkinson 2000: 222–5). Differences on the battlefield would have been prevalent, as with other states, and the hoplite ideal of equality was not a real one at all.

The evidence for state-supplied weapons in other regions of the Greek world is limited. Philip and Alexander at certain times appear to have equipped the Macedonian army, but they were in the special position of being kings rather than officials within *poleis*. Philip's wealth after the fall of Pangaeum and the foundation of Philippoi freed him from relying solely on what his tribal levies might provide. Alexander, too, was free to distribute wealth and plunder on an unprecedented scale. On several occasions Alexander gave his troops arms. Polyaeus (*Strat.* 4.3.13) tells us that the soldiers (*stratiôtai*) in the Macedonian army received semi-thoraxes or thoraxes. Alexander probably gave the 30,000 sons of his men whom he had trained in Macedonian techniques, the so-called *epigonoï*, their armour (Plut. *Alex.* 71). None of the references to the Macedonian army is helpful as his army was a special case on a long-drawn-out series of campaigns far away from most of the men's homes.

In conclusion, with regard to the citizen, the state and arms, there was a gradual reduction in the amount of armament carried by hoplites through the seventh to the fifth centuries BC anyway, making it easier for poorer citizens to meet whatever qualifications existed for entry into the phalanx. The *aspis* and a spear remained central for qualification as a hoplite. By the fourth century, some states were providing arms to certain citizens. Athens did provide arms to certain individuals and Sparta seems likely to have provided poorer members of the community with arms as well. Even in the fifth century men whose socio-economic status was not high fought in the phalanx, and lack of resources need not have meant exclusion from the phalanx. The myth of a hoplite class of farmers, removed from the needs of everyday life and holding a stake in society, was just that, a myth. Many hoplites were poor and ripe for mercenary service. But these men aside, employers could have armed whichever men they needed or wanted from among the very poor. Whether they regularly chose to do so is a contested, but important, issue.

Who armed mercenary soldiers?

Traditionally, scholars thought that mercenaries provided their own arms and armour (Parke 1933: 105–6). This has recently received attention and correction, and debate has followed (McKechnie 1989: 80–5; 1994, 297–305;

countered by Whitehead 1991: 105–13; see also Bettalli 1995: 28–9). The issue is not whether commanders did on occasion arm the poor, for there is, as we shall see, evidence to show that they did. Rather the debate centres on whether they did so as a matter of course and, consequently, whether the destitute regularly entered mercenary armies well armed. Potential mercenaries had other means of procuring their arms than by gift of an employer. They could purchase them. The cost of the equipment was probably prohibitive, but the evidence is not sufficient. As many of the preserved arms were dedications, our impression is of expensive metal weapons predominating in the Greek world. It has been suggested that seventh- and sixth-century BC mercenaries were of relatively high status and therefore had their own arms and equipment as displaced members of re-forming *poleis* at a time when equipment was at a premium (Kaplan 2002: 229–41). Nevertheless, cheaper models and fewer arms must have existed and these brought the cost of the hoplite panoply down steeply in the fifth and fourth centuries BC, making hoplite warfare yet more accessible.

The evidence for the costs of arms ranges from the sixth to the fourth century and is not detailed (see McKechnie 1985: 329–34; 1989: 81 n. 12; Jackson 1991: 228–41; Hanson 1995: 294–301; Morgan 2001: 23; Wees 2001: 45–71, esp. 48). The earliest reference to cost is an inscription referring to Athenian relations with the inhabitants of Salamis in the late sixth century BC (M&L 14 = *IG* I(3).1). The inscription suggests that men living on the island of Salamis must provide their own arms to the value of thirty drachmae. A magistrate validated their value. This seems cheap, in the light of later figures for arms costs. Furthermore, these *hopla* cost only the equivalent of thirty bushels (*medimnoi*) of grain (Plut. *Sol.* 23.3; Wees 2001: 48). This figure was far below the *zeugitai*'s necessary production of 200 or more bushels a year. When compared to the value ascribed to the bronze armour of Diomedes of nine oxen, however, we find something by which to make a comparison (Hom. *Il.* 6.235–6; Plut. *Sol.* 23.3). Solon's price for an ox was five drachmae and Diomedes' armour in these terms was worth forty-five drachmae. Of course, these Homeric and Solonian values are not necessarily associable. Diomedes' arms were fictional and undatable. The Salaminian figure of thirty-five drachmae might have been a minimum standard about which we know nothing. The need for inspection is easily understood from the necessities of standardization imposed by hoplite warfare.

In the fifth and fourth centuries the range of prices for *hopla* was about seventy-five to 300 drachmae. Good arms and armour were expensive, sometimes costing the entire gross annual produce value of a *zeugitês*' farm of 200 bushels (= 200 drachmae) and even rising to that of the *hippeis*' gross annual product of 300. On average, scholars price *hopla* at between seventy-five and 100 drachmae. Even at the lower end, an advance payment of this magnitude was a significant sum for many Athenians. Nevertheless, many wealthy *thêtes*, the ones who held some land, could have afforded hoplite equipment (Wees

2001: 45–71). The hoplite army was not that exclusive. As arms got cheaper, lighter and increasingly mass-produced, more and more poorer citizens could have bought themselves into the hoplite army and so would have been in a position to join mercenary armies as well.

The evidence for whether mercenaries came to campaigns with their own armour is often ambiguous. The sources' failure to mention the provenance of arms could reflect either that employers regularly did arm their mercenaries or that mercenaries almost always came with their own equipment. One or other practice was so commonplace it went unmentioned. This failure to mention provenance would tend to support the position that mercenaries campaigned with their own arms. The evidence supports this case and the only extant explicit references to arms provenance we have relate how, perhaps extraordinarily, employers armed their men. Hence circumstantial evidence shows that mercenaries came ready armed for service with arms that they had, somehow or other, acquired. In Xenophon's *Anabasis*, for example, some groups and some individuals came with their own arms. The Rhodian slingers and the Milesian exiles each brought weapons with them that did not originate with their employer (Xen. *An.* 3.3.16–20, 1.2.6). Xenophon himself had a dress panoply in addition to his more workaday armour (Xen. *An.* 3.2.7). During the 360s and 350s BC thousands of mercenaries found service with the Phocians in the Third Sacred War. The sources never state if the Phocians in their desperation armed any of these men. After the settlement of the war in 346 BC, Philip made the remnants of Phocis' mercenary army give up their weapons. Besides being a symbolic gesture of defeat, this was designed to punish them severely and cost them their future income as soldiers ready to fight. Nevertheless, as Whitehead observed, the defeated mercenaries drew swords against their leader after their departure from Phocis (Diod. 16.62.2; Whitehead 1991: 112). This indicated that they had rearmed themselves after their surrender. Perhaps Philip had allowed them to keep their personal weapons, but had made them leave those manufactured or stolen from the treasuries of Delphi. Whichever was the case, these Phocian survivors at least had offensive weapons with which to undertake their next military commission. Later in the fourth century, the Great King of Persia instructed his satraps to disband their personal armies, and the newly demobilized soldiers supported themselves by pillaging in Asia Minor (Whitehead 1991: 112; Diod. 17.111.1). Clearly, these men left service with their own arms that in turn facilitated successful pillaging. Circumstantially, much evidence suggests that many mercenaries came to employers already armed. Their arms made them attractive as mercenaries who looked and acted the part of soldiers.

Conversely, certain employers provided arms to their men from the outset of employment, thereby opening mercenary service to all who could make the journey to them. Sicily provides the context for the clearest illustrations of arms distribution among mercenaries and other soldiers lacking equip-

ment. Diodorus (16.41.1–5), in a lengthy prequel to the wars of Dionysius I of Syracuse in around 399 BC, states that the tyrant,

having hired many skilled workmen . . . got them to make many panoplies of arms . . . [H]e distributed models of each kind because he had gathered mercenaries from many nations for he was eager to have every one of his soldiers armed with the weapons of his people, conceiving that by such armour his army would for that very reason fight to best effect in armour to which they were accustomed.

He also arranged that these same workmen

made 140,000 shields [*aspides*] and a like number of daggers and helmets and he made 14,000 well made and designed cuirasses. These he distributed to the cavalry and to the captains [*lochagoi*] and to mercenaries in his bodyguard.

(Diod. 16.43.2–3).

Evidently, Dionysius distributed arms to those who needed them. His son, Dionysius II, did a similar thing once he had disarmed the citizens of Syracuse (Diod. 14.10.2; 16.9.2). When Dion landed at Corinth, he began to gather mercenary troops and to collect suits of armour (Diod. 16.6.5). Upon arrival he handed over 5,000 suits of armour to those Syracusans who lacked panoplies (Diod. 16.10.1). Regrettably, there is no mention of any mercenaries specifically receiving arms and it is quite likely that the recipients of the arms were citizens whom the tyrants had disarmed. Polyaeus (*Strat.* 1.26, 5.1) cites examples of tyrants arming slaves and foreigners in Sicily.

The Syracusans had armed many of their men in the winter of 414/13 BC when the Athenians were outside their walls. Hermocrates advised that their generals (*stratēgoi*), once appointed, should get the hoplite force (*hoplitikon*) ready, providing arms (*hopla*) to those who had none, in order that the number might be as large as possible (Thuc. 6.72.4; Diod. 13.96.1). Of course, these men were not mercenaries, but they were not regular hoplites either. These Sicilian examples are not necessarily typical. Tyrant rulers were hardly typical of regular state-governed practices. The scale of Dionysius' provisioning was extraordinary and the desperation of the Syracusans during the Athenian siege naturally led to drastic measures. These Sicilian examples do, however, show that when the will existed or the pressures were great, states would arm those who did not have the requisite equipment.

Several other indisputable references show mercenaries being provided with arms in other contexts and regions. Lysias (19.43; see Diod. 16.41–2; McKechnie 1989: 84; Whitehead 1991: 106), in a speech on the estate of Aristophanes, noted that, among other expensive acquisitions and liturgies

performed, including putting on dramas and equipping warships for the Sicilian campaign in 414, Aristophanes had, in about 391 BC,

when the Cypriots came and you [Athenians] gave them ten vessels,
supplied thirty thousand drachmas to pay the light infantry [*peltastai*]
and purchase their weapons [*hopla*].

Despite being only liturgical the personal burden was undertaken for the state. Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.1.1) cited an instance of a commander providing equipment to men who were clearly not owners of arms. In about 406 BC, Pharnabazus gave to each sailor (*nautês*) food (*ephodia*) and arms (*hopla*) and set them as guards over his coastline.

Perhaps more elliptically, Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.2.5) wrote that when Agesilaus set out from Asia to return to Greece in 394 BC, many Greeks did not wish to go with him, and as he

desired to lead the best men [*beltistoi*] and as many as possible he
offered prizes [*athla*] to the cities for which one should send the best
force, and to the captains [*lochagoi*] of the mercenaries [*misthophoroi*]
for the one who should join the expedition with the best equipped
company of hoplites, of bowmen and of peltasts.

The implication is that the captains of companies had some responsibility for arming the men under their command. When we read a little later about the competition that, ‘as for the prizes most of them were beautifully wrought arms [*hopla*] both for hoplites and horsemen’ the impression is reinforced. David Whitehead, however, sees this as proof that these men in Asia came forward ready armed and that the *lochagoi* recruited them in such condition (Whitehead 1991: 106–7). But this does not explain why the prizes went to the *lochagoi* and not to the men. The captains received in kind, and more, the arms that they might have bought for their men. At the very least the passage shows that the captains carried some responsibilities for signing men whose equipment was acceptable to their standards.

Another instance in which mercenary equipment clearly derived from the employer was the case of Mania, female satrap of Aeolis around 399 BC. Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.1.13) stated that she kept a mercenary force (*xenikon*) of Greeks and to those of whom she approved (*epaineô*) in battle she gave gifts (*dôra*). Consequently, her force was the most magnificently (*lamprotata*) equipped (*kataskenazô*) and the implication from Xenophon is that the gifts lay at the heart of their equipment. In this instance, however, it is not clear from where her mercenaries originally derived their arms, only that they improved under her auspices.

Xenophon nowhere stated whether Cyrus provided the soldiers on the *anabasis* with their arms. Circumstantial evidence abounds to support each

position. For example, the great number of mercenaries from Arcadia and Achaëa, areas that were less well developed politically, economically and socially, might suggest so many men could never have afforded their own equipment. Xenophon's description of the uniformity of equipment worn by the Greeks on the campaign might be evidence that their arms, along with their very Spartan red tunics, came from a single source (Xen. *An.* 1.2.16; Roy 1967: 310). However, hoplite arms and armour tended towards the uniform. The Persians told the Greeks to hand over their arms, as these had once belonged to Cyrus, the Great King's slave (Xen. *An.* 2.1.8). Implicitly, this statement suggests that Cyrus had owned and provided the Greeks' equipment, but as victor the King owned the persons and property of the losers. There was no mention of armour at the first interview between the Greeks and the Persians, and the Persians might have perceived Cyrus, the commander and paymaster, as the owner of the weapons wielded by his men, but nothing explicit states this. By implication, and admittedly this is an argument from silence, it would seem more likely that Xenophon's troops came on the expedition with their own equipment. Nothing suggests otherwise in the *Anabasis*, and the very few remarks Xenophon made about the provenance of mercenary weapons confirm the mercenaries as the original owners.

The remaining evidence regarding provenance of arms and armour is equally ambiguous. Stratagems of Polyænus are not the most reliable sources of information, but one related how Iphicrates, while in Acre with a mercenary army, uncovered a conspiracy against him and seized some of the conspirators' arms before driving them from his camp (Polyænus, *Strat.* 3.9.56). The incident invites a variety of questions as to Iphicrates' perceptions and intentions (Whitehead 1991: 107–8): whether the arms were originally his to seize; whether this was a punitive or a defensive measure (Parke 1933: 105–6); whether he only confiscated their offensive weapons (McKechnie 1989: 84).

States did stockpile weapons. The purpose of this stockpiling is important. Occasionally, stockpiled weapons were given to those men who had no arms themselves. Both Dionysius I and Dionysius II had stockpiles of weapons and these they gave to mercenaries freely (Plut. *Tim.* 13.3; Diod. 14.41–3; Aen. *Tact.* 30.1). The Athenians also had such a stockpile in the Chalkotheke, though it is debatable whether this building was an arsenal (e.g. *IG* II 2 1424a. 126–40). If the Chalkotheke was an arsenal, and not a storehouse for votive weapons as David Whitehead suggested, its contents would have altered more in the twenty years between 370 and 350/49 BC and respective inventories show that its contents did not alter that much (Whitehead 1991: 109). Significantly, nowhere in the sources is it suggested that these weapons were kept for distribution to mercenaries. McKechnie (1989: 85) believes that the purpose of the Athenian stockpile was redistribution for men otherwise unable to fight, although he does not state the intended recipients. Aeneas

Tacticus did not mention stockpiling weapons for redistribution. Perhaps he considered that stockpiling was not an option, but it may equally have been commonplace and therefore did not require any statement. Nevertheless, he was concerned with keeping arms out of the hands of potential internal threats to the security of a city (Aen. Tact. 10.7.18–19; 12.2–13.4; 22.29).

Despite a lack of clarity, the evidence shows that some commanders were prepared to provide mercenaries with weapons. The dearth of explicit references perhaps says something about how such activity was viewed. Perhaps the story that Dionysius did provide arms was unique and indicative of his own poor character and the poor character of the men under his command. Yet Diodorus fails to say, if he knew, how the men serving with Phocis in the Sacred War found arms. If the Phocians had armed them, it is surprising that this information was omitted, since it was a slur upon both the employer and the ignoble and lowly men whom they hired, lacking both the resources and the status for citizen military service. In sum, there is conclusive proof for both armed and unarmed men being hired, but little to show which of the two situations was more common. The passage concerning Dionysius suggests that in that particular instance the tyrant armed many men and would suggest this was extraordinary, rather like the desperate Syracusans arming men during the Athenian siege. Desperate times require desperate measures.

Men who received arms were elevated to a new *hopla*-owning status. If Cyrus had armed the bulk of the Ten Thousand, the arms they carried would have become their own upon his death, thus instantly propelling them to independent future employment. No doubt men who had been armed in such a way were difficult to disarm and dismiss. Furthermore, a mercenary so armed might take his new weapons and find service elsewhere; perhaps this had been the fear of Iphicrates at Acre. It was a big risk for an employer to arm impoverished men. Such men might eventually prove themselves not only desperate, but also difficult to deal with, if and when relations turned sour. Itinerants had no stake anywhere. The provision of arms added a further complication to the relationship between employer and employee. Nevertheless, it could work to the employer's advantage if he had the resources to provide equipment and, hopefully, the power to keep his employees in service once they were armed.

Poorer men were able to fight in mercenary armies. If hoplite equipment was limited to an *aspis*, a spear and a cheap mass-produced helmet, hoplite warfare was not the exclusive preserve of the rich that the idealists perceived. The Arcadians and the Achaeans were not necessarily excluded from providing themselves with the equipment that they needed to serve Cyrus, even if they were poor, or from seeking employment with the Great King. In short, it was only necessary to arm a man sufficiently, albeit scantily, for mercenary service. But an employer could provide equipment, if it was needed, and clearly Dionysius did provide arms, suggesting that not all could afford to arm themselves. In view of the minimum requirements for hoplite warfare,

on the one hand, and the agency of employers, on the other, it would seem that all but a handful of free men were excluded from mercenary armies in the fourth century BC. Indeed, the decline in the socio-economic status of the citizen-hoplite in this period at Athens, and the number of poor hoplites was significant (see Xen *Ath. Pol.* 1.1–2; Pl. *Leg.* 707a–b; Jones 1957: 31; Ridley 1979: 508–48; Burke 1992: 219–21; Wees 2001: 45–71). Citizen hoplite warfare remained the principal kind of warfare on mainland Greece at this time, but the erosion of the hoplite citizen ethos and the rise of mercenaries went hand-in-hand through the Classical period.

NETWORKS AND RELATIONSHIPS

Introduction

In the first instance, the relationship between the employer and the mercenary was principally one of remuneration (Xen. *An.* 1.3.9; Diod. 14.81.5). Mercenaries, by definition, are interested in the tangible rewards of service. In reality, mercenary relationships in the ancient Greek world were far more complex. The previous discussions about the attractions to mercenary service, pay and hiring illustrated the importance of deeper associations inside and outside the Greek communities in creating and maintaining mercenary relationships. The short-term economic benefit of mercenary service was only one factor in the motivation for mercenary service. Hierarchies formed within mercenary communities. These hierarchies reflected social status that had its roots in the native state of the mercenaries. Money reinforced the status of employer, general and men. The generals received money from their employer for the men at the bottom of the chain. Thus, Xenophon (*Hell.* 1.1.31) noted that Hermocrates received money from Pharnabazus and collected mercenaries and that Cyrus paid Lysander and appointed trierarchs for the fleet (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.12). Cyrus also gave money to Clearchus with which he raised an army in the Chersonesus (Xen. *An.* 1.1.9). Money also bought loyalty for autocrats like Jason of Pherae (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.5) and Euphron of Sicyon (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.46). Amounts of payment and booty reflected military and social status among the mercenaries (e.g. Xen. *An.* 7.2.36). Such distinctions reflected their qualities both as men and as leaders on the battlefield (Xen. *An.* 3.1.7, 1.37). Command structures within armies linked the men together. The company field commanders were go-betweens for the general – the paymaster – to the men in service. The generals, who were usually nobles, were the links for many poorer men to the wider world of the Aegean basin and beyond. Their networks, based upon traditional aristocratic ties of friendship and service, drove mercenary service from the top down. Both within the communities of the eastern Mediterranean and across the diplomatic boundaries of the Greeks, Persians and Egyptians, mercenary service was an integral part of the networks of relationships in

the Classical world. Mercenary service operated at all levels of Greek society inside the *poleis* and throughout the Mediterranean basin.

Military organization

On campaign there was a hierarchical military structure in mercenary armies. At the top was the employer. He held the purse-strings and was the paymaster (*misthodontes*). The immediate employer was not always independent himself. The greatest of paymasters, the Persian Great King, rarely appeared in person on the battlefield, using as his agents satraps, relatives and ambassadors. In 396 BC the Great King appointed a man to manage the finances of Conon's Atheno-Persian fleet and to act as a paymaster for the campaign (Diod. 14.81. 5–6). The Great King aside, the employer and paymaster were often present on the campaign. Most employers who acted in a command position had with them their own native or local forces which they commanded personally and which legitimated their leadership role in the army as a whole. Thus, Cyrus had a large number of barbarians from his provincial satrapies (Xen. *An.* 1.1.5, 8.5). The Persian kings always had with them native forces commanded separately from any Greek mercenary force. On occasion, the presence of the employer on the battlefield with mercenary generals led to friction. Relations between Cotys and Iphicrates were strained (Dem. 23.132). The Thracian's ambitions conflicted with Iphicrates' loyalties. And friction could arise between generals; Cyrus found himself arbitrating between the Greek armies that accompanied him. When 2,000 men transferred their loyalties from one of the Greek generals to Clearchus, Cyrus intervened in the quarrel and allowed these men to remain under the latter's command (Xen. *An.* 1.3.7, 4.7). The paymaster was ultimately the commander-in-chief. The generals (*stratēgoi*) were employees like other mercenaries and followed his orders (Xen. *An.* 1.4.11, 2.17, 20).

The Persian satraps in the western part of the empire acted as intermediaries between the Great King and the Greek cities and generals. Occasionally, employers used men who were not generals as go-betweens to mercenary troops. They were usually men of high status who acted independently of their cities. They might serve in a variety of capacities, as recruiters, as diplomats, or as both. The Persian king and his satraps preferred to use Greeks as legates on diplomatic missions in the Greek world. They used men called *hyparchoi* to deal with Greeks. *Hyparchos* was an official title used to denote a man in the service of the Persians. The holder was not always a Greek. *Hyparchoi* had ambiguous positions in the Persian Empire, but always there was some connection to the Great King. Cook (1983: 177–8) cannot draw an adequate distinction between the *hyparchos* and the satrap. Herodotus (6.42) described Artaphrenes as *hyparchos ho Sardion* (*hyparch* of Sardis). He was the man who ruled the city for the Persians. Many such *hyparchoi* ruled cities for the Persians in the Western Empire. Demosthenes (23.142) described a man

called Philiscus, a Greek, as the greatest of all the *hyparchoi*. Parke (1933: 107–8) notes that his exact status cannot be determined, but sees him as the subordinate of Ariobazarnes the satrap. As we have stated already, *hyparchoi* were well connected to the Persian king and his circle. Like the satraps and the friends (*philoî*) of the Great King they were intermediaries, but unlike them the *hyparchos* was perhaps more transitional, moving in and out of the king's political entourage. Nevertheless, *hyparchoi* reached high positions within the Persian Empire. The career of Philiscus demonstrates this: he was a mercenary (Dem. 23.141) and also a diplomat (Diod. 15.70.2), a recruiter, and a tyrant at Abydus (Burnett and Edmonson 1961: 74–91). Greek legates could not always be trusted. Artaxerxes' invasion of Egypt in 350 BC demonstrates the need that the Persians felt to watch over their Greek mercenaries in the field (Diod. 16.47.1). The three contingents of Greek forces each had a Greek general and a Persian commander (*hegemon*). Clearly, these Persians were to oversee the actions of the Greeks.

Army organization reflected the way that the army had been created and the military practices of the Greek cities from which the mercenaries came. Briant (1996b: 674) noted that the structure of the army Pharnabazus led against Egypt in 373 BC was the same as that of Cyrus almost thirty years earlier. The Greeks with Cyrus were divided into separate, numerically unequal units, each commanded by a different general. Each of these units was called an army (*strateuma*). Within these armies the basic unit of hoplites was the *lochos*. Xenophon noted that the *lochos* numbered about 100 men on this campaign and was led presumably by a *lochagos*.¹ In addition, men were organized into *taxeis*, 200 strong, for special purposes (Xen. *An.* 4.3.22; Nussbaum 1967: 32). Xenophon (*An.* 6.5.11) noted *taxeis* on the *anabasis*, each with 200 men. It should be noted that the *taxis* was not a part of the Spartan army organization. It is possible that Xenophon's Athenian experience or terminology is at work in the creation of such units on this campaign. The *taxis* is a unit attested at Athens where there were ten *taxiarchoi* in charge of the recruitment and administration of, presumably, *taxeis* of infantry from a single Attican *phylê*. Other mercenaries served in *taxeis* later in the fourth century BC, notably Athenians, and the Athenian army employed the *taxis* (Isae. 4.18).

The *stratêgoi* were employed by the satraps and kings to lead campaigns rather than to function in a variety of diplomatic roles. These generals were the commanders in the field. They played an important and intermediary role between the employer or paymaster and the lower officers and soldiers of the line (Xen. *An.* 1.1.6–11, 3.8, 4.11, 4.13; Nussbaum 1967: 32–9). A mercenary general could be a very powerful statesman like Iphicrates, or simply a man who had brought with him other men on a specific campaign, like some of the less well known generals on the *anabasis*, who appear to have had little validation from, or through, their home governments. The generals' status is never clearly defined, although they did not need to be prominent within a *polis*. On the *anabasis* the generals each commanded an army (*strateuma*).

The armies were of various sizes. Some were large, but others could be very small. Thus Pasion had only 300 hoplites and 300 peltasts (Xen. *An.* 1.2.3). The *stratēgos* was the commander of a military force, but had a relationship with the employer and paymaster that made him different from, and senior to, the lower-ranking officers. The generals on the *anabasis* were *stratēgoi* by virtue of their connection with Cyrus. Other leaders secured positions through their connections, like the exiled Conon who was personally connected to the Great King's circle (Isoc. 5.61–2).

Xenophon (*An.* 5.6.36; 6.4.11) referred to the *hypostratēgos*, or lieutenant-general, as next in command after the general. The implication is that he was the deputy of the general and that in the event of the general's death or removal, the *hypostratēgos* took over command of the army (Xen. *An.* 3.1.32, 7.4.11). There is no specific pay distinction made between this officer and the *stratēgos* or the *lochagos*. Similarly, there is nothing to suggest a special status or role within the army, except to replace a fallen general. His existence might only have been symbolic; that is, his role was to provide continuity of command and a sensible contingency measure. Given the prospects and likelihood of death for generals of Greek armies, especially in defeat, this was a necessary consideration.

The *lochagos* was a company commander beneath general and lieutenant-general. Xenophon (*An.* 3.1.32) noted that the *lochagos* was next in line for the generalship after the *hypostratēgos*. *Lochagoi* were socially superior to the men (Xen. *An.* 3.1.17) and were paid more (Xen. *An.* 7.2.36). Xenophon (*An.* 3.1.37; 4.1.27; 5.2.11) made much out of the belief that the *lochagoi* were supposed to be braver than their men and that they took this responsibility seriously. They may have led the men from the front. Some officers led files in the phalanx, a point that Xenophon made in his *Memorabilia* (3.1.8). The *lochagos*, as we have seen, was closely concerned with hiring and possibly arming his men. As the general was a fundamental link between the employer and the *lochagos*, so the *lochagos* fulfilled a similar function between general and men (Nussbaum 1967: 32–9). On the *anabasis* campaign the *lochagos* appears to have commanded a *lochos*, and is portrayed as having several responsibilities. The generals interacted with the group of *lochagoi* as a senior statesman might with a *polis* council (e.g. Xen. *An.* 1.7.2; 2.2.3; 3.5.7; 4.4.12, 6.7; 5.2.8). On occasion, like the generals, they were senior enough to represent the army as ambassadors to external embassies (e.g. Xen. *An.* 2.2.8; 3.5.14; 5.6.14; 6.2.7; 7.3.15, 2.17). The *lochagoi* were active army advocates. Gerry Nussbaum (1967: 39) notes that *lochagoi* spoke in the military assembly and it was rare for a common soldier to speak. Nussbaum has identified a single instance of a common soldier addressing the army in the *Anabasis* (Xen. *An.* 3.2.32). *Lochagoi* could intervene on behalf of the men under their command when they were harassed by other officers (Xen. *An.* 7.6.7, 17). Parke (1933: 105) cites Polyaeus (*Strat.* 3.9.56) to illustrate the close relationship between the *lochagos* and his unit. There is no reason to

doubt this intimacy in the light of other examples of intermediary commanders demonstrating power over their men on mercenary campaigns – for example, Charidemus and his sizable command who abandoned the Athenian army when Timotheus arrived in Thrace (Dem. 23.149). Theirs was a special association with the men they commanded and the mechanics of the army that they served.

Xenophon (*An.* 3.4.21–2) also noted commanders called *pentekosteres* (or *pentekonteres*) commanding units called *pentekostyes*. These were formed especially for the return journey of the *anabasis*. The presence of an officer called an *enômotarchês* (or *enômotarchos*) implies the presence on the campaign of the unit called the *enômotia* (Xen. *An.* 3.4.21; 4.3.26). Singor (2002: 282) states that the *enômotiai* were the ‘building-blocks’ of the Spartan army. There is nothing to distinguish these commanders from the *lochagoi* in terms of wages received and there is nothing that determines their status (Nussbaum 1967: 15; Xen. *An.* 3.4.21). What is of interest is that all these titles for units on the campaign with Cyrus were basic to the Spartan army, as the *lochos* and its commander the *lochagos* were fundamental elements within the army (see Lazenby 1985: 5–11, 41–4; Singor 2002: 235–82). Thucydides (5.67.3–68) described in some detail the command structure of the Spartan army before the Battle of Mantinea. According to Thucydides (5.68.3), four *pentekostyes* made up the Spartan *lochos*. The smallest unit was the *enômotia* that is mentioned by Thucydides and Xenophon. Only the Spartan *mora* is absent from the *anabasis*. Given the large number of Peloponnesians present on the campaign, however, it should come as no surprise that the familiar Spartan model of military organization would have been used.

Other ranks in Cyrus’ mercenary army can be identified. Lycius was a *hipparchos* or cavalry commander (Xen. *An.* 3.3.20). Not surprisingly *hipparchos* was a title held at Athens by the two cavalry commanders. The presence of *taxeis* on the *anabasis* would suggest that *taxis* commanders (*taxiarchoi*) might also be present with the army. Nussbaum surmises that the *taxiarchos* was the non-hoplite equivalent of the *lochagos* or of an intermediate commander between him and the general. Clearly, he played a different role in the Athenian army (Nussbaum 1967: 32, n. 2; Xen. *An.* 3.1.36). There were men who commanded specific units in Xenophon’s mercenary army; for example, Episthenes commanded the lightly armed troops, and Stratocles was in charge of the Cretan archers (Xen. *An.* 1.10.7, 4.2.28). There were also special rotating commands that suggest that each *lochagos* functioned in a way similar to that of a prytany council in Athenian democratic practice (Xen. *An.* 4.7.8, 5.1.17, 6.5). Xenophon (*An.* 2.2.20, 5.7.10) used generic terms for commanders (*archontes*) in the *Anabasis*, which are found also in other mercenary armies, and demonstrated the important role they played in campaign decision-making. Other sources illustrate the same significance (Diod. 16.70.2). *Archontes* were the front-rank men (*hoi prôtostatai*) in the Spartan army described by Xenophon (*Lac. Pol.* 11.5; *Mem.* 3.1.8; *Cyr.* 3.3.57, 6.3.24;

see also Thuc. 5.71). These command terms derived from other origins than Spartan or Athenian military terminology.

Sources of authority

Everett Wheeler (1993: 140) once remarked upon the absence of an officer class in the Greek communities. The selection of officers among established communities was, at times, haphazard, and there were three ways by which officers might be selected. First, the commander-in-chief, whether employer, paymaster or general, might promote them or award them with command (e.g. Diod. 15.51); second, they might select themselves, in so far as they were the employers (Plut. *Dion* 22); finally, the men themselves might elect their own commanders (Xen. *An.* 6.2.12). Nussbaum (1967: 52–61) claims that the leaders who replaced the dead generals after Cunaxa were elected from a group of officers (Xen. *An.* 2.1.46). Lacking the legitimization of a home government, the officers of mercenary units must have derived authority from some source that their men recognized and accepted. There was no conscription list among Greek mercenary forces. There were no courts martial upon the return to their home city. The men agreed to follow their officers. Officers thus found themselves in an ambiguous position. They could not be too harsh on their men for fear that the men would desert, but could not be too soft in case military discipline would collapse.

Certain *poleis* provided a greater number of commanding officers for mercenaries overseas than others. This would suggest that the provenance of a commander could be the source of his authority over mercenaries. On the *anabasis*, an Arcadian soldier protested against the authoritarian positions of Spartans and Athenians despite the fact there were no contingents of either state on the campaign. Spartans and Athenians held command. Sparta is an obvious candidate for such vested authority. The military position of the Spartans in the Peloponnese was unparalleled until 369 BC. Spartan citizens (*Spartiatiai*) outside Laconia regularly commanded non-Spartiate troops. The Spartans provided generals for the King's enemies in Egypt and for their own allies in Sicily. Even exiled Spartans, like Clearchus, commanded authority, so it is not surprising to find them as mercenary commanders (Xen. *An.* 1.1.2). Athenians too provided a disproportionate number of mercenary commanders. Almost all the known Athenians in Xenophon's *Anabasis* were officers.² To these can be added famous mercenary commanders like Iphicrates, Chabrias, Chares, Timotheus, Phocion and Leosthenes. The nature of our sources may partly explain Athenian prevalence, but there may well be more to it than this. The reputation that the Athenians gained from the Persian Wars and the experience of Athenian commanders in leading large naval and infantry forces in the Great Peloponnesian War, as with the Spartans with the Peloponnesian League, left them well placed to command in mercenary contexts. The predominant Greek cities all provided

commanders for the Persian king's mercenaries, for example Nicostratus from Argos and Pammenes from Thebes (Diod. 15.41, 16.43, 16.34; Dem. 23.183). Provenance without doubt assisted the authority of commanding officers.

Social status played a crucial role also in the command structures of armies. This reflected the connections of the officers, at home and abroad, to prominent individuals. Greeks such as Xenophon perceived a relationship between social status and the ability to lead by example (Xen. *An.* 3.1.21). In Sparta all the file leaders (*prôtostatai*) were thus officers or *archontes* (Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 11.5). An officer's responsibility to lead the attack remained a part of military ideology through the fourth century and was still prevalent in the armies of the Hellenistic monarchs, as evidence regarding the later Macedonian syntagma shows (Asclepiodotus, *Tact.* 2.8, 3.6). Even in those armies a nobleman (*aristos*) was in the front (ibid. 2.2). The relationship between the officer as battle leader and his being both the best armed and the best paid was evident throughout the fifth and fourth centuries BC. Ronald Ridley (1979: 514 n. 24) makes the point well that the position of the *stratégos* at the head of the phalanx meant that the dangers to that man were great. Defeat would almost certainly mean the death of the *stratégos*. Authority stemmed from personal bravery as well as social status and one's civic identity.

Even within the armies of the *poleis*, consent through a vote of the men at arms empowered leaders to command. The citizen assembly (*dêmos*), as the representative and reflection of the Athenian military (i.e. its citizens), gave officers their authority.³ Mercenary armies were more practical. In the field more democratic processes enabled troops to decide who should command them. In dangerous situations, despite the passive nature of military assemblies, in the *anabasis* and in other campaigns, the army's agreement to an officer's wishes, even his leadership, played a crucial role in action taken. The power and involvement of the soldiers were dictated by the circumstances in which the army found itself. Xenophon states as much in his summary of the officers killed by Tissaphernes after the Battle of Cunaxa. Proxenus' positive and pleasant attitude gave him little authority at dangerous moments on campaign, but men loved him during times of safety and peace (Xen. *An.* 2.6.19–20). Clearchus, on the other hand, was a hard taskmaster; men did not like to serve with him in peacetime, but through war and danger he was the ideal commander (Xen. *An.* 2.6.13; 2.6.7–12). The ability of soldiers to choose their commanders within mercenary armies was always a threat to an officer's authority. Two thousand men deserted the command of Xenias and Pasion to join with Clearchus during the negotiations prior to the march east to the Battle of Cunaxa (Xen. *An.* 1.3.7). On the return journey from the battle, the Peloponnesians, specifically the Arcadians, formed their own army with their own Arcadian generals (Xen. *An.* 6.2.11). This new arrangement was short-lived and the elected commanders were soon removed, but it illustrates that mercenaries could pick and choose commanders with some

fluidity, especially as circumstances changed. The Arcadians only formed their own units after they had reached the perceived safety of the sea.

Cyrus commanded his Greek employees through a combination of reputation and potential (Xen. *An.* 1.9, 3.1.10, 6.4.8). Cyrus was commander-in-chief with a general staff that included just one Greek, Clearchus. The Persians perceived Clearchus as the most powerful of the Greeks, a role that he assumed from the start (Xen. *An.* 1.6.5; 1.3.1). His personality played a monumental role in his image. He inspired confidence (Xen. *An.* 1.3.7), the men obeyed him (Xen. *An.* 2.2.6) and therefore personality was critical to his authority (Xen. *An.* 2.1–15). Xenophon distinguished Clearchus from the other Greek *stratēgoi* at the outset. He described the other generals as ritualized friends (*xenoi*) of the prince, who lacked experience. Clearchus was not a *xenos*, but a hiring officer of mercenaries (*xenologos*) and he had experience (Xen. *An.* 1.1.9). When Clearchus beat a man from Meno's army with a stick, the men of that army were outraged. It was a double outrage: he was not the man's commander and he was a Spartan beating a free man (Xen. *An.* 1.5.11; see Crowther and Frass 1998: 51–82; Hornblower 2000: 57–82). The incident demonstrates that Clearchus considered himself in charge of all the Greeks, even those under other generals. Clearchus was a Spartan used to and experienced with authoritarian command. Provenance and experience gave him the ability to command and his relationship to Cyrus, singularly different from that of the other generals, gave him further credentials to manage the entire Greek force on the *anabasis*.

Social structure and family abroad

Mercenaries lived and worked outside their home states (*apoikia*), often far outside, and formed tight communities with each other, maintaining and developing their own Greek identities abroad. We have seen elsewhere that tribal connections of Greeks at home may have helped the early Peloponnesians gather troops for service in Sicily. The group identity of the tribe rather than the individual or family connections within the more rigid sociopolitical structure of a *polis* like Athens would have facilitated opportunities for men from Arcadia and Achaea to find service in large numbers (see Nielsen 1996c: 117–63 and 1999: 16–79; Roy 1996: 110–11). While there were many cities in the Peloponnese, it is questionable to what extent synoecism had occurred in these regions by the sixth and fifth centuries BC. In groups with shared roots, background and customs, it is not surprising to find rituals and lifestyles transported from home and practised in common abroad. Andrew Dalby (1992: 28–30) demonstrates that Archaic institutions of tribal- and mess-groupings were more prevalent among the Classical Greeks outside the *polis*, specifically the mercenaries with Xenophon, than they were on the mainland of the same period. Some mercenaries had families with them, and these also needed to create artificial social structures abroad out of

the traditional ones that came from home (Xen. *An.* 1.4.8; Isoc. 5.121). The army as a community created from the hierarchy of the military command structure filtered out to embrace a wide variety of individuals attached to that community. The relationship between military organizations and social structure in Greek society seems to have been very strong. Mercenary armies were mobile cities of Greeks and foreigners trying to forge their own identities in different circumstances.

The presence of messes in mercenary service illustrates relationships rooted and formed at home. The *Anabasis* contains one reference to tent-mates or *syskenoi* (Xen. *An.* 5.8.5–6). Tent-mates would have had close ties to each other, like those of groups who ate, lived and fought together in mainland Greek communities. Sparta provides the clearest example of a mess-mate system of communal living (*sysstitia*, *pheiditia*). Sparta was not the only state that had messes and their equivalents. Athenians also served in messes overseas. Mess-mates (*syssitoi*) gathered food to cook together and acted as a group within the army (Isae. 4.18; Dem. 54.4–5; Dalby 1992: 28–9). Xenophon (*An.* 3.5.7, 5.14) cited several examples of messes in a mercenary context (see Bourriot 1996: 129–40; Fornis and Cassillas 1997: 37–46). The Spartans found honour expressed in the mess, and it would be unlikely if the mercenary did not. Spartan organization might have played a role in the formation of mercenary armies overseas. The Dorian and Arcadian nature of the Peloponnesians and the large number of mercenaries who came from that region ought to demonstrate that mess-systems and tribal systems, closely associated as they both were with military structures, were common in mercenary service if not always identifiable in the sources. Singor (1999: 67–8; 2002: 273–6) and Toynbee (1969: 369) suggest that there was a direct relationship between Spartan *sysstitia* and *enômotia*. This possibility is also discussed by Lazenby (1985: 23). Herodotus (1.65.5) mentioned these two terms in the same phrase. Plutarch (*Lyc.* 12.3), Xenophon (*Lac. Pol.* 5.2) and Aristotle (*Pol.* 1271a27; 1272a2) each referred to the military nature of the *sysstitia*. It is not doubted that the Dorian Peloponnesians would share common cultural threads. For example, the three Dorian tribes can be detected throughout the Peloponnese. Dorian festivals like the Carneia were celebrated at Argos (*IG* 4.598), at Epidaurus, (*IG* 4.21) and at Sikyon (Hdt. 5.68.2). The Carneia's relationship to military matters ought to be noted. The various armies of the Peloponnesian states all had similar institutions (Hdt. 6.92; Thuc. 1.107.5; 5.59.4, 72.3; Tomlinson 1972: 175–86).

The Athenian evidence for mess-mates (*syssitoi*, *syskénoi*) is legal in its nature. It suggests that the relationship between mess-mates was regarded as a special one, though in many armies circumstances might have dictated such relationships. The similarity of Greek practices from *polis* to *polis*, and the significance of Athenian dining groups (*betairiai*), with their political and social associations at home and militarily overseas, might be worth consideration. Victor Davis Hanson (1989: 122–5) emphasizes the social controls on

Athenian hoplites exerted by relatives and fellow demesmen who surrounded them on campaign. Social organization, reinforced from home, played a critical role in military organization overseas. Andrew Dalby (1992: 30) states that 'links between equals ... are reinforced by certain kinds of food preparation and by communal eating'. Mercenary armies are unlikely to have been filled with individuals who knew none of their fellow-soldiers. Associations with home and with traditional military and social practices must have been a common feature of any ancient Greek mercenary army.

Armies were not just made up of the fighting men. Nussbaum points out the presence of a large (and passive) civilian population with the army of Cyrus (Nussbaum 1967: *passim*). All mercenary armies must have had such an accompaniment. The sources rarely refer to these retainers and camp followers, the artisans, slaves, mobile brothels and retailers. Only once did Xenophon (*An.* 4.2.20) refer to an individual retainer, his own shield-bearer (hypaspist). He cannot have been alone in having such a man to carry his shield (*aspis*). The Spartans had shield-bearers (hypaspists) and used helots for such service (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.14; Hdt. 7.229.1; Thuc. 4.8.9). Athenians on garrison duty at Panactum also had slaves (*paidēs*) who looked after them in the mess, doing chores like dinner preparation (Dem. 54.4). Certain retainers served in more military capacities. Xenophon's hypaspist disappeared during an action (Xen. *An.* 4.2.20). He could have been a regular combatant under Xenophon's command, or perhaps he was his slave in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Many mercenaries must have left wives and children behind them in their home communities. Xenophon referred to many on Cyrus' expedition as having families (*goneioi*, *gunaikes*, *paidēs*) at home (*patria*) to whom they longed to return (Xen. *An.* 3.1.3, 4.46). Other mercenaries had families with them outside their homeland. These families either travelled with them or were left behind in a stronghold. Very occasionally the evidence highlights a specific mercenary with a family in his *polis* (Isae. 2). Cyrus had the wives and children (*gynaikes* and *tekna*) of the men who deserted him put under guard at Tralles (Xen. *An.* 1.4.8.). These deserters were from among his long-serving garrison regulars. Men such as these were more likely to have settled families than wandering mercenaries. The employer sometimes kept these families for their own protection, but they also provided certain guarantees of the mercenaries' good behaviour. Women and children appeared on the campaign with mercenaries, but were probably not often from formal family relationships (Xen. *An.* 5.3.1). Nevertheless, wives and children appear elsewhere in the sources during the fourth century BC. Pelopidas' mercenaries left their families at Pharsalus while they campaigned in Thessaly (Plut. *Pel.* 27). The implication is that these wives routinely travelled with their husbands. Other mercenaries took their families around with them even on campaign. Plutarch (*Alex.* 22) implies this very possibility. More tellingly, Isocrates (4.168) stated that there are men 'wandering with their women and

children in strange lands . . . compelled . . . to enlist in foreign armies'. For most itinerant mercenaries the maintenance of wives and children at home must have been almost impossible, and no doubt many who served or settled far from home did so by abandoning their families. The evidence suggests that it was hard enough for oarsmen with the Athenian fleet to look after their families and so trierarchs had to provide funds for the household (*oikos*) maintenance of their crew to keep them in service (Dem. 50.12). Of course, if the majority of mercenaries had families to which to return, and assuming that they did return, the image of an itinerant mercenary community becomes much less predominant.

In addition to the family associations of mercenaries abroad, there is evidence that family members fought alongside each other in mercenary bands. The brothers in Isaeus 2 are a tangible example. We have already seen that hoplites in *polis* armies fought with their family members and demesmen all around them. Despite Xenophon's implication that Spartan relatives did not fight together, the bond between mess-mates at Sparta must have compensated for any absence of kin in the battle-line (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.10, 6.4.16). There is little reason to doubt that related hoplites fought side-by-side with members of their home *polis* while on overseas service. Inscriptions demonstrate the possibility that fathers and sons fought together as mercenaries (*SEG* 31.1552, 1554). These names were found on the walls of the chapel of Achoris at Karnak in Egypt and demonstrate that one mercenary was possibly the son of another. This raises the question of whether mercenary service was inherited. The first mercenaries may have established aristocratic and long-term links that enabled their descendants to serve overseas in their turn, in a process similar to ritualized friendships. The same is true of the officers and their sons who served a specific dynasty or court. The fact that certain regions, Arcadia and Achaëa, featured prominently as recruiting grounds in the years from 404 to 322 BC must suggest that service in these regions, and by implication amongst certain families, became expected and accepted.

Aristocratic relationships were reflected in the names of Greek sons. Pisis-tratus was named after the son of Nestor of Pylos, and Clisthenes carried the name of his maternal grandfather, the tyrant of Sicyon, to indicate a familial connection (Hdt. 6.130–1, 5.65). Ordinary men may also have had ties to those kings or dynasties whom they served or at least might have tried to foster those ties through names. Amyrtaeus, a Rhodian who appears to have led Greeks in Egypt in the 380s or 360s BC, bears the same name as the King in the Marshes described by Thucydides in the mid-fifth century (Thuc. 1.110; Hicks and Hill 122; *CIG* 3.4702). The inscribed names of a group of Carians who served Psamettichus in the sixth century at Abu Simbel reveal the name of Psamettichus amongst them (Tod 4; Hicks and Hill 3). His father was a Greek, as the inscription notes, and a friend of the Egyptian king who wanted that friendship recognized through his son. Names were a part of *xeniai* relationships, and an employer's good deeds or reputation

influenced the naming of mercenaries' children (Herman 1987: 101–2; Habicht 1990: 561–77).

Relationships in mercenary armies cut across *polis* boundaries. No rules governed whether commanders commanded men from their homes or from elsewhere. Unfortunately, the *Anabasis* gives only general details about the make-up of the units of the army, but the Theban Proxenus commanded *lochagoi* from Boeotia, Elis and Arcadia and invited Xenophon, the Athenian, along as well. Epigraphic dedications from other armies also demonstrate this multipolitical dimension of mercenary service. In the first half of the fourth century BC, a group of Greek mercenaries established a dedication, believed by most scholars to be connected with the campaigns of Chabrias in the 380s or the 360s (Hicks and Hill 122; *CIG* 3 4702; Parke 1933: 59–60), to an Egyptian ruler, the inscription of which reads as follows:

For the everlasting memory for their good deeds to the Greeks, these [named] have set this up by the pyramids of Tanos [Ptah Tanen] the god. Lisicrates an Athenian, Androcharis a Nysurian, Mnasigenes a Boeotian, Epiteles a Cyrenaian, Straton a Caryandrian, Sosikles an Athenian, Demetrius an Athenian, Apollonidas a Corinthian, Pythodorus an Athenian, Aristobulus an Athenian.

And Amyrtaeus a Rhodian himself dedicated the table for sacrifices.
[my translation]

This early fourth-century BC dedication in Egypt by Amyrtaeus and his colleagues demonstrates that five Athenians and six other Greeks from different states all participated in the offering. It is interesting that their *poleis* of origin remained part of their identity despite their collective action far from their homes. These men may simply have been mess-mates, part of the same unit commanded by Amyrtaeus, but they could each also have been *lochagoi* within an army of which the Rhodian was a general who singularly dedicated the sacrificial table (*trapeza*). They must have had some relationship even if they were only part of the same army. A similar group can be found in contemporary inscriptions from Karnak listing Greeks in Cyprus, but no provenance is given (*SEG* 31.1549–55). Mercenaries from disparate backgrounds and different cities formed communities, units and armies. Nevertheless, many mercenaries seem to have served with men with whom they were associated in their homelands. In Classical Greece, mercenary associations were not as superficial as the modern image of the mercenary would suggest.

Nationalism

All the men discussed here were Greeks serving together in the same armies. Were mercenaries the first united group of Greeks in history? Greekness has received much attention recently (Cartledge 1993: 9–17; Hall 1997; Trundle

1999: 28–38). We have seen that employers hired Greeks because they were perceived as the best troops available. Greek sources make the distinction between Greeks and barbarians and are no doubt responsible for a marked, even artificial, distinction between the two. Even taking into account the polarizing and moralizing nature of philosophers, politicians and historians, there is evidence that taking money from non-Greeks (*barbaroi*) was deemed unworthy by some. Xenophon (*Hell.* 1.6.7) had Callicratidas state that it was unworthy for Greeks to pander to the Persians for the sake of money. Nevertheless, Greeks did take foreign money, regularly. Greeks also had relationships with non-Greeks that went beyond the financial. The family connections of Iphicrates, Memnon and Mentor are all examples of Greek statesmen establishing close ties with eastern rulers. Greeks, however, are never found serving in nationally mixed units. The Greeks on the *anabasis* of Cyrus carefully remained separate from the non-Greeks, and those mercenaries left with Darius III in the last days of his life were clearly isolated from his Persians. We have seen that the necessity of diplomatic and sensitive liaisons between Greek mercenaries and their non-Greek paymasters were important, even between the Greeks and a man as admired by them as Cyrus.

Inevitably, Greekness and Greek unity among Greek mercenaries are most evident in times of crisis. Before a battle with non-Greeks, all commanders of Greek forces appealed to the Hellenic nature of their cause. This was, no doubt, a *topos* of Greek historiography. Alexander went further; before the Battle of the Issus river in 333 BC he praised the Hellenic nature of his cause and denigrated the mercenary nature of that of the Greeks in Persian service (Arr. *Anab.* 2.7.4). The Persian's mercenaries, he said, served against a Greek cause for poor pay only. Xenophon's *Anabasis* illustrates the otherness felt by Greeks towards the non-Greeks. Crisis and fear emphasized this feeling. Cyrus' death resulted in his generals' exhortation to the Greeks that as Greeks they were special and powerful (Xen. *An.* 3.2.10–13). The Greeks were happy to see Phalinus, the hoplite battle expert, while negotiating with Tissaphernes, because he was a Greek (Xen. *An.* 2.1.16). The story of Apollonides, a *lochagos* from Boeotia, reveals the army's xenophobia well (Xen. *An.* 3.1.26–32). He advocated diplomacy and friendship towards the Persians and reminded them of their difficult situation. Another *lochagos* revealed that Apollonides was no Boeotian at all, not even a Greek, but a Lydian and therefore a foreigner in their midst. Small wonder this man advocated a soft line with the Persians, and he was driven from the camp accordingly. This story reveals a rising xenophobia among the Greeks at a time of crisis. They distrusted all foreigners and the incident created solidarity within the threatened but affirmed group. The majority found a scapegoat in the one who was different and justified their no-surrender stance. Things changed within the army when its circumstances did. Once the army felt less threatened by non-Greeks, xenophobic exhortations gave way to infighting as *inter-polis* and

inter-*ethnos* rivalries emerged between the Arcadians and Spartan generals in particular (Xen. *An.* 6.2.11).

The nationalism of Greeks against the rest can be taken too far. Inter-*polis* rivalries illustrate something that was never far from Greek political relationships. Greeks regularly fought against each other, both in wars for political dominance and in wars for others. In mercenary campaigns in which Greek fought against Greek, on only one occasion do Greeks of one side defend Greeks from the other against a Persian force. During Artaxerxes' invasion of Egypt, the Greeks defending forts at Pelusium, having surrendered with terms, were attacked by the Persians (*barbaroi*) who aimed to plunder their belongings (Diod. 16.49.5). The Greeks serving with those same Persians protected their kin by attacking their allies. Amazingly, their commander successfully defended these actions to the Persian King. In another instance of Hellenic communal spirit, Greeks remonstrated against their fellow Greeks serving with the Carthaginians against the Greek cities of Sicily (Plut. *Tim.* 21). It is important to note that these stories come from Diodorus and Plutarch respectively, and both historians were keen to illustrate mercenaries behaving in conformity with a Greek ideal.

Both stories are also distinctive for their rarity. H. W. Parke correctly juxtaposes the former of the two instances with the 'ruthless methods of Nicos-tratus' from Argos who commanded Greeks in Egypt against other Greeks (Parke 1933: 168; Diod. 16.48.3). We need to remember that more Greeks died in the service of the Persian Empire than in fighting for the Greek cities (Seibt 1977: 12). Persian kings, satraps, and Sicilian tyrants employed Greeks in great numbers, often to fight against other Greeks. Even on the mainland, employers throughout the fourth century BC had little trouble hiring Greeks to fight either mercenary or citizen, but regularly Greek, opposition. There was little Greek common feeling to those who enlisted.

The absence of Greek unity and common affections generally illustrated by the ubiquity of Greeks in mercenary service in the late Classical period contrasts with certain contemporary and modern ideals about the age. The mid-fifth century BC had seen the first steps towards federalism, which involved sacrificing the autonomy of a *polis* at home for the interests of a common foreign policy with a number of cities as part of a league. For example, the Arcadian League possibly emerged in the fifth century (Nielsen 1996b: 39–62). The Achaean League emerged as a federation of twelve cities in the early fourth century and the Aetolians had united into a league or sym-polity by 367 BC. Federalism enjoyed some popularity in the fourth century, but intra-Greek and inter-*polis* rivalries fuelled mercenary service in the period. In addition, some Greek political commentators suggested that national Greek identity ought to supersede the *polis* as an autonomous and ideal unit. These ideas went back to the fifth century, but are often seen by modern commentators as themes of the fourth century BC. They are exemplified by notions regarding common peace (*koinê eirênê*) as desirable among

the Greek *poleis* of the mainland (Ryder 1965). Xenophon never referred to this theme, but Diodorus did often. The only fourth-century reference to it is an inscription (Dittenberg, *SIG* III 182; Tod 145). Isocrates (5.120–1) believed that peace between the Greek cities would then enable a common effort against Persia. John Buckler (1994: 99–122) has recently explained, however, that such ideas were anachronistic political conceptions used by later historians, but not by any in the fourth century, thus they had little contemporary currency. Prolific mercenary service in the period supports this point, as Greeks often fought against each other for foreign paymasters. In reality and at the grass roots, mercenaries were anathema to developments of federalism and ideas of communal peace and yet mercenaries were themselves a major feature of the fourth century BC.

Loyalty

An important aspect of Greek mercenary service was their loyalty. Today, mercenaries are not generally known for their loyalty. The paradigms of mercenary perfidy are the Italian mercenary commanders of renaissance Italy, the *condottieri*, who transferred their services from one side to another at the drop of a coin (Mallett 1974; Mockler 1985: 7–14). We have seen, particularly with Athenian naval crews, that Greek commanders faced the possibility of desertion on a daily basis even amongst citizen recruits (Dem. 50.11). Mercenaries did desert their commanders for better pay and bribery (e.g. Plut. *Pl.* 27). Leadership of mercenaries was based on contingency and the perception the men had of their employer. Employers who had money, or access to it, enjoyed their men's faith, and so did employers whom the men feared and respected. Confidence in a commander's abilities to provide food or remuneration played an important role, but faith in his ability to succeed and to bring the men safely back from a campaign was paramount (e.g. Xen. *An.* 1.3.7). The reasons for desertion might be personal rather than fiscal or even rational. When Timotheus replaced Iphicrates as general in Thrace in 364 BC, Charidemus and his mercenaries followed Iphicrates and offered their services to Cotys (Dem. 23.149). A thousand mercenaries deserted Timoleon before the Battle of Crimisus (Plut. *Tim.* 25; Diod. 16.78.5–6). Diodorus stated that this occurred because the men lacked faith in Timoleon's judgment and ability to win the battle. Agesilaus abandoned his employer, the nominal ruler of Egypt named Tachos, for another Egyptian pretender, Nectanebo, in about 361 BC (Plutarch, *Ages.* 36–7). The sources neglect to give the full reason, but animosity certainly existed. Tachos saw Agesilaus' role as being simply to command the mercenaries; the Spartan king wanted more and disagreed with him over strategy as well. He may have felt he could dominate Nectanebo more easily than he could Tachos. Chabrias, the Athenian in charge of the Egyptian navy, tried in vain to dissuade the Spartan from switching sides.

Conversely, mercenaries could and did remain loyal. Agesilaus stayed true to Nectanebo despite an Egyptian namesake hopeful of turning the king against his new ally. They often stayed loyal despite great odds against them and a lack of pay. Emotional sentiment should not be excluded from all mercenary relationships. The retention of loyalty, like the holding of authority, was based on more than pragmatism. Clearchus' tears and sentimentality at the start of the *anabasis* campaign in 401 BC worked to keep his mercenaries loyal to his standard. The presence of a charismatic leader was important. Cyrus' mercenaries stayed with him even though they were scared of going against the Great King. They continued, fearing the shame they might experience amongst each other and the prince (Xen. *An.* 3.1.10). The majority of Timoleon's mercenaries did not leave him at the Crimissus despite good reason to do so (Plut. *Tim.* 25). Dion's mercenaries received generous offers from the citizens of Syracuse to join them, but they stayed with their leader (Plut. *Dion.* 38). Men could be found serving Phalaecus some years after the Sacred War had ended. This man, if the sources are reliable, had little prospect of success and little respectability. The Greeks facing Artaxerxes' invasion of Egypt refused to surrender even though their Egyptian employers wished to do so. They therefore upheld the cause of Egypt more than the Egyptians themselves (Diod. 16.61.3–64.3)! The Greeks with Darius III, during his last days in 330 BC, provide a similar illustration of desperate mercenary loyalty. In a hopeless situation, with Alexander at their heels, the Greek mercenaries did not abandon the waning Great King and proved more loyal than his own countrymen, who murdered him (Arr. *Anab.* 3.21.4; Diod. 17.27.2; Curt. Ruf. 5.8.4). Of course, the closeness of the long-term interests of the men to their commander should be stressed. All mercenaries knew that without an employer their prospects for food, let alone pay or donations, were slim.

Flexibility was invaluable to the success of mercenaries and particularly their commanders. Mentor's readiness to serve, first an Egyptian, then Temmes of Sidon, and finally the Persians, underscored his rise to power. Clearchus, and by association the mercenaries with him, were equally pragmatic. After the death of Cyrus they asked Tissaphernes to take them into service (Xen. *An.* 2.5.11–14). They even suggested that they could spearhead an invasion of Egypt. Once back in the Greek orbit in 399 BC, the army casually discussed which power they should serve at the end of their journey, the options being a rogue individual paymaster named Coeratades, the Spartans who were embarking on war with the Persians, or the Thracian prince Seuthes (Xen. *An.* 7.1.33, 2.2, 3.20).

Mercenary generals

Mercenary service was based on a relationship involving employment with people abroad who were powerful and dependable enough to provide remuneration in either financial or other form for services rendered. The generals

who led mercenaries for the great paymasters of the Mediterranean were often powerful men in their own right. Traditional views of such mercenary generals have seen them as pragmatic and selfish mercenaries in the style of the Italian *condottiere* or the tainted modern professional. As the mercenary leaders among Greek armies were often aristocrats, their ancestral relationships assisted their service and cut across the territorial and civic boundaries of the *polis*. Gabriel Herman exposed the importance of ritualized friendships to the Classical Greek world and the world, therefore, of the *poleis*. He notes that considerations of nationalism were 'almost entirely absent' from Greek ideology (1987: 161). Aristocrats of the *poleis* continued to be friends abroad through their Archaic bonds of guest or ritualized friendship in the Classical period. Networks that can be traced across the eastern Mediterranean demonstrate that underlying mercenary service was a far more complex set of inter-state and personal relationships. Commanders who served abroad were not just privateers, itinerant and emigrant warriors. Some were exploring alternative choices in living outside the boundaries of the *polis*. Some men dipped into military adventuring, while others embraced it. Many were statesmen doing what statesmen had always done, establishing overseas relationships that were useful to themselves and their home state. From another perspective, at the same time the councils and assemblies of the *poleis* connived in this activity. Mercenaries were part of the diplomatic and international stage. The notion, therefore, of the mercenary in Greek antiquity needs some redefinition and rethinking.

It has long been argued that the fourth century BC was an age of specialization. The decline of the *polis* was the result of the separation of the citizen-farmer from the soldiers and the politicians of the state (Marinovic 1988: 297). Lawrence Tritle (1993: 125–9) tries to show that the degree of separation between Athenian generals and politicians was not as great as has been assumed. More recently, however, Debra Hamel (1995: 25–39) has illustrated that the traditional conclusions hold true. Fourth-century Athenians did witness a more marked separation between those who served the state as generals and those who worked in politics than they had seen in the previous century. This specialization, combined with the prominence of hoplite warfare and the decline in the unity of the western Persian Empire, seems to have determined a steady flow of military expertise from the Greek world to the east. The second volume of William Kendrick Pritchett's *The Greek State at War* (1974: 56–116) discusses the fourth-century *condottiere* and demonstrates that the Greek generals who were part of this flow were less mercenary and more responsible to their home governments than earlier scholars, like Parke in particular, have argued. Pritchett's conclusions establish the complexities of inter-state politics and service abroad in this period. The mercenary nature of foreign activity was blurred by the political disintegration of the *polis* in the fourth century along with the changing interests of the individuals and the states in which they lived. Recently,

authors have identified the often obscured nature of mercenary service alongside the various *poleis'* diplomatic interests in this period (Herman 1987: 97–102; Mitchell 1997: 188). Mercenary service, if indeed it can be called such, served the Greek *poleis* as an important branch of international diplomacy and policy.

The Athenian *stratēgoi* who served overseas are far more prominent than others for whom there is evidence. The Atheno-centric nature of the sources may explain why individual Athenians feature so heavily in the evidence. Athenian generals led men persuaded by pay throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. Even Athenians clearly acting on behalf of the state had mercenary troops under their command. Nicias and Demosthenes took mercenaries to Syracuse and mercenaries regularly appear with Athenian armies subsequently. It can also be difficult to distinguish the mercenary from the Athenian *stratēgos* on state business. The Athenian Lycon appeared in service with Pissuthnes who revolted from the Persians between about 423 and 414 BC (*FGrH* 688 Ctesias 15.53–4). At first glance he looks like a Greek mercenary commander with a foreign employer. Simon Hornblower (1982: 31–2), following an inscription (M&L 77 line 79) which shows that the Athenians sent pay to men in Ephesus, postulates that Lycon may have been acting, initially, with state blessing. Perhaps he has a point, as lined up against Pissuthnes were some of the men who were to deal the death blow to Athens with the Spartan alliance in 411 BC. Lycon's mercenary nature was therefore blurred. But not that blurred, for we know that he was converted to the Persian cause by money (*chrēmata*) and finally received cities and land for his services. He was the first (about whom there is evidence) of many generals who found service abroad whose status was somewhere between mercenary and state commander. Others in the fourth century did much the same, being neither outright *condottieri* nor loyal drones to their native governments.

Xenophon became a mercenary leader as a matter of friendship and chance. He claimed only to be on the expedition out of friendship to Proxenus who had promised him friendship with Cyrus. He stated that from the start he was neither general nor captain nor soldier (Xen. *An.* 3.1.4). When the generals were all killed, he found himself in a position of authority. Even then he was only a mercenary commander in the truest sense from the time that the army agreed to serve Seuthes to the time they left his employment. Until that point, he was the commander of an army of desperate men trying to leave the Persian Empire. Xenophon's career was varied. He did not go back to Athens at least until after the Atheno-Spartan rapprochement of 369 BC, possibly because he had been exiled in either 399 or 394 BC, but he campaigned in Asia and Greece with Agesilaus and remained under Spartan friendship in the Peloponnese. The estates at Scyllus, near Olympia, provided for him essentially by the Spartans, were the rewards for his years in their service. His career illustrates the pattern of state service superseded by overseas friendships that was common for aristocrats at the time. In addition,

the fluid political situation gave him the opportunity to return to Athens a little while after being driven from Scyllus about 371 BC.

Iphicrates became famous in the 390s BC. He served Athens both as a commander (*archôn*) and as a *stratêgos* throughout his lengthy career. Pritchett is emphatic that he was 'controlled by the home authorities' (Pritchett 1974: 63) certainly until 388 BC in which year Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.8.34) noted that 1,200 peltasts were sent to fight the Spartan Anaxibius at Corinth. Iphicrates served the state loyally at many actions from the Battle of Lechaeum at Corinth in 390 BC to the Social War of the 350s BC.⁴ Pritchett (1974: 66–7) maintains that Iphicrates acted independently of Athens on only three occasions in his career. One of these was through his relationship with the Macedonian King Amyntas (*ibid.*: 71–2). This need not concern us, for there is little that seems compromising in this, but it illustrates further the way that Athenian statesmen moved between aristocratic associations on the one hand and state service on the other.

Nevertheless, Iphicrates had two other independent connections overseas that on the surface appear both to compromise his loyalty to the state and to make his actions deserving of the label mercenary. The first of these was with Pharnabazus and the Persian King in 377/6 BC. Pritchett (1974: 68) argues away the mercenary nature of this service. Diodorus (15.29.4, 41, 42.4) stated that the Athenians sent Iphicrates to the Persians at the request of the Great King (Nepos 11.2.4; Plut. *Art.* 24.1; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 3.9.38, 56, 63). The request was significant. The Persians had already made the Athenians recall Chabrias from Egypt. They asserted their power over Athens again in their request for an Athenian general to be sent to them. This was Iphicrates. He remained accountable to the Athenians and, when a dispute arose between him and the satrap, Iphicrates returned home (Diod. 15.42–3). The Athenians then told the Persians that they would deal with the general as they saw fit. Significantly, he was not punished for any real or imagined misdemeanour.

The second of Iphicrates' compromising overseas connections, in Thrace in the later 360s, is not so clearly state-sanctioned. Iphicrates had become the son-in-law of the Thracian prince Cotys, a sometime enemy of the Athenians, the decade previously. Demosthenes (23.130–2) is the main source and was keen to paint Iphicrates in a poor light in a long passage about his activities:

I look at Cotys and I find that he was related by marriage to Iphicrates. In the same degree as Cersobleptes to Charidemus; and that the achievements of Iphicrates on behalf of Cotys were far more important and meritorious than anything that Charidemus has done for Cersobleptes . . . Nevertheless, [Iphicrates] had the courage to fight a battle at sea against your *stratêgoi* in defence of Cotys, setting a higher value on the salvation of that king than upon all the honours he enjoyed in your city . . . In spite of that, when Cotys, who owed his deliverance to Iphicrates, and had had practical experience of his

loyalty, believed himself to be permanently out of danger, he took no pains to reward him, and never showed you any civility through his agency in the hope of winning forgiveness for his past conduct. On the contrary, he claimed his help in besieging the rest of your strongholds, taking with him the forces collected by Iphicrates as well as his barbarian troops and engaging the services of Charidemus. He reduced Iphicrates to such helplessness that he withdrew to Antissa, and afterwards to Drys, and lived there; for he did not think he could honourably return to you whom he had slighted for the sake of a Thracian and a barbarian.

Demosthenes' speech looks damning for Iphicrates. Not only was Iphicrates in the service of a foreign ruler, admittedly also his father-in-law, but also, and much worse, he was fighting against the forces of his native *polis*. Demosthenes' rhetoric was aimed at discrediting his opponents. It is possible that Iphicrates was on diplomatic missions for the Athenians. There was certainly Athenian diplomatic activity in Thrace which might explain his presence on state business, but the epigraphic evidence does not confirm that Iphicrates was there for diplomacy (Tod *GHI* 116 and 117). Some sources attested Iphicrates acting against the Thracians at some unspecified points in time (Nepos 11.2.1; Seneca, *Controversiae*, 6.5; Theopomp. *FGrH* frag. 161; Poly-aenus, *Strat.* 3.9.4, 41, 46, 50, 60, 62). Several authorities give the names of different rulers whom he served. Nepos (11.2.1) recorded Seuthes, while Demosthenes (23.129) recorded Cotys. Neither stated against whom he fought. Parke (1933: 55) following Beloch (1912: 56, n. 1) suggests the possibility that he served both in turn without changing sides, and alludes to the possibility that they were both fighting against Hebryzelmis of the Odrysae. There was clearly enough confusion about Iphicrates' loyalties in the region to provide him with some defence against Demosthenes' charges. We might argue, against Demosthenes, that Iphicrates had assisted Cotys initially, but withdrew when the Athenians became his enemies. This would explain the absence of reward from the king for any of Iphicrates' assistance and why the Athenian general was forced to withdraw to Drys. Pritchett (1974: 66) thinks along similar lines that Iphicrates refused to attack Athenian forces, but would have taken part in defensive actions for Cotys. Tellingly, the Athenians took no action against him. This, as Pritchett suggests, is a testament to his innocence in the matter.

As Pritchett (1974: 68) noted, Parke (1933: 112) describes Chabrias as a professional *condottiere*, but the evidence does not bear out this statement. He served the state on numerous campaigns.⁵ Notably, he had strong connections to Egypt (Theopomp. *FGrH* frag. 105 and Nep. (12).3.4), but the dates of his Egyptian service are disputed, ranging from 386 to 377/6 BC. Hence, Diodorus (15.29) dated his service for Achoris to 377/6 BC, but Parke (1933: 59) suggests that all his Egyptian experience should be compressed to

386–380 BC and that Diodorus was wrong. Diodorus (15.29.1, 92.3) stated that Chabrias served in Egypt in a private capacity and probably without his own personal band of mercenaries. In his desire to play down the private nature of Greek mercenary generals' activities in the fourth century, Pritchett may overstate the argument that an alliance between the Athenians and Egyptians explains his presence there, but there were other Athenians in Egypt serving with Chares at about this period. In spite of the private capacity in which Chabrias served the Egyptian king Tachos, the Athenian government was still able to force his retirement from that service about 377 BC (Diod. 15.29.3). He returned to Egypt in 362/1 BC to participate in the war for Tachos. Here he clashed with Agesilaus over which Egyptian ruler they should follow. Parke (1933: 112) has no problem seeing him as a mercenary here, but while Pritchett (1974: 75) makes no effort to argue that he was acting for the state, he suggests that nothing illustrates that Chabrias came with soldiers from Greece. Once again, this career illustrates that an Athenian general could easily move from official state business to unofficial personal benefit in the fourth century BC.

Chares served the state through the 360s and 350s BC (Pritchett 1974: 77–85).⁶ Accusations against Chares of being a roving *condottiere* cannot be supported. The nature of Athenian wars in this period left generals few options to provide for their men, except to pursue seemingly independent actions of plunder and threats. Demosthenes (2.28; 8.24–9; 21.173; 24.12; 51.13) is scathing in his attacks against such generals, but the implication is still clear that they were theoretically acting for the state. Pritchett (1974: 80–5) makes much of the nature of these speeches as a *topos* against Chares and the fact that he was acquitted. The result of the trial, while unknown, would suggest little of his real guilt or innocence (Aisch. 2.90). Chares' actions against Athenian allies are often regarded as those of a privateer (Aisch. 2.71; Plut. *Phoc.* 14). Pritchett sees the final year of the Social War, 353 BC, as crucial to Chares' reputation as a mercenary. In this year he left the Athenian cause and joined with Artabazus in a revolt against Artaxerxes (Ochus). Pritchett (1974: 78) notes here the bad state of the Athenian economy as a result of the war. Isocrates (7.8) noted the exhaustion of the city. Two speeches of Demosthenes (19 and 23) referred to the limited resources of the state in the mid-350s. Diodorus (16.22.1) stated that Chares' reasons were not personal gain, but to spare the Athenians the expense of maintaining his army. The siege of Chios could not be relieved, and the army could not be brought home. As Pritchett (1974: 78) says, 'we may reasonably assume' that his decision to join the Persian was based on sound strategic sense. There is also evidence that the Athenians approved of the action that Chares took (Diod. 16.22.1). It was not the first time that armies had to subsist on support from other avenues of employment. Even in the Peloponnesian War, soldiers and sailors had to maintain themselves with seasonal farming work while out on campaign, as the Spartan navy crews did in the

summer of 406 BC, also at Chios (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.1). Furthermore, when Artaxerxes asked the Athenians to rein in their general, they did. Like Chabrias and Iphicrates before him, Chares was controlled by the state when the time came. His career, like theirs, demonstrates the influence of Persia at Athens and the fluidity with which powerful mercenary commanders could move between positions.

Ludmilla Marinovic (1988: 289–90) describes Charidemus as typical of a new style of emancipated general in the fourth century. That he was not an Athenian or a Spartan by birth perhaps makes him new, but he shared many of the same associations and the same ability to move freely between these alliances. His early career was littered with friendships towards states and rulers who hated each other, making his diplomatic position complex, but their number suggests that he transferred loyalties with ease. Thus, from 368 to 353 BC he served with the Athenians, the Olynthians, Artabazus the Persian satrap, and both Cotys and Cersobleptes the Thracians. The last of these relationships resulted in his receiving Athenian citizenship in 357 BC. An inscription illustrates that the Athenians awarded him a golden crown and the title of *energetēs* (IG 2.2.118; Pritchett 1974: 80–5). Demosthenes (23.149) painted a rhetorical picture of a man permanently disloyal to the state. Close analysis shows that Charidemus was only a ‘notorious mercenary’ commander before he was awarded Athenian citizenship. One illustration of this notoriety, indicative in itself of the fluid and very personal nature of military associations at the time, occurred in Thrace in 364. Charidemus and his mercenaries had been serving with the Athenians under Iphicrates, but when Timotheus replaced the latter as general, Charidemus joined Cotys. At the time Cotys was not an Athenian enemy and, importantly, Iphicrates was his associate as well. The two commanders shared a connection, perhaps, and when Iphicrates left Athenian service in Thrace, Charidemus followed.

Contrasted with the Demosthenic image of his mercenary military service were his commendations from the Athenian *dēmos*. Ironically, Demosthenes is the source for these (Pritchett 1974: 89). The *dēmos* crowned him three times, according to Demosthenes (18.114; IG 2.1496.28, 32, 36). Pritchett’s conclusions must be taken seriously, that the epigraphic record, Charidemus’ frequent election to the generalship, and the patriotic close to his Athenian career, in which he doggedly opposed the Macedonian threat and fled to the Persian court in 335, should go a long way to discount Demosthenes’ picture of a man permanently disloyal to the Athenians (Pritchett 1974: 89). He died in exile at the Persian king’s court (Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.6). Charidemus, like other Athenian generals, balanced state service and overseas friendship, to his own and his community’s benefit.

Unlike those generals discussed above, Conon was an exile from Athens after his escape from Aegospotami in 405 BC. He resided with Euagoras and later served the Persians in a private capacity, but clearly he had many Athenians with him in the Atheno-Persian fleet and at Cnidus in 394 (Diod. 14.39.1;

see *Hell. Oxy.* 11.1, 12.1–2, 13.1; *Xen. Hell.* 3.5.1–5; *Diod.* 14.81.1; *Plut. Ages.* 15; *Lys.* 2.60). Pausanias (3.9.8) recorded that some Athenians took Persian gold. The Battle of Cnidus destroyed Spartan naval power in the Aegean (*Xen. Hell.* 4.3.10–12; *Diod.* 14.83.4). By his victory at Cnidus Conon did more for Athens than he might have done as an Athenian without Persian assistance (*Diod.* 14.39.3). Conon accepted the command on the grounds that he hoped that he might win great renown and the leadership of the Greeks for his native country. The sources are clear that his motives were patriotic. Conon was not a mercenary, and the actions he took subsequent to his naval victory demonstrate that he and the Persians were keen to put Athens in a stronger strategic position than it had been since the Great Peloponnesian War. In his case international circumstances dictated his actions and relationships. He benefited greatly from his Persian associations and bequeathed a fortune to his son Timotheus.

Timotheus, like his father, served with the Great King Artaxerxes II when he took Persian service in 372 BC (*Dem.* 49.25, 28). Parke (1933: 75) contradicts the evidence and states that Timotheus was not a mercenary and always served Athens. The Demosthenic speech claims that Timotheus fled to Persia to avoid the prosecution, but Pritchett (1974: 4–33) notes the frequency of trials of generals at Athens. Nevertheless, Timotheus enjoyed a long career in Athenian service as well (*Diod.* 15.29–30, 34.3–36; *Xen. Hell.* 5.4.60–6; *Nepos, Tim.* 2). As an Athenian statesman, he played an important part in establishing the second Athenian confederacy between 378 and 373 BC. He was *stratēgos*, capturing Samos and Sestos around 365, before enjoying successes in Thrace and Macedonia from 364 to 362 BC. He served Athens until his exile after a defeat in the Social War of 357–353 BC and his death followed soon thereafter. While his foreign service was not extensive, he, too, was able to use his father's connections to the Persian court and blend a hectic military career for Athens with Persian associations.

In very similar vein to Timotheus, Phocion (known as the Good) took service with the satrap Idrieus, alongside Euagoras of Cyprus, during a busy career for Athens (*Diod.* 16.12). The reputations of Timotheus and Phocion as Athenian statesmen and servants have been second to none. They illustrate the ease with which Athenian statesmen could serve the state as *stratēgos* in one year and an overseas paymaster in the next (*Dem.* 49.6, 28). Timotheus was no sooner in the service of Athens as general in 374/3 BC than the Athenians removed him, and then he set sail for service with the king. Phocion served Idrieus, but returned to Athens for his election as *stratēgos* in 349/8 BC, a point not lost on Parke (1933: 166). The positions of these generals is not as stark as either Pritchett or Parke would see it. They followed the tradition, perhaps established by Lycon, of mixing state with foreign service for their own benefit.

Similarly the struggles against the Macedonians reveal the complexities of patriotism and overseas service. Indeed, Parke (1933: 178, n. 1), following

Didymus (10.55), notes the depth of Athenian involvement with the Persians in the 340s and 330s BC as the two powers tried to snuff out the growing strength of the Macedonians. In 340 BC, the Athenian Apollodorus commanded troops at Perinthus, the last state between the Persian and Macedonian Empires. He was in the service of Arsites, the Persian satrap of Hellenistic Phrygia on the north-western edge of the Persian Empire, who was keen to prevent Philip's drive east. Apollodorus did not die an exile and was buried with civic honours in the Ceramicus (Paus. 1.29.10). His mercenary service and his civic duty happily worked together in fighting against the Macedonians. The Athenians and the Persians collaborated on many campaigns against the Macedonians; even Chares was sent to a meeting with the Persian generals to discuss strategy (Didymus 10.55). Leosthenes was another Athenian patriot and general who had served overseas and found his cause against the Macedonians overlapped with his mercenary service. Many Athenians like him fought with the Persians, the Spartans and finally the Athenians themselves against the Macedonian cause (Diod. 17.25.6; Worthington 1987: 489–91). In the final act of Athenian freedom, Leosthenes' career came full circle as the Athenians commissioned him to collect mercenaries and lead their forces in the Lamian War (Diod. 17.111.3).

Prominent Athenians regularly served overseas in the fourth century BC. All of those for whom there is evidence did so without prosecution by the state. The Athenians did not punish even the seemingly culpable Iphicrates. The mercenary nature of these men must be disputed. Only Chabrias never served a Persian master, but then he had become heavily involved with powerful Egyptians who were almost always Persia's enemies. The Persian role in the affairs of Athens in the fourth century, when viewed from the perspective of these relationships, appears omnipresent. The Persians' perception of the Greeks in this period, used as they were to availing themselves of conquered foreign expertise and innovations, and their ability to request and replace Athenian generals at will, demonstrate their powerful position in the Greek world. Greece was not a satrapy, but it might as well have been.

Importantly, there were Athenians who did not balance their careers between service overseas and service for their home state. Some Athenian commanders fought in Egypt and Persia, but are not attested fighting for their homeland. For example, Diodorus (15.48.2) noted Diophantus the Athenian, also mentioned by Isocrates (*Ep.* 8.8), as being in Asia before 350 BC. Lycon, of course, may well be another example. Men like these must have found foreign service more congenial and more regular than service on behalf of the state. It goes without saying that these men were never powerful nor prominent in Athens. Conversely, there were many prominent Athenians who are not known to have served overseas and no doubt many not so prominent Athenians did not take foreign service either (Pritchett 1974: 104–5). They were not averse to military service, but they were busy with domestic politics. Thrasybulus serves to illustrate the point. He was the enemy of Conon

and he did not serve the Persians. However, personal rivalries within a Greek state did not necessarily prevent men taking service with the same foreign paymaster. Thrasybulus, like Conon, was a patriot and an imperialist who was not opposed to an alliance with Persia if it meant maintaining Athenian power. When Conon returned to Athens from Cnidus and Persian service in 393 BC, Thrasybulus' power waned. There is nothing in the record to suggest that individual Athenians shunned Persian service. Conon demonstrates well that friendship overseas could mean power at home, but Thrasybulus' career is testimony that such friendships were not essential.

Powerful men from other Greek communities regularly found service overseas as well. Known Spartans, like Athenians, were commonly leaders and employers rather than mercenary soldiers. Those Spartans who became roving mercenary commanders were either exiles like Clearchus (Xen. *An.* 1.2.9), or men appointed to lead mercenary troops for the Spartans, sometimes through their *xeniai* connections (Hodkinson 2000: 344–52, esp. 349), like Chirisophus (Xen. *An.* 1.4.3) and Neon, who replaced him (Xen. *An.* 5.6.36). Appointments by the Spartan authorities to lead the mercenaries employed by others seem common (e.g. Diod. 14.78.1–3). Spartans had plenty of experience of leading Peloponnesian Greeks into battle as a result of their hegemony in southern Greece. Spartan kings were not different in this regard from their Athenian counterparts. Plutarch by calling Agesilaus a captain (*lochagos*) of mercenaries was defaming his reputation (Plut. *Ages.* 36). Oddly, Plutarch (*Ages.* 37) later acknowledges that he was there as a representative of the state. Parke (1933: 90) is still more disparaging when he states:

Agesilaos [sic] in his old age had to turn *condottiere* to earn the wherewithal to augment Sparta's military strength and in striving to procure mercenaries he founded for Spartan kings a tradition of mercenary service.

And a little later Parke (*ibid.*: 111) notes that 'he [Agesilaus] persisted in maintaining the elaborate pretence that he was only an ally [of Egypt] and representative of the Spartan state'. It is hard to see that a king of Sparta, with advisers and 1,000 *neodamodeis* hoplites, could be anything but an ally of the power for which he was fighting and a representative of the state he ruled. Agesilaus was allied to the Egyptian cause and therefore not a mercenary. Diodorus (15.90.2) called the Spartans the allies of Tachos (*Lakedaimonious symmachēin*). The Lacedaimonians dispatched Agesilaus with 1,000 hoplites to fight as an ally (Diod. 15.92.2). Xenophon (*Ages.* 2.28–31) claimed that Agesilaus wished to liberate Asia Minor by his alliances in Egypt. Other Spartan commanders served in Egypt (Diod. 15.48.2; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 2.16.1). More still appeared in Sicily with the Spartan ally Dionysius I. These men seem indistinguishable from Gylippus at Syracuse. All the Spartans who

left Laconia did so initially on matters of state. They regularly commanded non-Spartans and mercenaries put under their charge by their state.

The Spartans ran the Peloponnese almost as a recruiting centre, both for themselves and for their allies and friends abroad. State policy and mercenary hiring were intertwined. The Spartans required foreigners to obtain permission from the ephors before hiring in the Peloponnese (Diod. 14.44.1, 58.1). The Spartans sent Chrisophus to Cyrus with 700 men (Xen. *An.* 1.4.3; *Hell.* 2.1.1) and kept Dionysius I supplied with Peloponnesian troops and Spartan advisers throughout his reign. Sparta maintained a close relationship with these advisers, as Dionysius' ability to return such men as displeased him to Sparta for courts martial shows (Diod. 14.78.1–3). The Spartiates acted as advisers, commanders and overseers of Peloponnesians abroad as part of the complex series of networks throughout the Mediterranean by which Spartan power was maintained and by which Peloponnesian soldiers found themselves in mercenary service.

Thebes was no different from the other states. Only Proxenus acted privately in leading a contingent of men on the *anabasis*. Just as the Persians did with Athens, they requested from Thebes the provision of a general and mercenaries for service. Thebes sent Pammenes with mercenaries into Asia. He was not, therefore, necessarily a mercenary (Diod. 16.34.1). He was hired at the behest of Artabazus and he won two victories (Polyaenus, *Strat.* 7.33; Pritchett 1974: 91). Parke (1933: 124) claims that the 5,000 who went with Pammenes were mercenary adventurers because his removal and replacement by Artaxerxes' brother could only have been tolerated by non-Thebans. Demosthenes (23.183) noted that Pammenes may have been with Philip at Maroneia and then later in the Phocian war (*RE* vol. 18 1949: 298). There may have been exceptions, such as the little-known Lacrates who commanded the first contingent at Pelusium for the Egyptians (Diod. 15.49.1). Nothing can be said of this man's ambitions or relationship to his employer and home.

As for the rest of the Greek cities, their prominent statesmen are found commanding mercenaries in no different respects than the Athenians and the Spartans. Corinthian Timoleon commanded mercenaries, but was not himself a mercenary (Diod. 15.65.2). The nature of Corinth's relations with her satellites was a special one involving more control by the Corinthians (Graham 1964: 118–52). The actions of Timoleon were an extension of Corinthian foreign policy. Corinthian commanders of mercenaries acted for the state. The same was true of the Phocian commanders of the multitude of mercenaries gathered for the Sacred War of 356–346 BC. These men were not themselves mercenaries, they were the employers. They were Phocians supporting the Phocian cause. Only after the Battle of the Crocus Field, which resulted in the expulsion from Phocis to the Peloponnese, did Phalaeus, the Phocian commander, have to turn to itinerant mercenary service. This cannot be said about any of his predecessors at Phocis.

The famous Rhodian mercenary leaders Mentor and his brother Memnon, under their Persian masters, reached pinnacles of success in the 340s and 330s BC unparalleled by Greeks previously. Rhodes is situated in the eastern orbit of the Greek world. It is not surprising that men from this part of the world found service with the powerful men of the east. Arrian (*Anab.* 2.1.5) noted the presence of another Rhodian in the Persian King's service as commander of the garrison at Mytilene. The family's ties overseas began with Artabazus, with whom Memnon went into exile at Philip's court after the failure of the satrap's revolt (Diod. 15.51.3). Mentor took service with a rebellious Egyptian ruler (Diod. 15.45.1). This Egyptian sent Mentor to Temmes of Sidon, along with the men under his command. Almost immediately, Temmes died and Mentor appeared in Persian service (Diod. 15.50.7). Mentor became very powerful in the service of the Great King, especially in recruiting Greek mercenaries and through his relationship with Bagoas. The Great King saw the skills demonstrated by Mentor and promoted him (Diod. 15.52.1). His influence in Persia was enough to reinstate his brother and brother-in-law (Diod. 16.50.7). Memnon was as successful as his brother had been. Darius considered him one of his best commanders (Diod. 17.7.2). He put him in charge of the campaign against Alexander after the Battle of Granicus, and his death was a serious blow to the Persian cause (Diod. 17.29.1).

The two Rhodians led large numbers of men employed for a Persian king. They had more power than any Greek general could hope to exercise within an individual *polis*, even perhaps in Athens at its height in the fifth century. Memnon became the second most important man in the Persian Empire. His domains were the same as those held by the Great King's brother Cyrus, almost seventy years before. Had he been a Lydian or Mede, would he have been seen as a mercenary general instead of the less glamorous reality of being a servant and friend of the King? The story of Esther is enlightening, for Mordecai, a Hebrew, rose to become the second most important man in the Persian Empire in the time of Xerxes (Esther 8.1–10). Memnon and Mentor were from an eastern Mediterranean island within the Persian orbit, following the best available option for their personal success. They became much more than just mercenary generals; they became, like the Athenian generals and the Spartan kings, powerful statesmen in their own right. As the eastern Mediterranean became more a part of the Persian Empire and the Near East, generally, so Greeks are found, as Momigliano (1975: 125) writes, 'at practically every level in the expansion of the Persian State'.

In conclusion, the mercenary commander was a more complex figure than a *condottiere*. In addition, many powerful men in the Greek communities of the later fifth and fourth centuries were more than just pawns of their *poleis*. Most of the Athenians served their state with more loyalty and regularity than the modern image of a mercenary adventurer would permit. Before the Delian League and the Athenian Empire Athenian aristocrats made money overseas. The Alcmaeonidae and Philaïdae had strong connections

with the Hellespont in the later sixth century BC. The empire of the fifth century was able to occupy all levels of society in work and offer lucrative rewards politically and economically. There was no need for dynastic connections because the *polis*, with its attached empire, was the only dynasty that was of any value at that time. With the fall of this empire, the aristocrats, particularly, needed foreign connections once again. These connections could be forged through military service as generals overseas. Just as Miltiades forged successful bonds with Hellespontine despots in the later sixth century, so the generals did the same in the fourth on a much wider level. They served the Athenians loyally for the same reason that they went overseas: they wanted power based on the money and allies they could make abroad, but power that they could equally wield at home.

Xenia and philia

Alcibiades no doubt thought that a relationship with the Persian satrap Tissaphernes in 411 BC would return him to favour and prominence in Athenian politics (Thuc. 8.47.2). Thucydides made him claim to the Athenian trierarchs that he could gain them the friendship (*philia*) of Tissaphernes, the powerful Persian satrap, and subsequently the Great King (Thuc. 8.48.1, 50.1, 2, 52.1). Friendship of powerful people either to a state or to individuals clearly meant a great deal to those who had secured it. Herman postulates that Alcibiades considered that the state's best interests and his own were coextensive.⁷ Many Athenian aristocrats would have thought in the same way. The Classical Greek aristocrats continued to have friends across the boundaries of the *polis*, even though at the time the *polis* had become the principal indicator of identity amongst the Greeks. Herman sees the struggle between aristocrats and the *dēmos* of the *poleis* as one of class relationships, but regards traditional aristocratic relationships between nobles as crucial to diplomatic activity throughout the *polis* period. Mercenary service was part of this struggle. Aristocrats led less well connected, non-aristocratic men from their own and other Greek communities for the advantage of their friends abroad. Mercenary relationships, therefore, crossed the boundaries of class between elite and poor within Greek communities, and *polis* boundaries between aristocrats and the rulers in the wider eastern Mediterranean.

At the heart of both these mercenary relationships between the nobility and the poor and between noble leaders were friendship (*philia*) and the ritualized friendship (*xenia*) of powerful outsiders. At the dawn of Greek mercenary service in the seventh century, Archilochus sang the words, 'Glaukus, an *epikouros* man is a friend [*philos*] as long as he fights' (Lavelle's translation), and thus associated friendship with the fighter-alongside (Lavelle 1997: 236; West 1993: 14). As Lavelle perceptively suggests, perhaps Archilochus understood the reality of the relationship. Thus he highlighted the ambiguity of the *epikouros* as *philos*. *Philia* (friendship) was more than a passing

acquaintance. In Athenian society, one's friends, along with one's family, provided the basis of one's status in the city. Barry Strauss (1986: 26), following Robert Connor (1971: 35–84, esp. 39; Xen. *Mem.* 2.6), notes that friends (*philoí*) referred to 'one's own people': a group who set out to help one another politically and privately. He states that '[a]n Athenian entered politics to help his *philoí* and to hurt his enemies'. This mentality functioned in both public and private life. Strauss recognizes the proximity in this relationship to the small and very political dinner clubs (*hetairiai*) discussed above in their connection to mercenary service overseas. *Hetairiae*, like *philiai*, represented non-shifting permanent alliances. There was no need for equality between *philoí* (Strauss 1986: 27). Thus, friendships within the city were the basis of patron–client relationships. Powerful men looked after the interests of the weak. It was just this kind of relationship that enabled the wealthy to bring men with them from within their own communities for military service overseas. As we have seen, networks based on earlier relationships formed within their native communities brought mercenary armies together (e.g. Xen. *An.* 6.4.8). Even the peltasts from Thrace with the *anabasis* expedition, who deserted at the first opportunity after the death of Cyrus at Cunaxa, may well have been connected by more than mercenary interests. Jan Best (1969: 54–5; Xen. *An.* 2.2.7; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.2–5, 3.2.8–10; Diod. 14.38.3, 6–7) argues that the peltasts were from the Odrysae, a tribe friendly to Clearchus and the Spartans during the Peloponnesian War, and Spartan allies later on in 399 BC. Their desertion appears cynical, but their relationship to the Greeks was more than simply mercenary convenience. Other evidence shows that friends served together overseas from the same city (Isae. 4.18). The speaker was keen to point out that the opposing claimant and the dead man, who were both mercenaries in service together in some capacity, were not *philoí*.

Philia could cross the boundaries of the *poleis*. Among employers and the mercenaries they commanded, there is plenty of evidence of *philiae*. Cyrus had friendships in the Greek world. These friendships might extend to an entire polity. The Lacedaimonians, for example, owed him a debt of gratitude for his role in the Ionian War (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.1). J. R. Wilson (1989: 147–51), following Thucydides (7.57.1–2), suggests that friends (*philoí*) stood at one end of an axis and wage-earning mercenaries (*misthophoroi*) stood at the other, in Thucydides' perception. But this is too stark a contrast for all wage-earning mercenaries. We have seen that many mercenaries had deep-rooted relationships with the men they followed and those who fought with them. Xenophon's description of the men with Cyrus demonstrates that the over-riding importance of friendship cannot be ignored. Friendship (*philia*) played a major role in all of the relationships of those on the *anabasis*. To Xenophon, Cyrus' friendship was better than any monthly wage (Xen. *An.* 1.9.17). Several times Xenophon made people claim the value of Cyrus' friendship (Xen. *An.* 1.3.6, 3.12, 4.15, 5.11–2; 3.1.4).

The other generals on the *anabasis* campaign would have to agree with

Xenophon's conclusion about the significance of Cyrus' friendship. Xenophon (*An.* 2.6.17) stated that 'Proxenus through the friendship [*philia*] with the foremost men of his day, was able to hold his own in conferring benefits'. Proxenus even told Xenophon that the friendship (*philia*) of Cyrus was worth more to him than his native state (*Xen. An.* 3.1.4). In order to get the wealth he desired, Menon set out to befriend the most powerful men of the day who could no doubt protect him from those he had abused. Xenophon (*An.* 2.6.21) stated that Menon, in order to get great wealth, 'desired to be a friend [*philos*] of the most powerful men of his day in order to commit unjust deeds without suffering the penalty'. His family had once established an ancestral friendship with the Great King (*Pl. Menon* 78d). Nowhere is the importance of *philia* better illustrated than in the speeches by Clearchus (*Xen. An.* 1.3.3–6; 3.3.9–12). One (*Xen. An.* 2.5.14) delivered to Tissaphernes expatiated at length about the possibilities of friendship with Cyrus and then continues as follows:

Again take those who dwell around you. If you were to be the friend of any you would be the greatest possible friend while if any were to annoy you, you would play the part of master over all of them in case you had us for supporters, for we should serve you not for the sake of pay but for gratitude we should feel, and rightly feel, toward you, the man who saved us.

In the Greek sources, the Great King also had *philoi*. Cyrus noted that the satraps of Persia were the King's friends (*Xen. An.* 1.7.7). Mentor the Rhodian, in being promoted, was raised above all of the other *philoi* of the Great King (*Diod.* 16.52.1–3). Clearly friends, in a Persian context, meant something more than a passing acquaintance. Friendship of the King recognized an official and an honorary relationship. Olmstead (1948: 290) notes that Themistocles was granted the status of friend of the Great King as a purely 'honorary title'. Mentor, as a friend of the King, did him services. Diodorus (16.50.7) noted that one of these services was recruiting men for military service from among the Greeks. At the root of the Rhodian's success was his relationship with Artabazus, a Persian satrap. This relationship enabled him to move into a closer relationship with the King (*Dem.* 23.157). Demosthenes noted that the good fortune (*eutychia*) of both brothers was the result of their relationship through marriage with the satrap. It should be noted that Persian kings and their families were forbidden to marry foreigners of any status. This would have been another factor making close relations with the King's court difficult.

The Persians, therefore, were not alone in having these connections of friendship abroad. Among other dynasties, the term *betairoi*, or companions, was common. Dion had a group of companions (*betairoi*) who accompanied him to Sicily from the Greek mainland (*Plut. Dion*, 22). Diodorus describes

Philistus, the commander of Dionysius' mercenaries, as 'the most faithful of the dynast's friends' (Diod. 16.16.3). The best illustrations of this outside Persia are the *betairoi* of the family of Philip and Alexander. The sources are clear that the Greek companions enjoyed a special status with the Macedonian court. Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 frag. 225) wrote of these men unfavourably in a classic illustration of the relationship between money and foreign friendships that had made Philip so powerful in the Greek cities.

If there was any man in Greece or among the barbarians who was perverted or shameless in habits they were all assembled before Philip in Macedon and called Companions [*betairoi*] of the King. Philip had no respect for men who were self restrained in habits and cared for their private lives, but he honoured and promoted the extravagants, the alcoholics and the gamblers. So he not only made them like this, but he even made them athletes in other wicked and loathsome behaviour. What shameful or frightful quality did they lack, what honourable or earnest quality did they possess? Some, though shaven and smoothed, went on being men, while others though bearded dared to have relations with each other. They would take round two or three male prostitutes [*betairouomenoi*], while they themselves performed for others the same services as these performed for them. Wherefore one might justly reckon them not Companions, but Companionesses, call them not soldiers [*stratiôtai*], but brothel-men [*chamaitipoi*]: they were men killers by nature, but men-kissers by habit.

Alexander had *philoï* who were Macedonians (Diod. 16.94.4, 17.37.3), and Nearchus of Crete even commanded in Alexander's navy on the journey from Indus to Babylon.⁸

Thus, friendships (*philiae*) worked with *polis* relationships, facilitating mercenary service and enabling men to have contact overseas through those whose power and status exploited pre-existing family connections. At the end of the *Anabasis*, Xenophon enables only his friends, ordinary soldiers though many of them were, to gain some plunder on a special mission (Xen. *An.* 7.8.11). *Philia* functioned on several levels across boundaries of status within cities and within armies, and across boundaries of polity, facilitating mercenary service.

We have seen previously how ritualized friendships (*xeniai*) facilitated mercenary service in several ways. Xenophon called all but one of Cyrus' Greek contacts *xenoi*. Clearchus, while he was the exception, still called himself a *xenos* of Cyrus in a speech to the Greeks. Often little but context distinguished being a ritualized friend (*xenos*) and having someone's friendship (*philia*). Proxenus and Xenophon were themselves *xenoi*, and Proxenus promised that he would make Xenophon a *philos* of Cyrus (Xen. *An.* 3.1.4). *Xenia*,

like *philia*, features so commonly in mercenary relationships that its importance cannot be overlooked. Both terms must have a relationship here. In the fourth century BC, a job done by a *xenos*, on account of *philia*, was recruiting mercenaries and doing military service. Thus, the *philoí* of the Great King recruited mercenaries. Although we should not underestimate the power of money, *philia* and *xenia* were also inextricably intertwined in mercenary relationships in the Classical Greek world.

International politics

The cities viewed mercenary service as an extension of personal politics at home. Conon was not only exonerated for his Persian service, but even rewarded with a statue in the Agora. Cnidus was not an Athenian victory in spite of the presence of notable Athenians and an Athenian admiral (Lys. 2.60; *Hell. Oxy.* 2.1). Mercenary friendships created bonds beyond the domestic political realm and extended into foreign politics. Nicias received slanderous insults as the *misthótos* of Chabrias in Egypt (Dem. 19.287). Such hirelings must have had connections with Chabrias at home, and these were probably political connections. The slander they received came not for their service abroad, mercenary or otherwise, but because of their political enmities at home. The brothers in Isaeus 2 speak casually of travelling to Thrace with Iphicrates. Nicostratus fought abroad for eleven years but maintained enough connections in Athens to warrant a case over his property in the city's courts (Isae. 4). Above all, Astyphilus exemplifies the upright man who served his country and others without the need for excuse (Isae. 9). Herman (1987: 116–18) makes much of Alcibiades' example. Alcibiades was an aristocrat who, treacherously to modern nationalist eyes, floated from one allegiance to another. Herman argues that his behaviour was consistent with aristocratic ethics and he remained loyal to his 'class'.

The connections of mercenaries and their relationship to their various polities went far beyond the expediency of war and the moment. All the prominent Greek *poleis* traded in mercenaries between each other and the peoples of the eastern Mediterranean. The Athenians provided specific generals for the Persians at the Persians' request. Thebes and Argos did the same, and it has been illustrated above that the various overseas adventures of the Spartan kings were part of a state policy to increase Spartan income in order, ironically, to pay for mercenaries at home by serving abroad. Even non-royal Spartans who served in Sicily maintained strict ties with their *polis* (e.g. Plut. *Dion.* 48). There is nothing to suggest that the Spartan commanders of Dionysius' mercenaries were different in their role to that played by Gylippus in Syracuse's hours of need (Plut. *Dion.* 49). Dionysius was an ally of the Spartans who, even in their direst moments during the upheavals of the 360s BC, and in recognition, no doubt, for the help the Spartans had given him in recruiting mercenaries from the Peloponnese, remained loyal to

them (e.g. Diod. 14.58.1). Mercenary service was one way of cementing alliances and establishing inter-state relationships.

In the days before the mercenary explosion of the later fifth and fourth centuries BC, Arcadian nobles had relationships with Sicilian tyrants, and the Alcmaeonidae had a special relationship with Croesus and with Clisthenes of Sicyon. The Philaïdae had relations with Thracian princes, as did the Pisis-tratidae. During the years of the empire Athenians had no need for connections overseas. When the empire fell these connections were re-established. Significantly, families were involved in mercenary service to specific dynasties. Conon and his son Timotheus both served the Great King. The brothers Memnon and Mentor did also. Ian Worthington has argued that the father of the Athenian Leosthenes, a known mercenary in Persian service, had also served as a commander in Persia (Worthington 1987: 489–91). Iphicrates' son by the same name appeared on an embassy to the Persian King during Alexander's invasion (Arr. *Anab.* 2.15.2). These family connections enabled employers to tap into already established and trusted relationships for service.

The employer provided everything for the mercenary. Without the employer, the mercenary had no service. As Cyrus illustrates, the future goodwill of a powerful man meant everything to the men in his service. The opportunity to serve a great man was worth more than wages. Once a mission had been achieved the rewards might never stop. The reciprocity of the relationship can be summed up by the words of Xenophon, acting himself both as commander and as benefactor. He hoped that he could bring some benefit to his men and, as the men said to him (Xen. *An.* 7.1.21):

Now is your opportunity, Xenophon, to prove yourself a man. You have this great number of men. Now, should you so wish, you should render us a service and we should make you great [*megas*].

The potential uses and power of mercenary armies were seen in the fourth century BC. The relationships which cut across societies and states in the eastern Mediterranean leave little doubt that, at home and abroad, mercenary service was an integral part of the complex international world.

CONCLUSIONS

This book has concentrated on the Greek mercenary soldier in the later Archaic and Classical ages. Mercenaries became prolific in this period in several avenues of warfare. Firstly, naval warfare provided livelihoods for thousands of poor men in the fleets of Athens, Persia and Sparta. Naval warfare helped to influence land wars by monetization and sustained military campaigning. As warfare became more common and prolonged, so the cities of the Greeks and the autocrats of the east demanded increasing numbers of specialists in their armies, thus providing a second avenue for mercenary service. Finally, at the beginning of the fifth century, Greek hoplites had established themselves as the principal shock troops in any army in the Mediterranean, with the result that demand for Greek heavily armed troops grew in this period. There was, therefore, an explosion in the numbers of mercenaries in the later fifth and fourth centuries BC. Demand drove this explosion. Constant warfare and growing instability in the whole Mediterranean region provided the context for this demand. Tyrants emerged at this time in the Greek cities of Sicily, and Persian satraps grew increasingly independent over regions of an unstable Persian Empire. These rulers willingly employed men from outside the states they ruled, to support their regimes and to wage aggressive wars. Mercenaries were a central feature of politics and warfare in the fourth century.

Despite the ubiquity of the mercenary, he remained an ambiguous figure in Greek ideology. He was both a foreigner and a specialist. Foreigners were always perceived as potentially dangerous, while specialists conflicted with the ideal of the citizen-soldier-landholder of the Classical *polis*. But ideals did not prevent thousands of men from becoming mercenaries and did not prohibit the Greek states from hiring them. The ambiguity of the mercenary in the Greek conception is reflected in the different terms that the Greeks had for soldiers who served foreign powers. The euphemistic and Archaic fighter-alongside (*epikouros*) and ritualized guest-friend (*xenos*) were replaced by more accurate terms like wage-earner (*misthophoros*) and foreign wage-earner (*xenos misthophoros*) in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. Monetization underlay these new terms. In the fifth century BC Athenian citizens received

wages in coin (*misthos*) for both civil and military state service. They were called wage-earners or *misthophoroi*. The Athenian empire flooded the Aegean with money, thanks primarily to naval warfare's consumption of coins. Monetization and the large mercenary armies that appeared at the end of the fifth century went hand-in-hand.

The employers paid mercenaries through a variety of methods and types of pay. There were three principal kinds of payment: food (*sitos*), money for food (*sitêresion*) and money (*misthos*). In addition, booty was paramount. Employers wanted it to defray the costs of wages and men wanted it for the wealth it could provide. The amount of money paid to mercenaries is debated. Cyrus paid a drachma a day to his Greeks in 401 BC, while Demosthenes (4.28–9) suggested only a third of this amount as food money (and no pay) half a century later. The general provision of what may have been poor pay, however, was interspersed with periods of relative prosperity, for example during the Third Sacred War, 355–346 BC, when Phocian generals paid double the regular wage. However, determining a going rate or any relationship to cost of living is problematic, and it is impossible to determine how much was a good daily wage. Most mercenaries existed in service for years. Many must have hoped for a big haul of booty, but most probably never gained enough to leave the profession.

Greek mercenaries were a social as well as an economic phenomenon. They came from every stratum of society and every region of the Greek world. Desperate exiles fought alongside men who had land and status in their own communities to which they hoped to return. By far the greatest number of mercenaries in service outside the Greek mainland came from the Peloponnese, and most of these were hoplites. Poverty and political instability in Greece, and the rewards that employers could provide, contributed to Greeks seeking service abroad. But the reason for the great number of Greeks in service outside their communities in the fourth century BC was that employers needed men to fight for them. The political destabilization of both Sicily and Anatolia created this need. Hence, employers sought Greek hoplites, specifically Peloponnesians, for service. Greek cities replete with hoplite forces sought specialist light troops in return.

Mercenary service was an integral and accepted part of international and domestic society and politics. *Poleis* and generals made connections overseas by providing and leading mercenary armies for powerful rulers abroad. Within these armies, there were state and brotherhood-style organizations that reflected social groups from the soldiers' original communities. In many cases, men fought alongside members of their original communities, and fathers fought alongside sons. Mercenary service had strong connections with ritualized friendships (*xeniai*), which facilitated many mercenary relationships. Friendship (*philia*) also had close connections with and played an important role in overseas service. Aristocratic Greeks made friends abroad through military alliance. The power and money that they gained overseas

CONCLUSIONS

they then used at home or, if the rewards were greater, they turned them into political capital outside their states. Men from relatively small *poleis* as well as Athens or Sparta could hope for good opportunities in service with the wealthy dynasts of the east. The power of Memnon the Rhodian is testimony to the position that those involved in ostensibly mercenary activity could achieve.

The phenomenon of overseas connections that satisfied domestic ambitions is exemplified by the history of Athens in the period. When Athens had an empire during the fifth century BC, aristocratic families worked within the state as part of the state's apparatus. As long as the empire remained powerful their ambitions and desires were satiated. They did not need connections with overseas dignitaries, familial or otherwise. In contrast, during the periods before and after the Athenian hegemony, Athenian statesmen married into families of high status abroad and served foreign powers prolifically. Links to mercenaries and mercenary service were central to these relationships.

Mercenary service then influenced and reflected every aspect of military, political, economic and social relationships in the Mediterranean world of the fifth and fourth centuries BC. Indeed, as a theme from the Archaic age to the era of Alexander, mercenary service was and remains a central feature of Greek history.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

- 1 Hans van Wees (2001: 45–71) recently discusses the context and mythology of these status groups in ancient societies and their relationship to military service. See also Rosivach (2002).
- 2 Finley (1973: 172–3) claims that empire and economic activity and wealth are strongly intertwined. The point is best made by Jenkins (1972: 175) and Williams (1976: 22).
- 3 Dalby (1992) centres on the importance of eating habits to community in the *Anabasis*; see also Trundle (1999) on identity and community among mercenaries.
- 4 For examples see Nussbaum (1967); Roy (1967); Seibt (1977); Marinovic (1988); McKechnie (1989); Krasilnikoff (1993).
- 5 On Xenophon's *Anabasis* see Parke (1933: 23–42); Anderson (1970); Cawkwell (1972); Perlman (1976–7: 241–84); Higgins (1977); Rahe (1982); Hirsch (1985); Briant (1996a); Iapichino (1999); Tuplin (1999).
- 6 On Diodorus see Hammond (1937); Drews (1962); Gray (1987); Westlake (1987); Markle (1994); Stylianou (1998); and for a negative appraisal of Diodorus as neither an original writer nor a conscientious copyist see Jane Hornblower (1981: 18–27). On Plutarch see most recently Lamberton (2001).
- 7 See also Campbell (1967: 136); Bettalli (1995: 106); and recently Lavelle (1997: 235–9) who questions the assumption that Archilochus was really a mercenary.
- 8 See Snodgrass (1964b: 107–18); Bettalli (1995: 110); Lavelle (1997: 261).
- 9 Salmon (1977: 93–101) argues that the tyrants had the latent support of the hoplites and also (1997) discusses the violence of tyrannical rule in the Archaic period.
- 10 Diod. 11.48.3, 53.3, 67.5–7, 72.3. In general, see Demand (1993); and Luraghi (1994: 278–373).
- 11 See Aristotle (*Pol.*, 1285a35); Bowra (1936: 160); Brown (1983); West (1993: 12–13); Knapp (2002).
- 12 Herodotus (3.140) relates the story in which Darius the Great claimed that he had no need of Greeks and few men from Greece came to him for service.
- 13 Herodotus (5.30–1 and 34) told how Aristagoras spent all of his money (*chrēmata*) on war. Most of this was presumably used for paying soldiers whom he had hired.
- 14 On the professional and specialised forces within *poleis* in the later fifth and fourth centuries BC see Marrou (1948: 69–70); Reinmouth (1952); Dow (1960); Munn (1993: 189); Burckhardt (1996: 47–71).
- 15 See Burn (1988: 347–8); Carlier (1996). Many years ago Cary (1932: 6–9) stated

- 'Antipater broke with the principle of Philip and frankly converted the Greeks from allies to subjects'. For a clear view of the complexities of the fourth century BC see Rhodes (1994b: 565–91).
- 16 See Griffith (1935: 41); McKechnie (1989: 204–12); Billows (1990: 245–50); Lund (1992: 155–60).
- 17 On the armies of the Hellenistic monarchs and mercenaries see Parke (1933: 206–26); Griffith (1935); Bar-Kochva (1976: 20–53); Austin (1986); Lewis (1986); Launey (1987); Billows (1990: 292–305 and 1995: 146–82); Foulon (1995). See *OGIS* I.266 for an inscription outlining a contractual relationship between mercenaries and King Eumenes of Pergamum, and for discussion of *OGIS* I.266, see Griffith (1935: 172–3).

1 IMAGES AND SOURCES

- 1 For good discussions on this subject see Kallet-Marx (1993); Gabrielsen (1994: 105–25).
- 2 Parke does not cite Plutarch, but could easily have done so, as he (*Sol.* 15. 2–3) noted that the Athenians used euphemisms to cover up the 'ugliness' (*dyschereias*) of things with more attractive terms: thus, prostitutes (*pornai*) are called companions (*betairiai*).
- 3 See Tagliamonte (1994: 28); Bettalli (1995: 24); and for references see Lavelle (1989: 36 and 1997: 232–3; *Hom. Il.* 2.130, 815; 3.188, 451, 456; 5.473, 477, 478, 491; 6.111, 227; 7.348, 368, 477; 8.497; 9.233; 10.420; 11.220, 564; 12.61, 101, 108; 13.755; 16.538; 17.14, 212, 220, 335, 362; 18.229). Note that Homer (*Iliad*, 4.379) referred to a plea made to Mycenae to provide *epikouroi* to Tydeus against Thebes, and later (21.431) to Aphrodite as the *epikouros* of Ares.
- 4 See Lattimore (1962: 2.130, 815; 3.188, 451, 456; 5.473, 477, 478, 491; 6.111, 227; 7.348, 368, 477; 8.497; 9.233; 10.420; 11.220, 564; 12.61, 101, 108; 13.755; 16.538; 17.14, 212, 220, 335, 362; 18.229).
- 5 See Parke (1933: 188–90), Griffith (1935: 16 and 29) and Arrian (*Anab.* 3.9.4, 12.2, 13.3–4).
- 6 Parke notes this transition briefly by citing the replacement of helper with 'wage earning peltast', while Bettalli (1995: 26) states that *epikouros* is not a good term for a mercenary.
- 7 The appearance of coinage in the Greek world hinges upon the interpretation of the hoard found at Ephesus c. 560 BC. For discussion see Will (1954: 209–31); Cook (1958: 257–62); Kraay (1964); Finley (1973: 166–9); Humphreys (1979: 14–17); Wallace (1987); Burke (1992: 213); Martin (1996); von Reden (1997).
- 8 On raiders and other plunderers see Ormerod (1924); Jackson (1973); McKechnie (1989: 101–41). Most recently, Philip de Souza (2000: 2) makes the point that the terms referred to plunderers by land or sea.
- 9 See Herodotus (2.152–4); Lloyd (1975: 14–23); Bettalli (1995: 58); Lavelle (1997: 250); but note that Diodorus (1.66.12) had the pharaoh summon them from Anatolia.
- 10 Burchett and Roebuck (1977: 179) note that the French Revolution and the American War of Independence were the catalysts for a major change in attitude towards the mercenary. Mockler (1985: 4–5) cites the fact that the British used German and native 'mercenaries' as the primary agents to suppress the colonists, and this explains American distaste for mercenary service.
- 11 Section 959 of the US Code, title 18, under the heading, 'Enlistment in Foreign Service'.

- 12 Dalloz (1968–9: Article 135, loi 15 Juin, 1951, article 99). Belgium makes foreign enlistment illegal in its Code Pénal. Oddly, Sweden does not prohibit enlistment overseas, but does not prohibit recruitment on Swedish territory provided that the monarch gives permission for such service.
- 13 Mockler (1985: 13). The French Code Pénal, Article 85, prohibits recruitment for overseas service on French soil, but does not seem to have any reference that prevents French nationals enlisting for such service. No Frenchman has ever been charged with this offence despite occasions, notably in the mid-1970s, when they could have been.
- 14 Burchett and Roebuck (1977: 209) make the point that the war in Angola in particular ‘shattered once and for all the myth of the “Soldier of Fortune” with its catalogue of sadism and butchery, racism and stupidity, military incompetence and vainglory, lies and cheating and plain unmistakable cowardice and desertion of mates’.
- 15 Best exemplified by Rhodesia whose declining manpower, struggle to maintain white supremacy, and war against the communist regime in Angola relied heavily on a pool of white mercenaries from western Europe.
- 16 See <http://www.sandline.com> (accessed 14 October 2003).
- 17 The ancient sources abound with stories concerned with this relationship. For examples see Homer (*Il.* 12.310–21) for the integral relationship of social and economic status to the battlefield; Herodotus (1.30) relates in the mouth of Solon the story of Tellus, the world’s happiest man (*olbiôtatos*), who died in battle for his city-state.
- 18 On Diodorus see Drews (1962); Gray (1987); Westlake (1987); Sacks (1990: 3–8, *passim*); Parker (2001); and for a negative evaluation of Diodorus as neither an original writer nor a conscientious copyist, see Jane Hornblower (1981: 18–27).

2 WHAT MOTIVATED GREEK MERCENARY SERVICE?

- 1 For a discussion of Herodotus and these Greeks in Egypt see Alan B. Lloyd (1975: 14–23).
- 2 See Krasilnikoff (1993: 78) and Trundle (1998). Sally Humphreys (1979) argues that wage-earning and coinage had significant effects on the Athenian economy in the late fifth century. Sainte Croix (1981: 182) claims that Greek mercenary service was the first example of large-scale hired labour in antiquity.
- 3 See Plato (*Lach.* 182a–e) for the best illustration of how little skill was needed to perform well in hoplite battle. See also Snodgrass (1967 [1999]: 48–77); Wheeler (1982: 224); Hanson (1989: 29, 32–8 and 1995: 305–6); Bettalli (1995: 102–3). There are those who disagree with the view that hoplite warfare and the *aspis* did not require training, among whom are Frazer (1942); Cawkwell (1978: 150–3). Plato (*Rep.* 374d) is the only primary evidence that implies strong support for this latter position.
- 4 Tarn (1948: 112) regards the decree as an act of wisdom and statesmanship, while Badian (1961: 27) and Hamilton (1973: 136–7) are more critical regarding its implementation. The decree can be related to the wanderers of Asia who posed a threat to peace. It may also have been designed to give those in the disbanded armies of the satraps somewhere to go. Badian notes the numbers of mercenaries returning to the Greek mainland as a growing problem. Alexander may have acted to disrupt the internal politics of the Greek cities by asking them to take back their exiles (Bosworth 1988: 223).

4 HIRING GREEK MERCENARIES

- 1 Peter Krentz (1985: 55) notes that Homer uses *otheo* and *othismos* in his battle scenes, but denies that this indicates hoplite warfare. It is worth mentioning that Frazer (1942), in an article entitled 'The Myth of the Phalanx Scrimmage', argues that the evidence cited here does not indicate hoplite warfare, but is merely conventional military terminology. To Frazer, the concept that hoplite warfare was like a rugby scrum is false. Instead, the rear ranks of the phalanx were reserves who prevented a break-through in the front line and continually replaced the army's front line.

5 NETWORKS AND RELATIONSHIPS

- 1 Nussbaum (1967: 32) following Xenophon (*An.* 3.4.21, 4.8.15) notes that the *lochos* of 100 men was led by the *lochagos*. Note that a *lochos* clearly was not officially set at 100. Other references have different numbers. Polyaeus (*Strat.* 2.5.1) and Diodorus (15.34.2) note the *hieros lochos* of Thebes was 300 strong. The *lochos* of the Spartan army was very much larger at 640 men, two of which made up a *mora* in Xenophon's day (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.30, 4.20, 5.10). See Lazenby (1985: 5–7, 10) for discussion. It is not certain, however, how many *lochoi* were always in the Spartan *mora*. Xenophon (*Lac. Pol.* 11.4) claims that there were four *lochagoi*, and therefore four *lochoi*, in each *mora* and as he also attests that there were sixteen *enômotarchoi*, the implication is that there were 160 men in each Spartan *lochos*. Elsewhere (*Lac. Pol.* 11.5), he illustrates there were *prôtostatai* and *archontes*, officers and leaders, in the Spartan army. Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.4.20, 5.10) suggests there were twelve *lochoi* in the Spartan army and (in *Lac. Pol.* 11.4, 13.4 and *Hell.* 3.1.28, 2.16) he attested the presence of *lochagoi* in the Spartan army.
- 2 *Xen. An.* 3.1.47, for Xenophon the general; 4.2.13, for Amphicrates the *lochagos*; 5.6.14, for Ariston the *presbeus* (ambassador); 7.3.28, for Gnesipus the *lochagos*; 6.5.11, for Phrasias commanding a *taxis*; 4.5.24, for Polycrates the *lochagos*; 3.3.20, for Lycius the *hipparchos*; *Xen. An.* 4.2.13, for the Athenian Cephisodorus who was not an officer.
- 3 The Athenians elected their generals, rather than drawing them by lot, from the ten tribes. Xenophon laments, by analogy, their lack of training (*Xen. Mem.* 1.5.1–5). Spartan practice is more revealing, as Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.8.21, 5.2.24) maintained that the Lacedaimonians sent out (*sunekpempô*, *ekpempô*) or sent (*pempô*) (*Hell.* 3.1.4) and appointed (*ephistemi*) (*Hell.* 4.8.21) their officers. It is not known how Spartan officers were appointed. Xenophon may mean the assembly appointed them. On occasion, however, the ephors were involved in sending out harmosts (*Xen. Hell.* 4.8.32). Even the radical democracy at Athens recognized the need for the election and retention of individual generals.
- 4 See Pritchett (1974: 63). References to Iphicrates in the service of the state from the 390s to the 350s are as follows: *Xen. Hell.* 4.4.9; Orosius, 3.1.21; Diod. 14.91.2–3; *Xen. Hell.* 4.5.13; Dem. 13.22, 3.198; Aisch. 3.243; Deinarchus, 1.75; Paus. 3.10.1. Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.5.19; 5.1.25) noted that Iphicrates became *stratêgos* in the 380s (see also Diod. 14.9.2). Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.2.13) had him at Corcyra, replacing Timotheus, in 373/2 BC. The Athenians compelled him to return after 371 BC and the ratification of King's Peace (*Xen. Hell.* 6.4.1, 5.49). Iphicrates returned to command against Epaminondas (Nepos 11.3.2) and was again *stratêgos* in 368 BC. Demosthenes (23.149) noted that Charidemus served under him with a band of mercenaries. Aischines (2.28–9) described some of his actions during the Social War in the 350s.

- 5 Chabrias served the state from the 390s to the 360s and the references to this service are as follows: Demosthenes (4.24) stated that he commanded mercenaries in the 390s. He commanded Athenian peltasts in 379 BC (Nepos 12.2.2; Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.14). Diodorus (15.34.3) claimed that he won the Battle of Naxos in 376 BC. Chabrias was sent to Corinth to replace Iphicrates. He commanded at victories at Euboea and the Cyclades. Demosthenes (20.76) stated that he was in charge of Athenians at Thebes. Chabrias was with Athenians when he defeated Epaminondas at Corinth. An inscription (*IG* II(2) 111) illustrates he was *stratēgos* in 363/2 BC.
- 6 As *stratēgos* he assisted Phleious against Argos. He transferred to Oropus in the same year, 366 BC. He later appeared at Cenchreai in the Corinthia with a fleet. In 361 BC he was appointed to succeed Leosthenes at Peparethus. In the Social War, he was with the Athenian expedition to Euboea, next in the Chersonesus, and, finally, he fought in a battle off Chios.
- 7 Gabriel Herman (1987: *passim*, especially p. 116) refers to Alcibiades. Herman is of particular relevance for the notion of what is called 'ritualized friendship' or more commonly guest-friendship, but see also Mitchell (1997: 180). For the important role of *xeniai* and Spartan relationships see Hodkinson (2000: 344–52).
- 8 Billows (1990: 246) notes an interesting exercise in cross-cultural exchange which saw *betairoi* replace *philoi* within the Hellenistic courts. See McKechnie (1989: 204–12) for a general discussion of Greek *philoi* after Alexander.

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